chore: bump version to 0.7.0 + download page updates

Bumps:
- crates/{core,cli,tauri-app}/Cargo.toml: 0.6.2 → 0.7.0
- crates/tauri-app/tauri.conf.json: 0.6.2 → 0.7.0
- gen/android/app/tauri.properties: versionName 0.7.0, versionCode 7000

website/download.html: v0.7.0 promoted to top with FoF release notes;
v0.6.2 retained in archive section. Wire-additive notice + link to
design.html#fof for full architecture.

No -beta suffix this cycle: no users on prior version means no need
for the beta carve-out. Will resume beta convention when there are
real users to migrate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

Cargo.lock

@@ -2732,7 +2732,7 @@ checksum = "92ecc6618181def0457392ccd0ee51198e065e016d1d527a7ac1b6dc7c1f09d2"
 
 [[package]]
 name = "itsgoin-cli"
-version = "0.6.2"
+version = "0.7.0"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "hex",
@@ -2744,7 +2744,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "itsgoin-core"
-version = "0.6.2"
+version = "0.7.0"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "base64 0.22.1",
@@ -2767,7 +2767,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "itsgoin-desktop"
-version = "0.6.2"
+version = "0.7.0"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "base64 0.22.1",

crates/cli/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [package]
 name = "itsgoin-cli"
-version = "0.6.2"
+version = "0.7.0"
 edition = "2021"
 
 [[bin]]

crates/cli/src/main.rs

@@ -905,6 +905,7 @@ async fn print_post(
         itsgoin_core::types::PostVisibility::GroupEncrypted { epoch, .. } => {
             format!(" [group-encrypted, epoch {}]", epoch)
         }
+        itsgoin_core::types::PostVisibility::FoFClosed => " [fof-closed]".to_string(),
     };
 
     let ts = post.timestamp_ms / 1000;
@@ -917,6 +918,10 @@ async fn print_post(
             Some(text) => text.to_string(),
             None => "(encrypted)".to_string(),
         },
+        itsgoin_core::types::PostVisibility::FoFClosed => match decrypted {
+            Some(text) => text.to_string(),
+            None => "(fof-closed; not in this FoF set)".to_string(),
+        },
     };
 
     println!("---");

crates/core/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [package]
 name = "itsgoin-core"
-version = "0.6.2"
+version = "0.7.0"
 edition = "2021"
 
 [dependencies]

crates/core/src/announcement.rs

@@ -143,6 +143,8 @@ pub fn build_announcement_post(
         content: serde_json::to_string(&content).unwrap_or_default(),
         attachments: vec![],
         timestamp_ms,
+    fof_gating: None,
+    supersedes_post_id: None,
     }
 }
 

crates/core/src/connection.rs

@@ -6171,6 +6171,53 @@ impl ConnectionManager {
                                 }
                             }
                             crate::types::CommentPermission::Public => {}
+                            crate::types::CommentPermission::FriendsOfFriends => {
+                                // FoF Layer 2 CDN four-check accept rule:
+                                //   1. parent post must carry fof_gating
+                                //      (otherwise the policy is ambient
+                                //      with no key material to verify);
+                                //   2. pub_x_index must point at a real
+                                //      entry in pub_post_set;
+                                //   3. group_sig must validate against
+                                //      pub_post_set[pub_x_index];
+                                //   4. revocation_list must not contain
+                                //      pub_post_set[pub_x_index];
+                                //   5. identity_sig (existing comment
+                                //      signature field) verified below.
+                                //
+                                // Failures drop the comment without
+                                // forwarding — kills the bandwidth-DoS
+                                // attack an admitted-but-malicious FoF
+                                // member could otherwise mount.
+                                let parent = match storage.get_post(&payload.post_id) {
+                                    Ok(Some(p)) => p,
+                                    _ => continue,
+                                };
+                                let Some(gating) = parent.fof_gating.as_ref() else { continue; };
+                                if !crate::fof::verify_fof_group_sig(comment, gating) {
+                                    continue;
+                                }
+                                // Revocation check (step 4). Two
+                                // sources: the post's snapshot
+                                // revocation_list (rarely populated on
+                                // publish) and the live local table
+                                // fof_revocations (accumulated as
+                                // revocation diffs arrive on the wire).
+                                if let Some(idx) = comment.pub_x_index {
+                                    let pub_x = gating.pub_post_set
+                                        .get(idx as usize)
+                                        .copied();
+                                    if let Some(pub_x) = pub_x {
+                                        if gating.revocation_list.iter()
+                                            .any(|r| r.revoked_pub_x == pub_x) {
+                                            continue;
+                                        }
+                                        if storage.is_fof_pub_x_revoked(&payload.post_id, &pub_x).unwrap_or(false) {
+                                            continue;
+                                        }
+                                    }
+                                }
+                            }
                         }
                         if !crate::crypto::verify_comment_signature(
                             &comment.author,
@@ -6201,6 +6248,63 @@ impl ConnectionManager {
                             let _ = storage.set_comment_policy(&payload.post_id, new_policy);
                         }
                     }
+                    BlobHeaderDiffOp::FoFRevocation {
+                        post_id, revoked_pub_x, revoked_at_ms, reason_code, author_sig,
+                    } => {
+                        // Verify author identity signature before applying.
+                        // payload.author is the engagement-diff sender; the
+                        // post's real author lives in storage.
+                        let post_author = match storage.get_post(post_id) {
+                            Ok(Some(p)) => p.author,
+                            _ => continue,
+                        };
+                        if !crate::fof::verify_fof_revocation(
+                            &post_author, post_id, revoked_pub_x,
+                            *revoked_at_ms, *reason_code, author_sig,
+                        ) {
+                            continue;
+                        }
+                        // Apply: record + cascade-delete stored comments.
+                        let _ = crate::fof::apply_fof_revocation_locally(
+                            &storage, post_id, revoked_pub_x,
+                            *revoked_at_ms, *reason_code, author_sig,
+                        );
+                    }
+                    BlobHeaderDiffOp::FoFAccessGrant {
+                        post_id, new_pub_x, new_wrap_slot, granted_at_ms, author_sig,
+                    } => {
+                        let post_author = match storage.get_post(post_id) {
+                            Ok(Some(p)) => p.author,
+                            _ => continue,
+                        };
+                        if !crate::fof::verify_fof_access_grant(
+                            &post_author, post_id, new_pub_x, new_wrap_slot,
+                            *granted_at_ms, author_sig,
+                        ) {
+                            continue;
+                        }
+                        let _ = crate::fof::apply_fof_access_grant_locally(
+                            &storage, post_id, new_pub_x, new_wrap_slot,
+                        );
+                    }
+                    BlobHeaderDiffOp::FoFKeyBurn {
+                        post_id, slot_index, new_pub_x, new_wrap_slot, burned_at_ms, author_sig,
+                    } => {
+                        let post_author = match storage.get_post(post_id) {
+                            Ok(Some(p)) => p.author,
+                            _ => continue,
+                        };
+                        if !crate::fof::verify_fof_key_burn(
+                            &post_author, post_id, *slot_index, new_pub_x, new_wrap_slot,
+                            *burned_at_ms, author_sig,
+                        ) {
+                            continue;
+                        }
+                        let _ = crate::fof::apply_fof_key_burn_locally(
+                            &storage, post_id, *slot_index, new_pub_x, new_wrap_slot,
+                            *burned_at_ms,
+                        );
+                    }
                     BlobHeaderDiffOp::ThreadSplit { new_post_id } => {
                         let _ = storage.store_thread_meta(&crate::types::ThreadMeta {
                             post_id: *new_post_id,

crates/core/src/content.rs

@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ mod tests {
             content: "hello world".to_string(),
             attachments: vec![],
             timestamp_ms: 1000,
+        fof_gating: None,
+        supersedes_post_id: None,
         };
         let id1 = compute_post_id(&post);
         let id2 = compute_post_id(&post);
@@ -36,12 +38,16 @@ mod tests {
             content: "hello".to_string(),
             attachments: vec![],
             timestamp_ms: 1000,
+        fof_gating: None,
+        supersedes_post_id: None,
         };
         let post2 = Post {
             author: [1u8; 32],
             content: "world".to_string(),
             attachments: vec![],
             timestamp_ms: 1000,
+        fof_gating: None,
+        supersedes_post_id: None,
         };
         assert_ne!(compute_post_id(&post1), compute_post_id(&post2));
     }
@@ -53,6 +59,8 @@ mod tests {
             content: "test".to_string(),
             attachments: vec![],
             timestamp_ms: 1000,
+        fof_gating: None,
+        supersedes_post_id: None,
         };
         let id = compute_post_id(&post);
         assert!(verify_post_id(&id, &post));

crates/core/src/control.rs

@@ -120,6 +120,15 @@ pub fn receive_post(
         _ => {}
     }
 
+    // FoF Layer 2/3 hardening (pre-deploy audit): reject malformed
+    // FoF gating blocks BEFORE storage. Bounds wrap_slots count,
+    // enforces 1:1 wrap_slots/pub_post_set parity, validates
+    // ciphertext field sizes, caps revocation_list. Also enforces
+    // the FoFClosed-implies-gating invariant. Rejection prevents
+    // bad data from being re-propagated via neighbor-manifest diffs.
+    crate::fof::validate_fof_closed_has_gating(post, visibility)?;
+    crate::fof::validate_fof_gating_on_receive(post)?;
+
     let stored = if let Some(intent) = intent {
         s.store_post_with_intent(id, post, visibility, intent)?
     } else {
@@ -155,6 +164,8 @@ pub fn build_delete_control_post(
         content: serde_json::to_string(&op).unwrap_or_default(),
         attachments: vec![],
         timestamp_ms,
+    fof_gating: None,
+    supersedes_post_id: None,
     }
 }
 
