Replace DM-wrapped VouchGrant with HPKE (RFC 9180) per-recipient wrappers in the voucher's bio post. Recipient anonymity via HPKE key privacy; readers trial-decrypt per persona. 48B per wrapper, one ephemeral pubkey per batch. Scan gated to follows + manual gesture. Bucket padding + per-publish shuffle for size/position opacity. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
250 lines
14 KiB
Markdown
250 lines
14 KiB
Markdown
# Layer 1 — Vouch Primitive
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**Scope**: Introduce `V_x` vouch keys, per-persona keyring storage, and a distribution mechanism via anonymous per-recipient wrappers in the issuer's bio post. No post-gating yet — this layer ships first so the primitive is in place and UI-exercised before any post encryption depends on it.
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---
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## Goal
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After Layer 1 ships:
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- Each persona owns a current `V_me` symmetric key. New personas auto-generate one at creation.
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- Each persona has a keyring of received vouch keys: `{V_x : x has vouched for me}`.
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- Vouches are distributed via **anonymous wrappers appended to the voucher's bio post**, not via DM. No recipient IDs are visible on the wire.
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- Clients auto-scan new/updated bio posts of people they follow; successfully unwrapped `V_x` keys are silently added to the receiving persona's keyring.
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- Users can view who has vouched for them (from keyring) and who they've vouched for (from their own bio-post state).
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- No post encryption or comment gating depends on Layer 1 yet — that arrives in Layer 2/3.
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---
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## Lead decisions
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- **`V_me` is symmetric.** 32B CSPRNG-generated. Every vouchee holds the same `V_me`. This is the property that makes FoF reach emergent (wrap under `V_x`, anyone `x` vouched for decrypts).
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- **Distribution is unilateral.** Alice vouching for Bob = Alice includes an anonymous wrapper containing `V_alice` addressed to Bob's persona pubkey in her bio post. No handshake, no acknowledgment.
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- **Distribution channel is the bio post, not DM.** Bio posts already propagate via the CDN to followers. Recipient anonymity is preserved by HPKE key privacy (see below). No new control-message type is needed. Scan-on-fetch replaces push-notification.
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- **Per-wrapper scheme is HPKE (RFC 9180).** Per-recipient ciphertext is HPKE-sealed under the recipient's X25519 persona key. One ephemeral pubkey per bio-post batch, shared across all wrappers in that batch. Each wrapper is 48B on the wire (32B sealed `V_me` + 16B AEAD tag).
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- **HKDF `info` MUST be recipient-free.** `info = "itsgoin/vouch-grant/v1/" || bio_post_id`. Including any recipient identifier in `info` breaks key privacy and is forbidden.
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- **No prefilter tag on Layer 1 wrappers.** Unlike FoF post wrap slots (Layers 2–3, which use HMAC prefilter over `V_x`), vouch grants have no prior shared secret. Readers pay a full X25519 scalar-mult per wrapper per persona. Cost is acceptable at realistic vouch-set sizes (<40ms for 600 trials).
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- **Scan is follow-gated by default.** Clients auto-scan bio posts of followed personas. For non-followed personas, scanning is a manual "check this person's bio for a vouch" gesture. Rationale: vouches that would be relevant to a reader overwhelmingly come from people the reader follows.
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- **Wrapper count padded to fixed buckets (64 / 128 / 256 / 512).** Dummy wrappers are random bytes shaped identically to real wrappers. Prevents observers from reading vouch-set size off the bio post.
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- **Wrapper order shuffled on every publish.** Prevents positional inference of which vouchee slot changed between bio-post revisions.
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- **Epoch tag is part of the key.** Each `V_x` has associated `(owner_id, epoch)` so receivers can distinguish fresh from stale when the voucher rotates.
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- **Keyring is per-persona, not per-device.** Multi-persona users have independent keyrings. Layer 3 reader logic iterates personas when trial-decrypting.
