Display metadata (display_name, bio, avatar_cid) is no longer broadcast via
the ProfileUpdate direct push when the user edits their name. It travels as
a signed public post with VisibilityIntent::Profile, authored by the posting
identity, and propagates through the normal neighbor-manifest CDN path.
Core pieces:
- `types::ProfilePostContent` — JSON payload serialized into the post's
content field. Ed25519 signature by the posting secret over length-prefixed
display_name + bio + 32-byte avatar_cid (or zeros) + timestamp.
- `crypto::{sign,verify}_profile` with strict length prefixing to prevent
extension attacks.
- New `profile` module: `build_profile_post`, `verify_profile_post`,
`apply_profile_post_if_applicable`. Last-writer-wins by timestamp.
- `control::receive_post` now verifies Profile-intent posts upfront (same
as Control) so bogus signatures never enter storage, and applies them
after store so the `profiles` row updates atomically with the insert.
Node API:
- `Node::set_profile` rewritten: builds a signed Profile post, stores under
intent=Profile, applies it locally (upserts the profiles row keyed by the
posting identity), then propagates via `update_neighbor_manifests_as`.
Stops calling `network.push_profile` — display changes no longer trigger
a direct wire push.
- `Node::my_profile` / `has_profile` read by `default_posting_id` instead of
`node_id`, matching where the row is written now.
ProfileUpdate (0x50) and push_profile stay for now — they still carry
routing-only data (anchors, recent_peers, preferred_peers) via
`sanitized_for_network_broadcast` and are used by `set_anchors` /
`set_public_visible`. Removing the routing fields would be a broader
cleanup; scoped out of this phase.
Tests: roundtrip verify+store, wrong-author rejection (not stored), and
older-timestamp ignored. 114 / 114 core tests pass.
254 lines
9.7 KiB
Rust
254 lines
9.7 KiB
Rust
//! Control posts: signed protocol operations carried as public posts that
|
|
//! receivers apply to local state (delete, update visibility) without
|
|
//! rendering in feeds.
|
|
//!
|
|
//! Wire flow:
|
|
//! 1. Author creates a `Post { author, content = ControlOp JSON, ... }` with
|
|
//! `VisibilityIntent::Control`.
|
|
//! 2. Post propagates via CDN like any other post (header-diffs on neighbor
|
|
//! posts ship the reference; receivers pull the control post).
|
|
//! 3. On receive, callers invoke `apply_control_post_if_applicable` to
|
|
//! decode, verify the ControlOp's signature against the post's author,
|
|
//! confirm the target post's author matches, and apply.
|
|
//!
|
|
//! Control posts themselves are stored with `VisibilityIntent::Control`; feed
|
|
//! queries exclude them. They remain in storage as tombstones so we can
|
|
//! re-propagate them to peers and so future arrivals of the target post are
|
|
//! rejected via the delete tombstone.
|
|
|
|
use crate::crypto;
|
|
use crate::storage::Storage;
|
|
use crate::types::{ControlOp, DeleteRecord, NodeId, Post, PostId, PostVisibility, VisibilityIntent};
|
|
|
|
/// Parse the post's content as a `ControlOp`, verify its signature against
|
|
/// the post's author, verify target ownership, and apply to local storage.
|
|
/// No-op (returns Ok) if the post is not a control post. Returns an error
|
|
/// on a control post with an invalid signature or mismatched target author.
|
|
/// Callers pass an existing storage guard so the apply happens under the
|
|
/// same lock as the post-store that triggered the call.