@@ -182,6 +193,8 @@ pub fn build_visibility_control_post(
         content: serde_json::to_string(&op).unwrap_or_default(),
         attachments: vec![],
         timestamp_ms,
+    fof_gating: None,
+    supersedes_post_id: None,
     }
 }
 
@@ -212,6 +225,8 @@ mod tests {
             content: "hello".to_string(),
             attachments: vec![],
             timestamp_ms: 1000,
+        fof_gating: None,
+        supersedes_post_id: None,
         };
         let post_id = crate::content::compute_post_id(&post);
         s.store_post_with_visibility(&post_id, &post, &PostVisibility::Public).unwrap();
@@ -240,6 +255,8 @@ mod tests {
             content: "hello".to_string(),
             attachments: vec![],
             timestamp_ms: 1000,
+        fof_gating: None,
+        supersedes_post_id: None,
         };
         let post_id = crate::content::compute_post_id(&post);
         s.store_post_with_visibility(&post_id, &post, &PostVisibility::Public).unwrap();

crates/core/src/crypto.rs

@@ -12,6 +12,23 @@ use crate::types::{GroupEpoch, GroupId, GroupMemberKey, NodeId, PostId, WrappedK
 
 const CEK_WRAP_CONTEXT: &str = "itsgoin/cek-wrap/v1";
 
+/// FoF Layer 1: vouch-grant HPKE-style wrapper construction.
+/// HKDF/derive_key info MUST be recipient-free (key privacy).
+/// `bio_post_id` ties the wrapper to the publishing bio post.
+const VOUCH_GRANT_KEY_CONTEXT: &str = "itsgoin/vouch-grant/v1/key";
+const VOUCH_GRANT_NONCE_CONTEXT: &str = "itsgoin/vouch-grant/v1/nonce";
+
+/// FoF Layer 2: per-V_x wrap-slot derivation contexts. Each slot is
+/// dual-derived under a different sub-context: `read` yields the CEK
+/// (read capability), `sign` yields the per-V_x signing seed. Bound to
+/// the post via `slot_binder_nonce` (a random 32B nonce in the post
+/// header — not the PostId, which would be circular).
+const WRAP_SLOT_READ_KEY_CONTEXT: &str = "itsgoin/fof-wrap-slot/v1/read/key";
+const WRAP_SLOT_READ_NONCE_CONTEXT: &str = "itsgoin/fof-wrap-slot/v1/read/nonce";
+const WRAP_SLOT_SIGN_KEY_CONTEXT: &str = "itsgoin/fof-wrap-slot/v1/sign/key";
+const WRAP_SLOT_SIGN_NONCE_CONTEXT: &str = "itsgoin/fof-wrap-slot/v1/sign/nonce";
+const WRAP_SLOT_PREFILTER_CONTEXT: &str = "itsgoin/fof-wrap-slot/v1/prefilter";
+
 /// Convert an ed25519 seed (32 bytes from identity.key) to X25519 private scalar bytes.
 pub fn ed25519_seed_to_x25519_private(seed: &[u8; 32]) -> [u8; 32] {
     let signing_key = SigningKey::from_bytes(seed);
@@ -193,6 +210,260 @@ pub fn unwrap_group_cek(
     Ok(cek)
 }
 