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- **Rotation is coarse.** Revocation = rotate `V_me`, republish bio post with wrappers for the remaining vouchees. See Layer 6 for design discussion.
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---
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## Data model
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### `vouch_keys_own` table
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Per-persona, stores the persona's own `V_me` history (current + recent-past for graceful rotation).
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```
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vouch_keys_own(
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persona_id BLOB,
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epoch INTEGER,
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key_material BLOB(32),
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created_at_ms INTEGER,
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is_current INTEGER, -- 1 for active, 0 for retained past
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PRIMARY KEY (persona_id, epoch)
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)
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```
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### `vouch_keys_received` table
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Per-persona keyring — vouch keys successfully unwrapped from others' bio posts.
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```
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vouch_keys_received(
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holder_persona_id BLOB, -- whose keyring this entry belongs to
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owner_id BLOB, -- the persona who issued V_x
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epoch INTEGER,
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key_material BLOB(32),
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received_at_ms INTEGER,
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source_bio_post_id BLOB, -- provenance (which bio post we unwrapped from)
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PRIMARY KEY (holder_persona_id, owner_id, epoch)
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)
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```
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### `vouch_bio_scan_cache` table
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Skips re-scanning bio posts that haven't changed since last attempt.
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```
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vouch_bio_scan_cache(
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scanner_persona_id BLOB,
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bio_author_id BLOB,
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bio_epoch INTEGER, -- bio-post revision counter
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result INTEGER, -- 0 = no wrapper unlocked; 1 = unlocked
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unlocked_v_x_epoch INTEGER, -- NULL if result=0
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scanned_at_ms INTEGER,
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PRIMARY KEY (scanner_persona_id, bio_author_id, bio_epoch)
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)
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```
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On an unchanged bio, clients short-circuit via this cache. On a bio-post update, clients trial only the *new wrappers* in the diff (not the full batch), bounded by bio_epoch increment.
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### Outbound vouches
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No separate `vouches_issued` table. The bio post itself IS the authoritative record of whom the persona has vouched for. UI "people I've vouched for" is derived from local author-side state (the recipient pubkey list used at bio-post assembly time), stored in a simple `own_vouch_targets` table:
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```
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own_vouch_targets(
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voucher_persona_id BLOB,
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target_persona_id BLOB,
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target_x25519_pub BLOB(32),
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granted_at_ms INTEGER,
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current INTEGER, -- 1 = in latest bio-post batch, 0 = removed
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PRIMARY KEY (voucher_persona_id, target_persona_id)
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)
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```
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This is local-only; never transmitted. The wire carries only anonymous wrappers.
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---
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## Wrapper format
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Bio post carries a `VouchGrantBatch`:
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```
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VouchGrantBatch {
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batch_eph_pub: [u8; 32], // shared ephemeral X25519 pubkey for this batch
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v_x_epoch: u32, // epoch of V_me being distributed in this batch
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wrappers: Vec<Wrapper>, // padded to next bucket in {64, 128, 256, 512}
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}
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Wrapper {
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ciphertext: [u8; 32], // HPKE-sealed V_me (32B key)
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tag: [u8; 16], // AEAD auth tag
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}
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```
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Per-recipient wrapper construction (RFC 9180 HPKE sealing, single-shot mode):
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```
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shared_secret = X25519(batch_eph_priv, recipient_x25519_pub)
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key, nonce = HKDF-Expand(
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HKDF-Extract(salt="", ikm=shared_secret),
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info = "itsgoin/vouch-grant/v1/" || bio_post_id,
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L = key_len + nonce_len
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)
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(ciphertext, tag) = AEAD-Seal(key, nonce, aad="", plaintext=V_me)
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```
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All recipients share the same `batch_eph_pub`; each gets a distinct wrapper derived from ECDH between that ephemeral and the recipient's persona X25519 pubkey.
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Dummy wrappers: 32B random bytes + 16B random bytes. Shape-identical to real wrappers. Indistinguishable to any party lacking the voucher's target list.