|
|
pub fn apply_control_post_if_applicable(
|
|
s: &Storage,
|
|
post: &Post,
|
|
intent: Option<&VisibilityIntent>,
|
|
) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
|
|
if !matches!(intent, Some(VisibilityIntent::Control)) {
|
|
return Ok(());
|
|
}
|
|
let op: ControlOp = serde_json::from_str(&post.content)
|
|
.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("control post content is not a valid ControlOp: {}", e))?;
|
|
match op {
|
|
ControlOp::DeletePost { post_id, timestamp_ms, signature } => {
|
|
if !crypto::verify_control_delete(&post.author, &post_id, timestamp_ms, &signature) {
|
|
anyhow::bail!("invalid control-delete signature");
|
|
}
|
|
if let Some(target) = s.get_post(&post_id)? {
|
|
if target.author != post.author {
|
|
anyhow::bail!("control-delete author does not match target post's author");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
let record = DeleteRecord {
|
|
post_id,
|
|
author: post.author,
|
|
timestamp_ms,
|
|
signature: signature.clone(),
|
|
};
|
|
let _ = s.store_delete(&record);
|
|
let _ = s.apply_delete(&record);
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
}
|
|
ControlOp::UpdateVisibility { post_id, new_visibility, timestamp_ms, signature } => {
|
|
if !crypto::verify_control_visibility(&post.author, &post_id, &new_visibility, timestamp_ms, &signature) {
|
|
anyhow::bail!("invalid control-visibility signature");
|
|
}
|
|
if let Some(target) = s.get_post(&post_id)? {
|
|
if target.author != post.author {
|
|
anyhow::bail!("control-visibility author does not match target post's author");
|
|
}
|
|
let _ = s.update_post_visibility(&post_id, &new_visibility);
|
|
}
|
|
let _ = (timestamp_ms, new_visibility);
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Unified receive path: for every incoming post, call this instead of
|
|
/// `store_post_with_visibility` / `store_post_with_intent`. If the post is a
|
|
/// control post, the op is verified and applied atomically under the same
|
|
/// storage guard; if verification fails the post is NOT stored (so we don't
|
|
/// propagate bogus controls to other peers via neighbor-manifest diffs).
|
|
///
|
|
/// Returns Ok(true) if the post was newly stored, Ok(false) if already known,
|
|
/// and an error for control posts with invalid signatures or mismatched
|
|
/// target authors.
|
|
pub fn receive_post(
|
|
s: &Storage,
|
|
id: &PostId,
|
|
post: &Post,
|
|
visibility: &PostVisibility,
|
|
intent: Option<&VisibilityIntent>,
|
|
) -> anyhow::Result<bool> {
|
|
// Verify signed intent posts BEFORE storing. Bogus signed posts must
|
|
// never enter storage and get re-propagated via neighbor-manifest diffs.
|
|
match intent {
|
|
Some(VisibilityIntent::Control) => {
|
|
let op: ControlOp = serde_json::from_str(&post.content).map_err(|e| {
|
|
anyhow::anyhow!("control post content is not a valid ControlOp: {}", e)
|
|
})?;
|
|
match &op {
|
|
ControlOp::DeletePost { post_id, timestamp_ms, signature } => {
|
|
if !crypto::verify_control_delete(&post.author, post_id, *timestamp_ms, signature) {
|
|
anyhow::bail!("invalid control-delete signature");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
ControlOp::UpdateVisibility { post_id, new_visibility, timestamp_ms, signature } => {
|
|
if !crypto::verify_control_visibility(&post.author, post_id, new_visibility, *timestamp_ms, signature) {
|
|
anyhow::bail!("invalid control-visibility signature");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
Some(VisibilityIntent::Profile) => {
|
|
crate::profile::verify_profile_post(post)?;
|
|
}
|
|
_ => {}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let stored = if let Some(intent) = intent {
|
|
s.store_post_with_intent(id, post, visibility, intent)?
|
|
} else {
|
|
s.store_post_with_visibility(id, post, visibility)?
|
|
};
|
|
if stored {
|
|
apply_control_post_if_applicable(s, post, intent)?;
|
|
crate::profile::apply_profile_post_if_applicable(s, post, intent)?;
|
|
}
|
|
Ok(stored)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Build a Post representing a control-delete operation. Caller is
|
|
/// responsible for storing and propagating it.