+// --- FoF Layer 1: vouch-grant HPKE-style seal/open ---
+//
+// Per the FoF spec (docs/fof-spec/layer-1-vouch-primitive.md), a voucher
+// publishes anonymous per-recipient wrappers inside their bio post. Each
+// wrapper carries `V_me` (the voucher's symmetric key) sealed under a
+// shared secret derived from ECDH between a per-batch ephemeral X25519
+// keypair and the recipient's persona X25519 key.
+//
+// Recipient anonymity ("key privacy") is preserved because:
+//   1. Wrappers carry no recipient identifier.
+//   2. The KDF info string is recipient-free (only the post_id appears).
+//   3. All wrappers in a batch share the same ephemeral pubkey.
+//
+// Wire shape: 48 bytes per wrapper (32B sealed V_me + 16B AEAD tag).
+// One 32B ephemeral pubkey shared across all wrappers in the batch.
+
+/// Generate a fresh ephemeral X25519 keypair for a vouch-grant batch.
+/// Returns `(eph_priv_scalar, eph_pub)` in X25519 byte form. Reuses the
+/// ed25519 → X25519 derivation path that the rest of the codebase uses
+/// so all X25519 endpoints are produced identically.
+pub fn generate_vouch_batch_ephemeral() -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
+    let mut seed = [0u8; 32];
+    rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut seed);
+    let eph_priv = ed25519_seed_to_x25519_private(&seed);
+    let signing_key = SigningKey::from_bytes(&seed);
+    let eph_pub = signing_key.verifying_key().to_montgomery().to_bytes();
+    (eph_priv, eph_pub)
+}
+
+/// Derive the (wrapping_key, nonce) pair for a vouch-grant wrapper from
+/// the ECDH shared secret and the publishing bio post's ID.
+fn derive_vouch_grant_key_nonce(
+    shared_secret: &[u8; 32],
+    bio_post_id: &PostId,
+) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 12]) {
+    // Bake bio_post_id into the derivation context. Recipient-free.
+    let key_ctx = format!("{}/{}", VOUCH_GRANT_KEY_CONTEXT, hex_lower(bio_post_id));
+    let nonce_ctx = format!("{}/{}", VOUCH_GRANT_NONCE_CONTEXT, hex_lower(bio_post_id));
+    let wrapping_key = blake3::derive_key(&key_ctx, shared_secret);
+    let nonce_full = blake3::derive_key(&nonce_ctx, shared_secret);
+    let mut nonce = [0u8; 12];
+    nonce.copy_from_slice(&nonce_full[..12]);
+    (wrapping_key, nonce)
+}
+
+fn hex_lower(bytes: &[u8; 32]) -> String {
+    let mut s = String::with_capacity(64);
+    for b in bytes {
+        s.push_str(&format!("{:02x}", b));
+    }
+    s
+}
+
+/// Seal `V_me` (32B) under the recipient's X25519 pubkey using the
+/// batch's ephemeral X25519 private key. Returns the 48-byte wrapper
+/// `ciphertext(32) || tag(16)`.
+pub fn seal_vouch_grant(
+    eph_priv: &[u8; 32],
+    recipient_x25519_pub: &[u8; 32],
+    bio_post_id: &PostId,
+    v_me: &[u8; 32],
+) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    let shared_secret = x25519_dh(eph_priv, recipient_x25519_pub);
+    let (wrapping_key, nonce) = derive_vouch_grant_key_nonce(&shared_secret, bio_post_id);
+    let cipher = ChaCha20Poly1305::new_from_slice(&wrapping_key)
+        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("vouch-grant cipher init: {}", e))?;
+    let ciphertext = cipher
+        .encrypt(Nonce::from_slice(&nonce), v_me.as_slice())
+        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("vouch-grant seal: {}", e))?;
+    // ChaCha20-Poly1305 output is 32B plaintext + 16B tag = 48B.
+    if ciphertext.len() != 48 {
+        bail!("unexpected vouch-grant wrapper length: {}", ciphertext.len());
+    }
+    Ok(ciphertext)
+}
+
+/// Try to open a vouch-grant wrapper using the recipient's X25519 private
+/// scalar. Returns `Some(V_me)` on success, `None` on AEAD failure (i.e.,
+/// this wrapper was not addressed to this recipient).
+pub fn open_vouch_grant(
+    recipient_x25519_priv: &[u8; 32],
+    batch_eph_pub: &[u8; 32],
+    bio_post_id: &PostId,
+    wrapper_ciphertext: &[u8],
+) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
+    if wrapper_ciphertext.len() != 48 {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let shared_secret = x25519_dh(recipient_x25519_priv, batch_eph_pub);
+    let (wrapping_key, nonce) = derive_vouch_grant_key_nonce(&shared_secret, bio_post_id);
+    let cipher = ChaCha20Poly1305::new_from_slice(&wrapping_key).ok()?;
+    let plaintext = cipher
+        .decrypt(Nonce::from_slice(&nonce), wrapper_ciphertext)
+        .ok()?;
+    if plaintext.len() != 32 {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let mut v_me = [0u8; 32];
+    v_me.copy_from_slice(&plaintext);
+    Some(v_me)
+}
+
+// --- FoF Layer 2: wrap-slot seal/open (dual-derived read + sign) ---
+//
+// Each post under FoF comment-gating carries one wrap slot per
+// admitted V_x. The slot is dual-derived: one half yields the post's
+// shared CEK (read capability), the other yields the per-V_x signing
+// seed priv_x (comment-authorship capability for that voucher-chain).
+//
+// Receivers trial-decrypt slots whose prefilter tag matches one of
+// their held V_x's. Successful AEAD-open on the `read` part gives
+// them CEK; the `sign` part gives them priv_x. They derive the
+// matching pub_x = ed25519_pub(priv_x_seed); the CDN verifies their
+// comment signatures against pub_x via the post's pub_post_set.
+//
+// All AEAD derivation is bound to a per-post `slot_binder_nonce`
+// (random 32B in the post header). This plays the same role as the
+// spec's "post_id in HKDF info" but isn't circular (PostId =
+// BLAKE3(post) depends on wrap_slots → circular).
+//
+// Wire shape:
+//   prefilter_tag: 2 bytes (HMAC(V_x, slot_binder_nonce)[:2])
+//   read_part:     48 bytes (32B sealed CEK + 16B tag)
+//   sign_part:     48 bytes (32B sealed priv_x seed + 16B tag)
+// Total: 98 bytes per slot.
+
+/// Output of [`seal_wrap_slot`]. All fields are wire-stable. See module
+/// doc above for derivation details.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct SealedWrapSlot {
+    pub prefilter_tag: [u8; 2],
+    pub read_ciphertext: Vec<u8>,  // 48 bytes
+    pub sign_ciphertext: Vec<u8>,  // 48 bytes
+}
+
+/// Compute the 2-byte prefilter tag for a (V_x, slot_binder_nonce)
+/// pair. Cheap; receivers precompute one per held V_x per post and
+/// skip non-matching slots entirely.
+pub fn wrap_slot_prefilter_tag(v_x: &[u8; 32], slot_binder_nonce: &[u8; 32]) -> [u8; 2] {
+    let mut input = [0u8; 64];
+    input[..32].copy_from_slice(slot_binder_nonce);
+    input[32..].copy_from_slice(v_x);
+    let tag = blake3::derive_key(WRAP_SLOT_PREFILTER_CONTEXT, &input);
+    [tag[0], tag[1]]
+}
+
+fn derive_wrap_slot_part(
+    v_x: &[u8; 32],
+    slot_binder_nonce: &[u8; 32],
+    key_ctx: &str,
+    nonce_ctx: &str,
+) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 12]) {
+    let mut input = [0u8; 64];
+    input[..32].copy_from_slice(slot_binder_nonce);
+    input[32..].copy_from_slice(v_x);
+    let key = blake3::derive_key(key_ctx, &input);
+    let nonce_full = blake3::derive_key(nonce_ctx, &input);
+    let mut nonce = [0u8; 12];
+    nonce.copy_from_slice(&nonce_full[..12]);
+    (key, nonce)
+}
+
+/// Seal one wrap slot for a specific V_x. Pair (CEK, priv_x_seed) is
+/// the slot plaintext: the read part carries CEK, the sign part carries
+/// priv_x_seed. Both halves are bound to `slot_binder_nonce` via HKDF.
+pub fn seal_wrap_slot(
+    v_x: &[u8; 32],
+    slot_binder_nonce: &[u8; 32],
+    cek: &[u8; 32],
+    priv_x_seed: &[u8; 32],
+) -> Result<SealedWrapSlot> {
+    let (read_key, read_nonce) = derive_wrap_slot_part(
+        v_x, slot_binder_nonce,
+        WRAP_SLOT_READ_KEY_CONTEXT, WRAP_SLOT_READ_NONCE_CONTEXT,
+    );
+    let (sign_key, sign_nonce) = derive_wrap_slot_part(
+        v_x, slot_binder_nonce,
+        WRAP_SLOT_SIGN_KEY_CONTEXT, WRAP_SLOT_SIGN_NONCE_CONTEXT,
+    );
+    let read_cipher = ChaCha20Poly1305::new_from_slice(&read_key)
+        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("read cipher init: {}", e))?;
+    let sign_cipher = ChaCha20Poly1305::new_from_slice(&sign_key)
+        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("sign cipher init: {}", e))?;
+    let read_ct = read_cipher
+        .encrypt(Nonce::from_slice(&read_nonce), cek.as_slice())
+        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("read seal: {}", e))?;
+    let sign_ct = sign_cipher
+        .encrypt(Nonce::from_slice(&sign_nonce), priv_x_seed.as_slice())
+        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("sign seal: {}", e))?;
+    if read_ct.len() != 48 || sign_ct.len() != 48 {
+        bail!("unexpected wrap-slot ciphertext length");
+    }
+    Ok(SealedWrapSlot {
+        prefilter_tag: wrap_slot_prefilter_tag(v_x, slot_binder_nonce),
+        read_ciphertext: read_ct,
+        sign_ciphertext: sign_ct,
+    })
+}
+
+/// Output of a successful [`open_wrap_slot`].
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct OpenedWrapSlot {
+    pub cek: [u8; 32],
+    pub priv_x_seed: [u8; 32],
+}
+
+/// Try to open a wrap slot using one of the receiver's V_x's. Returns
+/// `None` if either AEAD fails (this slot isn't sealed under this V_x).
+pub fn open_wrap_slot(
+    v_x: &[u8; 32],
+    slot_binder_nonce: &[u8; 32],
+    read_ciphertext: &[u8],
+    sign_ciphertext: &[u8],
+) -> Option<OpenedWrapSlot> {
+    if read_ciphertext.len() != 48 || sign_ciphertext.len() != 48 {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let (read_key, read_nonce) = derive_wrap_slot_part(
+        v_x, slot_binder_nonce,
+        WRAP_SLOT_READ_KEY_CONTEXT, WRAP_SLOT_READ_NONCE_CONTEXT,
+    );
+    let (sign_key, sign_nonce) = derive_wrap_slot_part(
+        v_x, slot_binder_nonce,
+        WRAP_SLOT_SIGN_KEY_CONTEXT, WRAP_SLOT_SIGN_NONCE_CONTEXT,
+    );
+    let read_cipher = ChaCha20Poly1305::new_from_slice(&read_key).ok()?;
+    let sign_cipher = ChaCha20Poly1305::new_from_slice(&sign_key).ok()?;
+    let cek_bytes = read_cipher
+        .decrypt(Nonce::from_slice(&read_nonce), read_ciphertext)
+        .ok()?;
+    let seed_bytes = sign_cipher
+        .decrypt(Nonce::from_slice(&sign_nonce), sign_ciphertext)
+        .ok()?;
+    if cek_bytes.len() != 32 || seed_bytes.len() != 32 {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let mut cek = [0u8; 32];
+    cek.copy_from_slice(&cek_bytes);
+    let mut priv_x_seed = [0u8; 32];
+    priv_x_seed.copy_from_slice(&seed_bytes);
+    Some(OpenedWrapSlot { cek, priv_x_seed })
+}
+
+/// Derive the per-post comments CEK from the wrap-slot CEK. The
+/// comments-CEK is used to encrypt comment bodies separately from the
+/// post body — preserves the option of body-public + comments-private
+/// (Mode 2) without leaking the body CEK relationship.
+pub fn derive_cek_comments(cek: &[u8; 32], slot_binder_nonce: &[u8; 32]) -> [u8; 32] {
+    let mut input = [0u8; 64];
+    input[..32].copy_from_slice(cek);
+    input[32..].copy_from_slice(slot_binder_nonce);
+    blake3::derive_key("itsgoin/fof-cek-comments/v1", &input)
+}
+
 /// Encrypt a post with a provided CEK, wrapping for recipients.
 /// Returns `(base64_ciphertext, Vec<WrappedKey>)`.
 pub fn encrypt_post_with_cek(
@@ -1347,4 +1618,150 @@ mod tests {
         // Different calls produce different noise (with very high probability)
         assert_ne!(random_slot_noise(64), random_slot_noise(64));
     }
+
+    // --- FoF Layer 1: vouch-grant seal/open ---
+
+    fn make_persona_x25519(seed_byte: u8) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
+        // Derive (x25519_priv, x25519_pub) from an ed25519 seed, mirroring
+        // the production path personas use.
+        let mut seed = [0u8; 32];
+        seed[0] = seed_byte;
+        let priv_x = ed25519_seed_to_x25519_private(&seed);
+        let signing_key = SigningKey::from_bytes(&seed);
+        let pub_x = signing_key.verifying_key().to_montgomery().to_bytes();
+        (priv_x, pub_x)
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn vouch_grant_roundtrip() {
+        let (alice_priv, _alice_pub) = make_persona_x25519(11);
+        let (bob_priv, bob_pub) = make_persona_x25519(22);
+        let bio_post_id: PostId = [7u8; 32];
+        let v_me: [u8; 32] = [42u8; 32];
+
+        let (eph_priv, eph_pub) = generate_vouch_batch_ephemeral();
+
+        // Seal for Bob
+        let wrapper = seal_vouch_grant(&eph_priv, &bob_pub, &bio_post_id, &v_me).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(wrapper.len(), 48, "wrapper must be 48 bytes (32 sealed + 16 tag)");
+
+        // Bob opens it
+        let opened = open_vouch_grant(&bob_priv, &eph_pub, &bio_post_id, &wrapper);
+        assert_eq!(opened, Some(v_me));
+
+        // Alice (not the recipient) cannot open it
+        let alice_attempt = open_vouch_grant(&alice_priv, &eph_pub, &bio_post_id, &wrapper);
+        assert_eq!(alice_attempt, None, "non-recipient must not decrypt");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn vouch_grant_wrong_bio_post_id_fails() {
+        let (_, bob_pub) = make_persona_x25519(22);
+        let (bob_priv, _) = make_persona_x25519(22);
+        let real_bio_id: PostId = [1u8; 32];
+        let wrong_bio_id: PostId = [2u8; 32];
+        let v_me: [u8; 32] = [99u8; 32];
+
+        let (eph_priv, eph_pub) = generate_vouch_batch_ephemeral();
+        let wrapper = seal_vouch_grant(&eph_priv, &bob_pub, &real_bio_id, &v_me).unwrap();
+
+        // Wrong bio_post_id derives a different key+nonce → AEAD fails.
+        let attempt = open_vouch_grant(&bob_priv, &eph_pub, &wrong_bio_id, &wrapper);
+        assert_eq!(attempt, None);
+
+        // Right bio_post_id succeeds.
+        let ok = open_vouch_grant(&bob_priv, &eph_pub, &real_bio_id, &wrapper);
+        assert_eq!(ok, Some(v_me));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn vouch_grant_random_bytes_fail() {
+        let (bob_priv, _) = make_persona_x25519(22);
+        let bio_post_id: PostId = [5u8; 32];
+        let (_, eph_pub) = generate_vouch_batch_ephemeral();
+
+        let mut junk = [0u8; 48];
+        rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut junk);
+        let attempt = open_vouch_grant(&bob_priv, &eph_pub, &bio_post_id, &junk);
+        assert_eq!(attempt, None, "random bytes must AEAD-fail (dummy wrapper indistinguishable)");
+    }
+
+    // --- FoF Layer 2: wrap-slot seal/open ---
+
+    #[test]
+    fn wrap_slot_roundtrip() {
+        let v_x: [u8; 32] = [0x42; 32];
+        let slot_binder_nonce: [u8; 32] = [0xAB; 32];
+        let cek: [u8; 32] = [0x01; 32];
+        let priv_x_seed: [u8; 32] = [0x02; 32];
+
+        let sealed = seal_wrap_slot(&v_x, &slot_binder_nonce, &cek, &priv_x_seed).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(sealed.read_ciphertext.len(), 48);
+        assert_eq!(sealed.sign_ciphertext.len(), 48);
+
+        // Same V_x opens it.
+        let opened = open_wrap_slot(
+            &v_x, &slot_binder_nonce,
+            &sealed.read_ciphertext, &sealed.sign_ciphertext,
+        ).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(opened.cek, cek);
+        assert_eq!(opened.priv_x_seed, priv_x_seed);
+
+        // Different V_x must not.
+        let wrong_v_x: [u8; 32] = [0x99; 32];
+        let attempt = open_wrap_slot(
+            &wrong_v_x, &slot_binder_nonce,
+            &sealed.read_ciphertext, &sealed.sign_ciphertext,
+        );
+        assert_eq!(attempt, None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn wrap_slot_wrong_binder_fails() {
+        let v_x: [u8; 32] = [0x42; 32];
+        let real_nonce: [u8; 32] = [0xAB; 32];
+        let wrong_nonce: [u8; 32] = [0xCD; 32];
+        let cek: [u8; 32] = [0x01; 32];
+        let priv_x_seed: [u8; 32] = [0x02; 32];
+
+        let sealed = seal_wrap_slot(&v_x, &real_nonce, &cek, &priv_x_seed).unwrap();
+        // Same V_x but wrong slot_binder_nonce → AEAD-fail.
+        let attempt = open_wrap_slot(
+            &v_x, &wrong_nonce,
+            &sealed.read_ciphertext, &sealed.sign_ciphertext,
+        );
+        assert_eq!(attempt, None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn wrap_slot_prefilter_tag_is_stable_and_keyed() {
+        let v_a: [u8; 32] = [0x11; 32];
+        let v_b: [u8; 32] = [0x22; 32];
+        let nonce_x: [u8; 32] = [0xAA; 32];
+        let nonce_y: [u8; 32] = [0xBB; 32];
+
+        let t1 = wrap_slot_prefilter_tag(&v_a, &nonce_x);
+        let t2 = wrap_slot_prefilter_tag(&v_a, &nonce_x);
+        assert_eq!(t1, t2, "deterministic for same inputs");
+
+        // Different V_x or different nonce → different tag (overwhelmingly).
+        let t3 = wrap_slot_prefilter_tag(&v_b, &nonce_x);
+        assert_ne!(t1, t3);
+        let t4 = wrap_slot_prefilter_tag(&v_a, &nonce_y);
+        assert_ne!(t1, t4);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn cek_comments_is_distinct_per_post() {
+        let cek: [u8; 32] = [0x01; 32];
+        let nonce_a: [u8; 32] = [0xAA; 32];
+        let nonce_b: [u8; 32] = [0xBB; 32];
+        let a = derive_cek_comments(&cek, &nonce_a);
+        let b = derive_cek_comments(&cek, &nonce_b);
+        assert_ne!(a, b);
+        // Stable.
+        assert_eq!(derive_cek_comments(&cek, &nonce_a), a);
+        // Different from the base CEK.
+        assert_ne!(a, cek);
+    }
 }