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**TBD — OPUS (confirm)**: AEAD choice for HPKE. Default RFC 9180 suite `DHKEM(X25519, HKDF-SHA256), HKDF-SHA256, ChaCha20Poly1305` matches existing ItsGoin crypto usage; confirm no reason to prefer AES-GCM.
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---
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## Bio-post integration
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ItsGoin already has bio posts (control post with `VisibilityIntent::Profile`). Layer 1 adds an optional `vouch_grant_batch` section to the profile-post payload:
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```rust
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struct ProfilePostPayload {
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// ... existing fields (display_name, bio, avatar_cid, etc.) ...
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#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
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vouch_grants: Option<VouchGrantBatch>,
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bio_epoch: u32, // monotonic per-persona; incremented on every bio-post revision
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}
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```
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Adding/removing a vouchee is a bio-post update: new batch, new `batch_eph_pub`, wrappers re-shuffled, `bio_epoch` incremented, republish. Propagates via the standard bio-post CDN path.
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**Incremental grants via bio-post comments** (deferred): Scott's variant of appending additional wrappers as author-only comments on the bio post (to avoid full republish on every small change) is a future optimization. v1 ships with full republish per change; simpler mental model and keeps the wire contract symmetric. Revisit if bio-post bandwidth becomes a concern.
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---
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## Reader / scanner behavior
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### On follow (new)
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1. Fetch the followed persona's latest bio post.
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2. If `vouch_grants.is_some()` AND `(scanner_persona, bio_author, bio_epoch)` not in scan cache:
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- For each persona `P` in the reader's persona set:
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- For each wrapper in the batch:
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- Derive `shared_secret = X25519(P.x25519_priv, batch_eph_pub)`.
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- Derive `key, nonce = HKDF(shared_secret, info="itsgoin/vouch-grant/v1/" || bio_post_id, ...)`.
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- Attempt `AEAD-Open(wrapper.ciphertext, wrapper.tag, key, nonce)`.
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- On success: extract `V_me`, insert into `vouch_keys_received` as `(holder=P, owner=bio_author, epoch=v_x_epoch)`. Record scan-cache hit.
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3. If no wrapper unlocked across any persona: record scan-cache miss. Done.
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### On bio-post update (existing follow)
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Same as above, but trial only the wrappers that are new relative to the prior bio_epoch. Since wrappers are shuffled on every publish, "new wrappers" = all wrappers on every update. **TBD**: whether to persist the exact wrapper-ciphertext set per bio_epoch so deltas can be computed, or just rescan the full batch (pay the cost, skip the bookkeeping). Lead leaning: **rescan full batch**; the cost (~40ms × number of followed personas publishing updates) is tolerable and the bookkeeping adds state-sync complexity.
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### On manual "check bio" gesture
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Treat as new-follow scan. User-invoked. Useful when a non-followed persona has vouched for the user.
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### Multi-persona trial order
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Personas iterated in stable sorted order (by persona_id). First unlock wins; stop scanning wrappers once any persona succeeds on any wrapper (the wrapper was addressed to that persona specifically — other wrappers in the batch are for other recipients).
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**TBD — OPUS**: confirm early-exit is correct. One caveat: the voucher may grant to MULTIPLE of the reader's personas (e.g., "I vouch for your work-persona AND your private-persona"). In that case we want to unlock all matching wrappers, not just the first. Lead leaning: do not early-exit on persona; continue scanning with remaining personas so all applicable grants are received.
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---
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## Cost analysis
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Per wrapper per persona: 1 X25519 scalar mult + 1 HKDF + 1 AEAD-Open attempt. ~60µs on ARM mobile; faster on desktop.
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Typical bio update: 200 wrappers × 3 personas = 600 trials ≈ 36ms. Invisible to user.
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Padded bucket at 512 × 3 personas = 1536 trials ≈ 90ms. Still acceptable for a one-time ingest per bio update.
