8b042f6598
Retention was keyed on comment type, so public and post-key-signed comments carried a randomized 30-365d expiry inside their signed digest. Under the ruling neither should ever expire; only the private, non-post-key-signed (open-slot/greeting) channel gets an automatic TTL, since that is the throwaway-identity retirement mechanism. New crates/core/src/comment_ttl.rs is the single authority: CommentClass (Public / PostKeySigned / OpenSlot / Unverifiable) x CommentTtlRule (Never | Window | UnknownParent), with draw_expiry (writer) and ttl_ok (holder). expires_at_ms == 0 is the never-expires sentinel, honored by the sweep, the ingest gate, and the store_comment upsert. - Post.comment_ttl: Option<CommentTtlPolicy> — a GENERIC per-post policy, so an author-set TTL is a future config surface, not a redesign. Registry posts declare a flat 30d policy that binds EVERY comment on them (registrations, duplicate reports, anything else), replacing the registration-only rule. - OpenSlotDecl.max_comments: author-declarable cap on private PK-unsigned comments, enforced holder-side (clamped to the holder default), replacing the hardcoded per-bio greeting cap. Refusal remains "declare no slot". Node::set_greetings_max + `greetings-max` CLI command to write it. - Holder enforcement rejects TTLs contradicting the parent's policy in both directions; a comment naming a different post than its envelope is rejected. - UnknownParent rule: bounded TTLs accepted from unheld parents (self-heal), never-expires refused — permanence is not granted on unseen evidence. Also fixed while here: five Post-reconstructing queries silently dropped comment_ttl AND the pre-existing fof_gating (shipped in v0.8.0-alpha), so any gated or policy-carrying post failed BLAKE3 verification on sync/export and was discarded with no diagnostic. All hydration now goes through one POST_COLUMNS/post_from_row path; export/import round-trips the policy. Registry frozen bytes regenerated for the policy field; REGISTRY_POST_ID is now 10a1be3383efb2977607fe45c4a7b3f1b5e626e81d0ac1af9c0f3d7eb9864d32. design.html section 21 rewritten to the corrected taxonomy. 250 core tests (was 228); a3 integration 12/12 (new step 6 asserts registry comments hold exactly 30d while greetings randomize); c_topology 33/33. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LGiPD2cF75mnvneSCjdDC5
77 lines
2.5 KiB
Rust
77 lines
2.5 KiB
Rust
pub mod activity;
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#[cfg(target_os = "android")]
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pub mod android_wifi;
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pub mod blob;
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pub mod comment_ttl;
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pub mod connection;
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pub mod content;
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pub mod control;
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pub mod crypto;
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pub mod group_key_distribution;
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pub mod http;
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pub mod export;
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pub mod fof;
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pub mod identity;
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pub mod import;
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pub mod announcement;
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pub mod network;
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pub mod node;
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pub mod profile;
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pub mod protocol;
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pub mod registry;
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pub mod storage;
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pub mod stun;
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pub mod types;
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pub mod upnp;
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pub mod web;
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// Re-export iroh types needed by consumers
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pub use iroh::{EndpointAddr, EndpointId};
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use types::NodeId;
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/// Posting-identity public key of the bootstrap anchor. Only announcements
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/// authored by this key are accepted by `control::receive_post` for the
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/// `VisibilityIntent::Announcement` intent. Hardcoded so clients cannot be
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/// tricked into accepting a forged network-wide announcement.
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pub const DEFAULT_ANCHOR_POSTING_ID: NodeId = [
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0x17, 0xaf, 0x14, 0x19, 0x56, 0xae, 0x0b, 0x50,
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0xdc, 0x1c, 0xb9, 0x24, 0x8c, 0xad, 0xf5, 0xfc,
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0xa3, 0x71, 0xea, 0x2d, 0x85, 0x31, 0xac, 0x9a,
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0xdd, 0x3c, 0x03, 0xca, 0xff, 0xc6, 0x14, 0x41,
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];
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/// Parse a connect string "nodeid_hex@ip:port" or "nodeid_hex@host:port" or bare "nodeid_hex"
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/// into (NodeId, EndpointAddr). Supports DNS hostnames via `ToSocketAddrs`.
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/// Shared utility used by CLI, Tauri, and bootstrap.
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pub fn parse_connect_string(s: &str) -> anyhow::Result<(NodeId, EndpointAddr)> {
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use std::net::ToSocketAddrs;
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if let Some((id_hex, addr_str)) = s.split_once('@') {
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let nid = parse_node_id_hex(id_hex)?;
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let endpoint_id = EndpointId::from_bytes(&nid)?;
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let all_addrs: Vec<std::net::SocketAddr> = addr_str
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.to_socket_addrs()?
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.collect();
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if all_addrs.is_empty() {
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anyhow::bail!("could not resolve address: {}", addr_str);
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}
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let mut addr = EndpointAddr::from(endpoint_id);
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for sock_addr in all_addrs {
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addr = addr.with_ip_addr(sock_addr);
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}
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Ok((nid, addr))
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} else {
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let nid = parse_node_id_hex(s)?;
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let endpoint_id = EndpointId::from_bytes(&nid)?;
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Ok((nid, EndpointAddr::from(endpoint_id)))
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}
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}
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/// Parse a hex-encoded node ID string into NodeId bytes.
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pub fn parse_node_id_hex(hex_str: &str) -> anyhow::Result<NodeId> {
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let bytes = hex::decode(hex_str)?;
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let id: NodeId = bytes
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.try_into()
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.map_err(|v: Vec<u8>| anyhow::anyhow!("expected 32 bytes, got {}", v.len()))?;
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Ok(id)
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}
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