crates/core/src/group_key_distribution.rs

@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ pub fn build_distribution_post(
         content: ciphertext_b64,
         attachments: vec![],
         timestamp_ms,
+    fof_gating: None,
+    supersedes_post_id: None,
     };
     let post_id = compute_post_id(&post);
     let visibility = PostVisibility::Encrypted { recipients: wrapped_keys };
@@ -241,6 +243,8 @@ mod tests {
             content: ciphertext,
             attachments: vec![],
             timestamp_ms: 200,
+        fof_gating: None,
+        supersedes_post_id: None,
         };
         let forged_vis = PostVisibility::Encrypted { recipients: wrapped };
 

crates/core/src/import.rs

@@ -62,6 +62,9 @@ fn parse_exported_intent(raw: Option<&str>, vis: &PostVisibility) -> VisibilityI
     // No intent recorded — infer from the visibility shape.
     match vis {
         PostVisibility::Public => VisibilityIntent::Public,
+        // FoF Layer 3: FoFClosed pairs with VisibilityIntent::Public.
+        // The FoF gating handles audience; intent is the structural tag.
+        PostVisibility::FoFClosed => VisibilityIntent::Public,
         PostVisibility::Encrypted { recipients } => {
             // Heuristic: DMs typically wrap to 1-2 people (recipient + self);
             // Friends posts wrap to every public follow (usually many).
@@ -286,6 +289,8 @@ pub async fn import_as_personas(
                     content: ep.content.clone(),
                     attachments: attachments.clone(),
                     timestamp_ms: ep.timestamp_ms,
+                fof_gating: None,
+                supersedes_post_id: None,
                 };
 
                 // Preserve the original visibility intent from the export.
@@ -459,6 +464,8 @@ pub async fn import_public_posts(
                     content: ep.content.clone(),
                     attachments: attachments.clone(),
                     timestamp_ms: ep.timestamp_ms,
+                fof_gating: None,
+                supersedes_post_id: None,
                 };
 
                 // Read blob data from archive
@@ -677,6 +684,16 @@ pub async fn merge_with_key(
                         skipped += 1;
                         continue;
                     }
+                    PostVisibility::FoFClosed => {
+                        // FoF Layer 3 import: skip for now. The recovered
+                        // post would need its fof_gating + CEK to decrypt,
+                        // and the receiving persona's keyring may not
+                        // include the right V_x. Re-issue via the author's
+                        // device is the supported path.
+                        debug!(post = ep.id, "FoFClosed post — skipping (import not yet supported)");
+                        skipped += 1;
+                        continue;
+                    }
                 };
 
                 // Create new post under our identity
@@ -685,6 +702,8 @@ pub async fn merge_with_key(
                     content: plaintext,
                     attachments: attachments.clone(),
                     timestamp_ms: ep.timestamp_ms,
+                fof_gating: None,
+                supersedes_post_id: None,
                 };
 
                 // Read blob data from archive (may need decryption for encrypted posts)

crates/core/src/lib.rs

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ pub mod crypto;
 pub mod group_key_distribution;
 pub mod http;
 pub mod export;
+pub mod fof;
 pub mod identity;
 pub mod import;
 pub mod announcement;

crates/core/src/network.rs

@@ -2234,6 +2234,11 @@ pub fn should_send_post(
                 .map(|members| members.iter().any(|m| query_list.contains(m)))
                 .unwrap_or(false)
         }
+        // FoF Layer 3: FoFClosed posts have no per-recipient identifiers
+        // on the wire. Match like Public (by author): the post propagates
+        // through the same CDN diversity path as public content; only
+        // FoF readers can decrypt.
+        PostVisibility::FoFClosed => query_list.contains(&post.author),
     }
 }
 
@@ -2253,6 +2258,8 @@ mod tests {
             content: "test".to_string(),
             attachments: vec![],
             timestamp_ms: 1000,
+        fof_gating: None,
+        supersedes_post_id: None,
         }
     }
 

crates/core/src/node.rs

@@ -63,6 +63,35 @@ pub struct Node {
     budget_last_reset_ms: Arc<AtomicU64>,
 }
 
+/// FoF Layer 1: generate a fresh 32B `V_me` and insert it as the
+/// persona's current epoch (epoch=1). Idempotent if the persona already
+/// has a current key — does nothing in that case.
+fn generate_and_store_initial_v_me(
+    storage: &crate::storage::Storage,
+    persona_id: &NodeId,
+    now_ms: u64,
+) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+    use rand::RngCore;
+    if storage.current_own_vouch_key(persona_id)?.is_some() {
+        return Ok(());
+    }
+    let mut key = [0u8; 32];
+    rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut key);
+    storage.insert_own_vouch_key(persona_id, 1, &key, now_ms)?;
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Async wrapper used by `Node::create_posting_identity`. Acquires the
+/// storage handle and delegates to the sync helper.
+async fn ensure_initial_v_me(
+    storage: &StoragePool,
+    persona_id: &NodeId,
+    now_ms: u64,
+) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+    let s = storage.get().await;
+    generate_and_store_initial_v_me(&s, persona_id, now_ms)
+}
+
 impl Node {
     /// Create or open a node in the given data directory (Desktop profile)
     pub async fn open(data_dir: impl AsRef<Path>) -> anyhow::Result<Self> {
@@ -133,6 +162,8 @@ impl Node {
                     created_at: now,
                 })?;
                 s.set_default_posting_id(&nid)?;
+                // FoF Layer 1: auto-gen V_me epoch 1 for this fresh persona.
+                generate_and_store_initial_v_me(&s, &nid, now)?;
                 // Mark this as the disposable auto-gen persona from the
                 // fresh-install flow. If the user subsequently imports, we
                 // prune this id iff it's still pristine (no name, no posts,
@@ -684,6 +715,12 @@ impl Node {
             }
         }
 