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Scan-cache prevents re-pay on unchanged bios.
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---
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## UI / UX
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Minimum viable surface for Layer 1 ship:
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- **Persona screen**: "Vouch for someone" action. Picker of contacts. Adds their persona to `own_vouch_targets`; republishes bio post with new batch on save.
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- **Persona screen**: "Who has vouched for me" list (reads `vouch_keys_received` grouped by `owner_id`).
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- **Persona screen**: "People I've vouched for" list (reads `own_vouch_targets` where `current = 1`).
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- **Settings**: "Rotate my vouch key" → generates new `V_me` epoch, republishes bio post with wrappers under the new key for every current target.
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- **Post detail**: manual "Check this person's bio for a vouch for me" button (non-followed author case).
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Layer 1 ships without any post/comment behavior change. Vouches are visible in UI but don't gate content yet.
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---
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## Privacy properties (Layer 1 scope)
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- **Recipient anonymity.** HPKE key privacy: wrapper ciphertext reveals nothing about the recipient's pubkey. Only trial decryption identifies recipients.
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- **No identifiers on the wire.** No recipient NodeIds, no persona IDs, no derived recipient tags in the bio post.
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- **Set-size opacity.** Bucket padding hides actual vouch-set size to within 2× granularity.
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- **Rotation unobservability.** Shuffled wrapper order per publish prevents positional inference of which slot changed.
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Timing leak is acknowledged: a bio-post update with a changed vouch set leaks "someone new was vouched for today" to observers who see the update. Batching (daily cadence instead of immediate) would blur this; out of scope for v1.
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---
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## Open questions
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- **Batching cadence.** Immediate (republish on every vouch-add) vs daily-batched (aggregate changes). Lead leaning: immediate in v1; observe whether timing leak is a concern in practice.
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- **Dummy-wrapper count strategy.** Always pad to next bucket, or pad to a fixed persona-local target size (e.g., "always 128")? Fixed target hides growth trajectory but wastes bandwidth early on. Lead leaning: next-bucket padding.
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- **`V_me` in identity export.** Losing `V_me` means every FoF post gated under it becomes permanently unreadable for every vouchee. Lead leaning: include `vouch_keys_own` (current + retained epochs) AND `vouch_keys_received` in persona export bundles.
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- **Rescan triggering.** Scan on fetch of the bio post is natural. Should we also opportunistically rescan on keyring-change events (when the persona acquires a new X25519 keypair — unlikely but possible during import)? Lead leaning: yes, rescan-on-keyring-change, cheap.
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- **Bio post size.** 512 wrappers × 48B = 24KB of vouch-grant payload. Plus ephemeral pubkey, epoch, headers. Negligible relative to profile-post overhead including avatars. No concern.
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- **Does the scanner need to verify the voucher's identity sig over the batch?** Bio posts are already signed by the author's identity key, so the `VouchGrantBatch` inherits that signature. Forgery requires identity-key compromise (out of FoF scope).
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---
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## Ship criteria for Layer 1
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- All personas auto-generate `V_me` at creation.
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- Bio-post publish path can embed a `VouchGrantBatch`.
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- `own_vouch_targets` table tracks who the persona has vouched for locally.
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- `vouch_keys_received` populated via auto-scan on bio-post fetch; gated to followed personas + manual gesture.
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- `vouch_bio_scan_cache` prevents re-scanning unchanged bios.
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- UI: vouch someone, list given vouches, list received vouches, rotate `V_me`.
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- No change to post visibility / comment behavior.
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- HPKE wrapper construction matches RFC 9180 with recipient-free `info`.
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- Bucket-padding + per-publish wrapper shuffle implemented.
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- Integration test: two personas on two devices. A vouches for B. B auto-scans A's bio post after follow. B's `vouch_keys_received` contains `V_alice` at the correct epoch. B un-follows A then manually scans: same result. A rotates `V_me`, republishes. B auto-rescans, gets new epoch.
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