|
|
pub fn build_delete_control_post(
|
|
author: &NodeId,
|
|
author_secret: &[u8; 32],
|
|
target_post_id: &crate::types::PostId,
|
|
) -> Post {
|
|
let timestamp_ms = std::time::SystemTime::now()
|
|
.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
|
|
.map(|d| d.as_millis() as u64)
|
|
.unwrap_or(0);
|
|
let signature = crypto::sign_control_delete(author_secret, target_post_id, timestamp_ms);
|
|
let op = ControlOp::DeletePost {
|
|
post_id: *target_post_id,
|
|
timestamp_ms,
|
|
signature,
|
|
};
|
|
Post {
|
|
author: *author,
|
|
content: serde_json::to_string(&op).unwrap_or_default(),
|
|
attachments: vec![],
|
|
timestamp_ms,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Build a Post representing a control-update-visibility operation. Caller
|
|
/// is responsible for storing and propagating it.
|
|
pub fn build_visibility_control_post(
|
|
author: &NodeId,
|
|
author_secret: &[u8; 32],
|
|
target_post_id: &crate::types::PostId,
|
|
new_visibility: &PostVisibility,
|
|
) -> Post {
|
|
let timestamp_ms = std::time::SystemTime::now()
|
|
.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
|
|
.map(|d| d.as_millis() as u64)
|
|
.unwrap_or(0);
|
|
let signature = crypto::sign_control_visibility(author_secret, target_post_id, new_visibility, timestamp_ms);
|
|
let op = ControlOp::UpdateVisibility {
|
|
post_id: *target_post_id,
|
|
new_visibility: new_visibility.clone(),
|
|
timestamp_ms,
|
|
signature,
|
|
};
|
|
Post {
|
|
author: *author,
|
|
content: serde_json::to_string(&op).unwrap_or_default(),
|
|
attachments: vec![],
|
|
timestamp_ms,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod tests {
|
|
use super::*;
|
|
use crate::storage::Storage;
|
|
use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
|
|
|
|
fn temp_storage() -> Storage {
|
|
Storage::open(":memory:").unwrap()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn make_keypair(seed_byte: u8) -> ([u8; 32], NodeId) {
|
|
let seed = [seed_byte; 32];
|
|
let signing_key = SigningKey::from_bytes(&seed);
|
|
let public = signing_key.verifying_key();
|
|
(seed, *public.as_bytes())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn control_delete_roundtrip_verifies_and_applies() {
|
|
let s = temp_storage();
|
|
let (author_sec, author_pub) = make_keypair(7);
|
|
|
|
let post = Post {
|
|
author: author_pub,
|
|
content: "hello".to_string(),
|
|
attachments: vec![],
|
|
timestamp_ms: 1000,
|
|
};
|
|
let post_id = crate::content::compute_post_id(&post);
|
|
s.store_post_with_visibility(&post_id, &post, &PostVisibility::Public).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let control = build_delete_control_post(&author_pub, &author_sec, &post_id);
|
|
let control_id = crate::content::compute_post_id(&control);
|
|
let stored = receive_post(
|
|
&s,
|
|
&control_id,
|
|
&control,
|
|
&PostVisibility::Public,
|
|
Some(&VisibilityIntent::Control),
|
|
).unwrap();
|
|
assert!(stored);
|
|
assert!(s.is_deleted(&post_id).unwrap());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn control_delete_rejects_wrong_author() {
|
|
let s = temp_storage();
|
|
let (_author_sec, author_pub) = make_keypair(7);
|
|
let (other_sec, _other_pub) = make_keypair(9);
|
|
|
|
let post = Post {
|
|
author: author_pub,
|
|
content: "hello".to_string(),
|
|
attachments: vec![],
|
|
timestamp_ms: 1000,
|
|
};
|
|
let post_id = crate::content::compute_post_id(&post);
|
|
s.store_post_with_visibility(&post_id, &post, &PostVisibility::Public).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
// Sign with wrong secret → invalid signature for `author_pub`.
|
|
let control = build_delete_control_post(&author_pub, &other_sec, &post_id);
|
|
let control_id = crate::content::compute_post_id(&control);
|
|
let res = receive_post(
|
|
&s,
|
|
&control_id,
|
|
&control,
|
|
&PostVisibility::Public,
|
|
Some(&VisibilityIntent::Control),
|
|
);
|
|
assert!(res.is_err());
|
|
assert!(s.get_post(&control_id).unwrap().is_none());
|
|
assert!(!s.is_deleted(&post_id).unwrap());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|