+        // FoF Layer 1: every persona owns its own V_me (symmetric 32B key).
+        // Auto-generate epoch 1 at creation. Stored in vouch_keys_own with
+        // is_current=1. Per Layer 4, rotations append new epochs; this row
+        // is never deleted automatically.
+        ensure_initial_v_me(&self.storage, &node_id, now).await?;
+
         Ok(identity)
     }
 
@@ -698,12 +735,22 @@ impl Node {
         bio: &str,
         avatar_cid: Option<[u8; 32]>,
     ) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+        // FoF Layer 1: build the vouch-grant batch (if this persona has
+        // any current vouch targets) + bump the bio_epoch.
+        let (vouch_grants, bio_epoch) = {
+            let storage = self.storage.get().await;
+            let batch = crate::profile::build_vouch_grant_batch(&*storage, posting_id)?;
+            let epoch = storage.next_bio_epoch_for(posting_id)?;
+            (batch, epoch)
+        };
         let profile_post = crate::profile::build_profile_post(
             posting_id,
             posting_secret,
             display_name,
             bio,
             avatar_cid,
+            vouch_grants,
+            bio_epoch,
         );
         let profile_post_id = crate::content::compute_post_id(&profile_post);
         let timestamp_ms = profile_post.timestamp_ms;
@@ -772,12 +819,16 @@ impl Node {
                 avatar_cid: None,
                 timestamp_ms: pi.created_at,
                 signature,
+                vouch_grants: None,
+                bio_epoch: 0,
             };
             let post = Post {
                 author: pi.node_id,
                 content: serde_json::to_string(&content).unwrap_or_default(),
                 attachments: vec![],
                 timestamp_ms: pi.created_at,
+            fof_gating: None,
+            supersedes_post_id: None,
             };
             let post_id = crate::content::compute_post_id(&post);
             {
@@ -964,6 +1015,7 @@ impl Node {
             content,
             intent,
             attachment_data,
+            None,
         ).await
     }
 
@@ -988,9 +1040,187 @@ impl Node {
             content,
             intent,
             attachment_data,
+            None,
         ).await
     }
 
+    /// FoF Layer 2: create a Mode 2 post (public body, FoF-gated
+    /// comments). Intent is Public; the FoF gating block is built
+    /// from the default persona's keyring and embedded in
+    /// `Post.fof_gating`. The author retains the per-post CEK locally
+    /// for decrypting their own comments later.
+    ///
+    /// Returns `(post_id, post, visibility, cek)`. `visibility` is
+    /// always Public for Mode 2.
+    pub async fn create_post_with_fof_comments(
+        &self,
+        content: String,
+        attachment_data: Vec<(Vec<u8>, String)>,
+    ) -> anyhow::Result<(PostId, Post, PostVisibility, [u8; 32])> {
+        // Build the gating block from the default persona's keyring.
+        let built = {
+            let storage = self.storage.get().await;
+            crate::fof::build_fof_comment_gating(&*storage, &self.default_posting_id)?
+                .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!(
+                    "default persona has no V_me; rotate or recreate before FoF posts"
+                ))?
+        };
+        let cek = built.cek;
+        let provenance = built.real_slot_provenance.clone();
+        let (post_id, post, visibility) = self.create_post_inner(
+            &self.default_posting_id,
+            &self.default_posting_secret,
+            content,
+            VisibilityIntent::Public,
+            attachment_data,
+            Some(built.gating),
+        ).await?;
+
+        // FoF Layer 4: persist provenance so cascade-revocation can
+        // resolve "which pub_x's on which of my posts were sealed
+        // under V_me epoch N" later.
+        // FoF Layer 5: cache the CEK + slot_binder_nonce for author-
+        // direct decrypt without trial-unlocking on read.
+        {
+            let storage = self.storage.get().await;
+            for entry in &provenance {
+                let _ = storage.record_post_slot_provenance(
+                    &self.default_posting_id, &post_id, entry.slot_index,
+                    &entry.v_x_owner, entry.v_x_epoch, &entry.pub_x,
+                );
+            }
+            // Recover slot_binder_nonce via the Post we just built — it
+            // lives inside fof_gating.
+            if let Some(gating) = post.fof_gating.as_ref() {
+                let _ = storage.cache_own_fof_post_cek(
+                    &self.default_posting_id, &post_id,
+                    &cek, &gating.slot_binder_nonce,
+                );
+            }
+        }
+
+        Ok((post_id, post, visibility, cek))
+    }
+
+    /// FoF Layer 3: read the decrypted body of a FoFClosed post if any
+    /// of this device's personas can unlock it. Returns `Ok(None)` for
+    /// non-FoFClosed posts and for FoFClosed posts not reachable via
+    /// any held V_x. Errors only on storage/crypto faults.
+    pub async fn read_fof_closed_body(
+        &self,
+        post_id: &PostId,
+    ) -> anyhow::Result<Option<String>> {
+        use base64::Engine;
+        let storage = self.storage.get().await;
+        let (post, visibility) = match storage.get_post_with_visibility(post_id)? {
+            Some(pv) => pv,
+            None => return Ok(None),
+        };
+        if !matches!(visibility, PostVisibility::FoFClosed) {
+            return Ok(None);
+        }
+        let gating = match post.fof_gating.as_ref() {
+            Some(g) => g,
+            None => return Ok(None),
+        };
+
+        // FoF Layer 5: author-direct fast path. If this device authored
+        // the post, the CEK was cached at publish time; skip the
+        // wrap-slot trial entirely.
+        let (cek, slot_binder_nonce) = if let Some((cek, nonce)) =
+            storage.lookup_own_fof_post_cek(&post.author, post_id)?
+        {
+            (cek, nonce)
+        } else {
+            let unlock = match crate::fof::find_unlock_for_post(&*storage, &post)? {
+                Some(u) => u,
+                None => return Ok(None),
+            };
+            (unlock.cek, gating.slot_binder_nonce)
+        };
+        drop(storage);
+
+        let body_ct = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD
+            .decode(post.content.as_bytes())
+            .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("FoFClosed body base64 decode: {}", e))?;
+        let plaintext = crate::fof::decrypt_fof_body(&body_ct, &cek, &slot_binder_nonce)?;
+        Ok(Some(plaintext))
+    }
+
+    /// FoF Layer 3: create a Mode 1 post (FoFClosed). The body is
+    /// encrypted under the gating CEK before storage; only readers
+    /// who can unlock a wrap_slot can decrypt it. Comments are also
+    /// FoF-gated, inheriting Layer 2's path.
+    ///
+    /// Returns `(post_id, post, visibility, cek)`.
+    pub async fn create_post_fof_closed(
+        &self,
+        content: String,
+    ) -> anyhow::Result<(PostId, Post, [u8; 32])> {
+        let built = {
+            let storage = self.storage.get().await;
+            crate::fof::build_fof_comment_gating(&*storage, &self.default_posting_id)?
+                .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!(
+                    "default persona has no V_me; rotate or recreate before FoF posts"
+                ))?
+        };
+        let cek = built.cek;
+        let slot_binder_nonce = built.slot_binder_nonce;
+        let provenance = built.real_slot_provenance.clone();
+
+        // Encrypt + pad body under the gating CEK. Output is base64'd
+        // so it can live in Post.content (which is a String).
+        let encrypted_body = crate::fof::encrypt_fof_body(&content, &cek, &slot_binder_nonce)?;
+        let body_b64 = {
+            use base64::Engine;
+            base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(&encrypted_body)
+        };
+
+        // Build + store + propagate. Visibility is FoFClosed (tag);
+        // gating lives in Post.fof_gating.
+        let now = std::time::SystemTime::now()
+            .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)?
+            .as_millis() as u64;
+        let post = Post {
+            author: self.default_posting_id,
+            content: body_b64,
+            attachments: vec![],
+            timestamp_ms: now,
+            fof_gating: Some(built.gating),
+        supersedes_post_id: None,
+        };
+        let post_id = crate::content::compute_post_id(&post);
+
+        {
+            let storage = self.storage.get().await;
+            storage.store_post_with_intent(
+                &post_id, &post,
+                &PostVisibility::FoFClosed,
+                &VisibilityIntent::Public,
+            )?;
+            // FoF Layer 4: persist provenance for cascade-revoke.
+            for entry in &provenance {
+                let _ = storage.record_post_slot_provenance(
+                    &self.default_posting_id, &post_id, entry.slot_index,
+                    &entry.v_x_owner, entry.v_x_epoch, &entry.pub_x,
+                );
+            }
+            // FoF Layer 5: cache CEK for author-direct decrypt.
+            let _ = storage.cache_own_fof_post_cek(
+                &self.default_posting_id, &post_id, &cek, &slot_binder_nonce,
+            );
+        }
+
+        self.update_neighbor_manifests_as(
+            &self.default_posting_id,
+            &self.default_posting_secret,
+            &post_id,
+            now,
+        ).await;
+
+        Ok((post_id, post, cek))
+    }
+
     async fn create_post_inner(
         &self,
         posting_id: &NodeId,
@@ -998,6 +1228,7 @@ impl Node {
         content: String,
         intent: VisibilityIntent,
         attachment_data: Vec<(Vec<u8>, String)>,
+        fof_gating: Option<crate::types::FoFCommentGating>,
     ) -> anyhow::Result<(PostId, Post, PostVisibility)> {
         // Validate attachments
         if attachment_data.len() > 4 {
@@ -1113,6 +1344,8 @@ impl Node {
             content: final_content,
             attachments,
             timestamp_ms: now,
+            fof_gating,
+            supersedes_post_id: None,
         };
 
         let post_id = compute_post_id(&post);
@@ -1126,8 +1359,13 @@ impl Node {
                 let _ = storage.pin_blob(&att.cid);
             }
 
-            // Initialize encrypted receipt + comment slots for non-public posts
-            if !matches!(visibility, PostVisibility::Public) {
+            // Initialize encrypted receipt + comment slots for non-public posts.
+            // FoFClosed posts use the FoF wrap_slots mechanism for both
+            // reads and comments — they don't use the legacy receipt/
+            // comment slot path. Skip init for FoFClosed.
+            if !matches!(visibility, PostVisibility::Public)
+                && !matches!(visibility, PostVisibility::FoFClosed)
+            {
                 let participant_count = match &visibility {
                     PostVisibility::Encrypted { recipients } => recipients.len(),
                     PostVisibility::GroupEncrypted { .. } => {
@@ -1142,7 +1380,7 @@ impl Node {
                             _ => 2,
                         }
                     }
-                    PostVisibility::Public => unreachable!(),
+                    PostVisibility::Public | PostVisibility::FoFClosed => unreachable!(),
                 };
 
                 let receipt_slots: Vec<Vec<u8>> = (0..participant_count)
@@ -1396,6 +1634,15 @@ impl Node {
                                 ).ok()
                             })
                     }
+                    // FoF Layer 3: FoFClosed body decrypt requires
+                    // trial-unlocking via the post's wrap_slots against
+                    // every persona's received-vouch keyring — which is
+                    // an async storage lookup, not available in this
+                    // sync helper. Feed rendering for FoFClosed posts
+                    // goes through a dedicated async path that resolves
+                    // the unlock + decrypts; this helper returns None
+                    // and lets the caller fall back.
+                    PostVisibility::FoFClosed => None,
                 };
                 (id, post, vis, decrypted)
             })
@@ -1503,12 +1750,22 @@ impl Node {
             storage.get_profile(&posting_id).ok().flatten().and_then(|p| p.avatar_cid)
         };
 
+        // FoF Layer 1: build the vouch-grant batch (if this persona has
+        // any current vouch targets) + bump bio_epoch.
+        let (vouch_grants, bio_epoch) = {
+            let storage = self.storage.get().await;
+            let batch = crate::profile::build_vouch_grant_batch(&*storage, &posting_id)?;
+            let epoch = storage.next_bio_epoch_for(&posting_id)?;
+            (batch, epoch)
+        };
         let profile_post = crate::profile::build_profile_post(
             &posting_id,
             &posting_secret,
             &display_name,
             &bio,
             avatar_cid,
+            vouch_grants,
+            bio_epoch,
         );
         let profile_post_id = crate::content::compute_post_id(&profile_post);
         let timestamp_ms = profile_post.timestamp_ms;
@@ -1637,6 +1894,220 @@ impl Node {
         storage.get_display_name(node_id)
     }
 
+    // ---- FoF Layer 1: Vouches ----
+
+    /// Vouch for a persona from the current default posting identity.
+    /// Inserts into `own_vouch_targets` and republishes the bio post so
+    /// the recipient sees the vouch on their next scan.
+    pub async fn vouch_for_peer(&self, target: &NodeId) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+        let (default_id, display_name, bio, avatar_cid, posting_secret) = {
+            let storage = self.storage.get().await;
+            let Some(default_id) = storage.get_default_posting_id()? else {
+                anyhow::bail!("no default posting identity");
+            };
+            let pi = storage.get_posting_identity(&default_id)?
+                .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("default posting identity not in storage"))?;
+            let profile = storage.get_profile(&default_id)?;
+            let (name, bio, avatar) = match profile {
+                Some(p) => (p.display_name, p.bio, p.avatar_cid),
+                None => (pi.display_name.clone(), String::new(), None),
+            };
+            (default_id, name, bio, avatar, pi.secret_seed)
+        };
+
+        // Convert the target's ed25519 NodeId to its X25519 pubkey via
+        // the same Montgomery derivation receivers use.
+        let target_x25519_pub = crate::crypto::ed25519_pubkey_to_x25519_public(target)?;
+        let now_ms = std::time::SystemTime::now()
+            .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)?
+            .as_millis() as u64;
+
+        {
+            let storage = self.storage.get().await;
+            storage.upsert_vouch_target(&default_id, target, &target_x25519_pub, now_ms, true)?;
+        }
+
+        // Republish bio post so the new vouch_grants batch propagates.
+        self.publish_profile_post_as(
+            &default_id, &posting_secret, &display_name, &bio, avatar_cid,
+        ).await?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// FoF Layer 4: pure V_me rotation. Generates a new V_me epoch for
+    /// the default persona without revoking any vouchee. Republishes
+    /// the persona's bio post under the new key for every current
+    /// target. Used for periodic refresh or leak response (combined
+    /// with `cascade_revoke_v_me_epoch` for old-content cleanup +
+    /// `key_burn_post` for leaked-key scenarios).
+    ///
+    /// Returns the new epoch number.
+    pub async fn rotate_v_me(&self) -> anyhow::Result<u32> {
+        use rand::RngCore;
+        let (default_id, display_name, bio, avatar_cid, posting_secret, new_epoch) = {
+            let storage = self.storage.get().await;
+            let Some(default_id) = storage.get_default_posting_id()? else {
+                anyhow::bail!("no default posting identity");
+            };
+            let pi = storage.get_posting_identity(&default_id)?
+                .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("default posting identity missing"))?;
+            let profile = storage.get_profile(&default_id)?;
+            let (name, bio, avatar) = match profile {
+                Some(p) => (p.display_name, p.bio, p.avatar_cid),
+                None => (pi.display_name.clone(), String::new(), None),
+            };
+
+            let next_epoch = storage.current_own_vouch_key(&default_id)?
+                .map(|(e, _)| e + 1)
+                .unwrap_or(1);
+            let mut new_key = [0u8; 32];
+            rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut new_key);
+            let now_ms = std::time::SystemTime::now()
+                .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)?
+                .as_millis() as u64;
+            storage.insert_own_vouch_key(&default_id, next_epoch, &new_key, now_ms)?;
+            (default_id, name, bio, avatar, pi.secret_seed, next_epoch)
+        };
+
+        // Republish bio so existing vouch targets receive the new key.
+        self.publish_profile_post_as(
+            &default_id, &posting_secret, &display_name, &bio, avatar_cid,
+        ).await?;
+        Ok(new_epoch)
+    }
+
+    /// FoF Layer 4: cascade revocation. For every FoF post authored by
+    /// the default persona where slots were sealed under V_me at
+    /// `retired_epoch`, publish a per-pub_x revocation diff. Existing
+    /// stored comments by those pub_x's are cascade-deleted via the
+    /// standard apply_fof_revocation path.
+    ///
+    /// Returns the number of post-level revocations published.
+    /// Typically called after `rotate_v_me` when the user wants to
+    /// retire access for vouchees they no longer want commenting on
+    /// old posts. Optional — by default rotation grandfathers old
+    /// posts.
+    pub async fn cascade_revoke_v_me_epoch(
+        &self,
+        retired_epoch: u32,
+        reason_code: u8,
+    ) -> anyhow::Result<usize> {
+        // Look up all (post_id, pub_x) pairs sealed under (self, retired_epoch).
+        let pairs = {
+            let storage = self.storage.get().await;
+            storage.list_provenance_for_v_x_epoch(
+                &self.default_posting_id,
+                &self.default_posting_id,
+                retired_epoch,
+            )?
+        };
+        let mut published = 0usize;
+        for (post_id, _pub_x, slot_index) in pairs {
+            // Use the existing per-post revocation helper. It signs +
+            // applies locally + propagates.
+            if self.revoke_fof_commenter(post_id, slot_index, reason_code).await.is_ok() {
+                published += 1;
+            }
+        }
+        Ok(published)
+    }
+
+    /// Revoke a vouch + rotate V_me. Per Scott's design: revocation IS
+    /// the rotation primitive. The new V_me_epoch is generated and the
+    /// bio post is republished with wrappers for every remaining target
+    /// (current=1); the revoked persona only ever held the old V_me, so
+    /// they're frozen out of future content but retain access to old
+    /// content (grandfathered) per Layer 4.
+    pub async fn revoke_vouch_and_rotate(&self, target: &NodeId) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+        use rand::RngCore;
+        let (default_id, display_name, bio, avatar_cid, posting_secret) = {
+            let storage = self.storage.get().await;
+            let Some(default_id) = storage.get_default_posting_id()? else {
+                anyhow::bail!("no default posting identity");
+            };
+            let pi = storage.get_posting_identity(&default_id)?
+                .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("default posting identity not in storage"))?;
+            let profile = storage.get_profile(&default_id)?;
+            let (name, bio, avatar) = match profile {
+                Some(p) => (p.display_name, p.bio, p.avatar_cid),
+                None => (pi.display_name.clone(), String::new(), None),
+            };
+            (default_id, name, bio, avatar, pi.secret_seed)
+        };
+
+        let now_ms = std::time::SystemTime::now()
+            .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)?
+            .as_millis() as u64;
+
+        {
+            let storage = self.storage.get().await;
+            // Soft-revoke: drop from current set (row retained for the
+            // audit trail + cascade-pickup later if needed).
+            storage.revoke_vouch_target(&default_id, target)?;
+
+            // Rotate V_me: pick the next epoch, insert as current. Prior
+            // epoch retained (Layer 4 receiver-chain model).
+            let next_epoch = storage.current_own_vouch_key(&default_id)?
+                .map(|(e, _)| e + 1)
+                .unwrap_or(1);
+            let mut new_key = [0u8; 32];
+            rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut new_key);
+            storage.insert_own_vouch_key(&default_id, next_epoch, &new_key, now_ms)?;
+        }
+
+        // Republish bio post — new V_me wrapped to every still-current target.
+        self.publish_profile_post_as(
+            &default_id, &posting_secret, &display_name, &bio, avatar_cid,
+        ).await?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// List vouches the default persona has issued. Returns
+    /// `(target_node_id, display_name, granted_at_ms)` tuples.
+    pub async fn list_vouches_given(&self) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<(NodeId, String, u64)>> {
+        let (default_id, targets) = {
+            let storage = self.storage.get().await;
+            let Some(default_id) = storage.get_default_posting_id()? else {
+                return Ok(Vec::new());
+            };
+            let targets = storage.list_current_vouch_targets(&default_id)?;
+            (default_id, targets)
+        };
+        let _ = default_id;
+        let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(targets.len());
+        for (tid, _xpub, at) in targets {
+            let display = match self.resolve_display_name(&tid).await {
+                Ok((name, _, _)) if !name.is_empty() => name,
+                _ => String::new(),
+            };
+            out.push((tid, display, at));
+        }
+        Ok(out)
+    }
+
+    /// List vouches received by the default persona. Returns
+    /// `(voucher_node_id, display_name, latest_epoch, latest_received_at_ms)`.
+    pub async fn list_vouches_received(&self) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<(NodeId, String, u32, u64)>> {
+        let (default_id, vouchers) = {
+            let storage = self.storage.get().await;
+            let Some(default_id) = storage.get_default_posting_id()? else {
+                return Ok(Vec::new());
+            };
+            let vouchers = storage.list_vouchers_for(&default_id)?;
+            (default_id, vouchers)
+        };
+        let _ = default_id;
+        let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(vouchers.len());
+        for (owner, epoch, at) in vouchers {
+            let display = match self.resolve_display_name(&owner).await {
+                Ok((name, _, _)) if !name.is_empty() => name,
+                _ => String::new(),
+            };
+            out.push((owner, display, epoch, at));
+        }
+        Ok(out)
+    }
+
     // ---- Blobs ----
 
     /// Get a blob by CID from local store.
@@ -1684,6 +2155,15 @@ impl Node {
                     Ok(None)
                 }
             }
+            // FoF Layer 3: blob decryption for FoFClosed posts requires
+            // the CEK recovered via wrap_slots. This sync helper doesn't
+            // have storage access for the keyring trial-unlock; the
+            // async caller path goes through get_blob_for_post which
+            // can perform the unlock. For now return None — blob
+            // decryption for FoF posts is wired in the receive/render
+            // slice. (v0 ships with FoF body decryption only; binary
+            // attachments arrive in a follow-up.)
+            PostVisibility::FoFClosed => Ok(None),
         }
     }
 
@@ -2807,6 +3287,9 @@ impl Node {
             PostVisibility::GroupEncrypted { .. } => {
                 anyhow::bail!("cannot revoke individual access on a group-encrypted post; remove from circle instead")
             }
+            PostVisibility::FoFClosed => {
+                anyhow::bail!("cannot revoke individual access on a FoF-gated post via this path; use revoke_fof_commenter (Layer 2) or grant_fof_access (Layer 3)")
+            }
         };
 
         let new_recipient_ids: Vec<NodeId> = existing_recipients
@@ -2886,6 +3369,8 @@ impl Node {
                     content: new_content,
                     attachments: post.attachments.clone(),
                     timestamp_ms: post.timestamp_ms,
+                fof_gating: None,
+                supersedes_post_id: None,
                 };
                 let new_post_id = compute_post_id(&new_post);
 
@@ -4344,6 +4829,21 @@ impl Node {
         post_id: PostId,
         content: String,
     ) -> anyhow::Result<crate::types::InlineComment> {
+        // FoF Layer 2: if the post carries fof_gating, route through
+        // the FoF comment path so the comment is encrypted under
+        // CEK_comments + signed under priv_x. The CDN four-check accept
+        // rule on receivers will then validate the comment.
+        let is_fof_gated = {
+            let storage = self.storage.get().await;
+            storage.get_post(&post_id)
+                .ok()
+                .flatten()
+                .and_then(|p| p.fof_gating)
+                .is_some()
+        };
+        if is_fof_gated {
+            return self.comment_on_fof_post(post_id, content).await;
+        }
         self.comment_on_post_inner(post_id, content, None).await
     }
 
@@ -4391,6 +4891,9 @@ impl Node {
             signature,
             deleted_at: None,
             ref_post_id,
+            pub_x_index: None,
+            group_sig: None,
+            encrypted_payload: None,
         };
 
         let storage = self.storage.get().await;
@@ -4516,6 +5019,286 @@ impl Node {
         Ok(())
     }
 
+    /// FoF Layer 2: revoke a specific pub_x from a FoF-gated post the
+    /// caller authored. Builds a signed FoFRevocation diff, applies it
+    /// locally (record + cascade delete), and propagates via the
+    /// standard engagement-diff path. Idempotent.
+    ///
+    /// Caller passes the `pub_x_index` (from a stored comment they want
+    /// to revoke). The pub_x bytes are resolved via the post's
+    /// pub_post_set; if the post or index is missing, returns Err.
+    pub async fn revoke_fof_commenter(
+        &self,
+        post_id: PostId,
+        pub_x_index: u32,
+        reason_code: u8,
+    ) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+        // Resolve pub_x bytes + confirm we authored the post.
+        let (post_author, posting_secret, revoked_pub_x) = {
+            let storage = self.storage.get().await;
+            let post = storage.get_post(&post_id)?
+                .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("post not found"))?;
+            let gating = post.fof_gating.as_ref()
+                .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("post is not FoF-gated"))?;
+            let pub_x = gating.pub_post_set.get(pub_x_index as usize).copied()
+                .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("pub_x_index out of bounds"))?;
+            let identity = storage.get_posting_identity(&post.author)?
+                .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("post author not on this device"))?;
+            (post.author, identity.secret_seed, pub_x)
+        };
+
+        let revoked_at_ms = std::time::SystemTime::now()
+            .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)?
+            .as_millis() as u64;
+        let author_sig = crate::fof::sign_fof_revocation(
+            &posting_secret, &post_id, &revoked_pub_x, revoked_at_ms, reason_code,
+        );
+
+        // Apply locally first so the author's UI updates immediately.
+        {
+            let storage = self.storage.get().await;
+            let _ = crate::fof::apply_fof_revocation_locally(
+                &*storage, &post_id, &revoked_pub_x, revoked_at_ms, reason_code, &author_sig,
+            );
+        }
+
+        // Propagate the diff.
+        let now = std::time::SystemTime::now()
+            .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)?
+            .as_millis() as u64;
+        let diff = crate::protocol::BlobHeaderDiffPayload {
+            post_id,
+            author: post_author,
+            ops: vec![crate::types::BlobHeaderDiffOp::FoFRevocation {
+                post_id,
+                revoked_pub_x,
+                revoked_at_ms,
+                reason_code,
+                author_sig,
+            }],
+            timestamp_ms: now,
+        };
+        self.network.propagate_engagement_diff(&post_id, &diff, &post_author).await;
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// FoF Layer 2: author a comment on a FoF-gated post. Finds the
+    /// caller's unlock (any held V_x that matches one of the post's
+    /// slots), encrypts the body under CEK_comments, signs with the
+    /// per-V_x priv_x, attaches pub_x_index, stores locally, and
+    /// propagates via the standard engagement-diff path.
+    ///
+    /// Returns the constructed InlineComment. Errors if the post
+    /// isn't FoF-gated, or if no held V_x admits the caller.
+    pub async fn comment_on_fof_post(
+        &self,
+        post_id: PostId,
+        body: String,
+    ) -> anyhow::Result<crate::types::InlineComment> {
+        let (unlock, slot_binder_nonce, commenter_id, commenter_secret, post_author) = {
+            let storage = self.storage.get().await;
+            let post = storage.get_post(&post_id)?
+                .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("post not found"))?;
+            let gating = post.fof_gating.as_ref()
+                .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("post is not FoF-gated"))?;
+            let slot_binder_nonce = gating.slot_binder_nonce;
+            let unlock = crate::fof::find_unlock_for_post(&*storage, &post)?
+                .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("no held V_x unlocks this post — not in FoF set"))?;
+            let identity = storage.get_posting_identity(&unlock.persona_id)?
+                .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("unlocking persona not on device"))?;
+            (unlock, slot_binder_nonce, identity.node_id, identity.secret_seed, post.author)
+        };
+
+        let now = std::time::SystemTime::now()
+            .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)?
+            .as_millis() as u64;
+        let comment = crate::fof::build_fof_comment(
+            &post_id, &unlock, &slot_binder_nonce,
+            &commenter_id, &commenter_secret, &body, None, now,
+        )?;
+
+        // Store locally.
+        {
+            let storage = self.storage.get().await;
+            storage.store_comment(&comment)?;
+        }
+
+        // Propagate via engagement-diff path.
+        let diff = crate::protocol::BlobHeaderDiffPayload {
+            post_id,
+            author: post_author,
+            ops: vec![crate::types::BlobHeaderDiffOp::AddComment(comment.clone())],
+            timestamp_ms: now,
+        };
+        self.network.propagate_engagement_diff(&post_id, &diff, &post_author).await;
+
+        Ok(comment)
+    }
+
+    /// FoF Layer 2: retroactively widen read+comment access on a
+    /// FoF-gated post the caller authored by sealing a fresh wrap slot
+    /// under the given V_x and appending it to the post's gating.
+    /// Propagates as a `FoFAccessGrant` engagement-diff.
+    pub async fn grant_fof_access(
+        &self,
+        post_id: PostId,
+        new_v_x: &[u8; 32],
+    ) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+        use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
+        use rand::RngCore;
+
+        // Resolve post + author + cached CEK + slot_binder_nonce. The
+        // author must be on this device.
+        let (post_author, posting_secret, cek, slot_binder_nonce) = {
+            let storage = self.storage.get().await;
+            let post = storage.get_post(&post_id)?
+                .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("post not found"))?;
+            let gating = post.fof_gating.as_ref()
+                .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("post is not FoF-gated"))?;
+            let identity = storage.get_posting_identity(&post.author)?
+                .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("post author not on this device"))?;
+
+            // Recover the CEK: try every V_x in the author persona's
+            // keyring against the post's slots. The author's own slot
+            // will unwrap and yield CEK.
+            let unlock = crate::fof::find_unlock_for_post(&*storage, &post)?
+                .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("could not recover CEK for own post"))?;
+            (post.author, identity.secret_seed, unlock.cek, gating.slot_binder_nonce)
+        };
+
+        // Generate a fresh (priv_x, pub_x) keypair, seal a wrap slot
+        // under the new V_x with the same CEK + slot_binder_nonce.
+        let mut seed = [0u8; 32];
+        rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut seed);
+        let signing_key = SigningKey::from_bytes(&seed);
+        let new_pub_x = *signing_key.verifying_key().as_bytes();
+
+        let sealed = crate::crypto::seal_wrap_slot(new_v_x, &slot_binder_nonce, &cek, &seed)?;
+        let new_wrap_slot = crate::types::WrapSlot {
+            prefilter_tag: sealed.prefilter_tag,
+            read_ciphertext: sealed.read_ciphertext,
+            sign_ciphertext: sealed.sign_ciphertext,
+        };
+
+        let granted_at_ms = std::time::SystemTime::now()
+            .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)?
+            .as_millis() as u64;
+        let author_sig = crate::fof::sign_fof_access_grant(
+            &posting_secret, &post_id, &new_pub_x, &new_wrap_slot, granted_at_ms,
+        );
+
+        // Apply locally first.
+        {
+            let storage = self.storage.get().await;
+            let _ = crate::fof::apply_fof_access_grant_locally(
+                &*storage, &post_id, &new_pub_x, &new_wrap_slot,
+            );
+        }
+
+        // Propagate.
+        let now = std::time::SystemTime::now()
+            .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)?
+            .as_millis() as u64;
+        let diff = crate::protocol::BlobHeaderDiffPayload {
+            post_id,
+            author: post_author,
+            ops: vec![crate::types::BlobHeaderDiffOp::FoFAccessGrant {
+                post_id,
+                new_pub_x,
+                new_wrap_slot,
+                granted_at_ms,
+                author_sig,
+            }],
+            timestamp_ms: now,
+        };
+        self.network.propagate_engagement_diff(&post_id, &diff, &post_author).await;
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// FoF Layer 4: in-place wrap-slot replacement for leaked-V_me
+    /// scenarios. Re-seals the slot at `slot_index` under `new_v_x`
+    /// (typically a freshly-rotated V_me), publishes a signed
+    /// FoFKeyBurn diff. Local stored copy of the post mutates to
+    /// replace the slot. Post body remains encrypted under the
+    /// existing CEK (CEK isn't rotated by this op).
+    pub async fn key_burn_post_slot(
+        &self,
+        post_id: PostId,
+        slot_index: u32,
+        new_v_x: &[u8; 32],
+    ) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+        use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
+        use rand::RngCore;
+
+        let (post_author, posting_secret, cek, slot_binder_nonce) = {
+            let storage = self.storage.get().await;
+            let post = storage.get_post(&post_id)?
+                .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("post not found"))?;
+            let gating = post.fof_gating.as_ref()
+                .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("post is not FoF-gated"))?;
+            if slot_index as usize >= gating.wrap_slots.len() {
+                anyhow::bail!("slot_index out of bounds");
+            }
+            let identity = storage.get_posting_identity(&post.author)?
+                .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("post author not on this device"))?;
+            // Recover CEK by trial-unlocking the author's own slot.
+            let unlock = crate::fof::find_unlock_for_post(&*storage, &post)?
+                .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("could not recover CEK for own post"))?;
+            (post.author, identity.secret_seed, unlock.cek, gating.slot_binder_nonce)
+        };
+
+        // Generate fresh per-V_x keypair, seal a new slot under new_v_x.
+        let mut seed = [0u8; 32];
+        rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut seed);
+        let signing_key = SigningKey::from_bytes(&seed);
+        let new_pub_x = *signing_key.verifying_key().as_bytes();
+
+        let sealed = crate::crypto::seal_wrap_slot(new_v_x, &slot_binder_nonce, &cek, &seed)?;
+        let new_wrap_slot = crate::types::WrapSlot {
+            prefilter_tag: sealed.prefilter_tag,
+            read_ciphertext: sealed.read_ciphertext,
+            sign_ciphertext: sealed.sign_ciphertext,
+        };
+
+        let burned_at_ms = std::time::SystemTime::now()
+            .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)?
+            .as_millis() as u64;
+        let author_sig = crate::fof::sign_fof_key_burn(
+            &posting_secret, &post_id, slot_index, &new_pub_x, &new_wrap_slot, burned_at_ms,
+        );
+
+        // Apply locally for immediate UI update.
+        {
+            let storage = self.storage.get().await;
+            let _ = crate::fof::apply_fof_key_burn_locally(
+                &*storage, &post_id, slot_index, &new_pub_x, &new_wrap_slot,
+                burned_at_ms,
+            );
+        }
+
+        // Propagate.
+        let now = std::time::SystemTime::now()
+            .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)?
+            .as_millis() as u64;
+        let diff = crate::protocol::BlobHeaderDiffPayload {
+            post_id,
+            author: post_author,
+            ops: vec![crate::types::BlobHeaderDiffOp::FoFKeyBurn {
+                post_id,
+                slot_index,
+                new_pub_x,
+                new_wrap_slot,
+                burned_at_ms,
+                author_sig,
+            }],
+            timestamp_ms: now,
+        };
+        self.network.propagate_engagement_diff(&post_id, &diff, &post_author).await;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
     /// Get the comment policy for a post.
     pub async fn get_comment_policy(&self, post_id: PostId) -> anyhow::Result<Option<crate::types::CommentPolicy>> {
         let storage = self.storage.get().await;
@@ -4608,6 +5391,11 @@ impl Node {
                     Ok(None)
                 }
             }
+            // FoF Layer 3: FoFClosed posts don't use the legacy
+            // receipt/comment slot mechanism — they use the FoF gating's
+            // CEK_comments. This helper isn't used for FoF posts;
+            // return None so callers fall back to the FoF-specific path.
+            PostVisibility::FoFClosed => Ok(None),
         }
     }
 

crates/core/src/profile.rs

@@ -46,6 +46,14 @@ pub fn apply_profile_post_if_applicable(
     }
     let content = verify_profile_post(post)?;
 
+    // FoF Layer 1: scan any embedded vouch-grant batch BEFORE the
+    // timestamp short-circuit below. A profile post that arrives older
+    // than what we've stored (last-writer-wins on display_name/bio) can
+    // still carry vouch grants we haven't seen — bio_epoch is the actual
+    // freshness signal for the wrapper batch, distinct from the
+    // post's display timestamp.
+    scan_vouch_grants_for_all_personas(s, &post.author, &content)?;
+
     // Only apply if newer than the stored row (last-writer-wins by timestamp).
     if let Some(existing) = s.get_profile(&post.author)? {
         if existing.updated_at >= content.timestamp_ms {
@@ -68,14 +76,113 @@ pub fn apply_profile_post_if_applicable(
     Ok(())
 }
 
+/// FoF Layer 1: trial-decrypt every wrapper in the post's
+/// `vouch_grants` batch against every persona on this device, recording
+/// successful unlocks into `vouch_keys_received`. Idempotent via the
+/// `(scanner_persona, bio_author, bio_epoch)` scan cache.
+///
+/// Follow-gated per the spec: skipped if the bio author is not in
+/// `follows`. The manual "check this bio for a vouch for me" gesture
+/// (post-Layer-1) will call a separate force-scan entrypoint.
+///
+/// Self-authored posts are skipped (we already have our own V_me).
+pub fn scan_vouch_grants_for_all_personas(
+    s: &Storage,
+    author: &NodeId,
+    content: &ProfilePostContent,
+) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+    let Some(batch) = &content.vouch_grants else { return Ok(()); };
+
+    // Skip if we authored this post.
+    if s.get_posting_identity(author)?.is_some() {
+        return Ok(());
+    }
+
+    // Follow-gate: only auto-scan bios of accounts we follow.
+    if !s.is_follow(author)? {
+        return Ok(());
+    }
+
+    let personas = s.list_posting_identities()?;
+    let now_ms = std::time::SystemTime::now()
+        .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
+        .map(|d| d.as_millis() as u64)
+        .unwrap_or(0);
+
+    for persona in &personas {
+        // Per-persona scan cache: skip if we already trialed this
+        // (scanner_persona, bio_author, bio_epoch) tuple.
+        if s.lookup_bio_scan_cache(&persona.node_id, author, content.bio_epoch)?.is_some() {
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        // Derive persona's X25519 private scalar to trial-decrypt
+        // wrappers under the batch ephemeral pubkey.
+        let persona_x25519_priv = crypto::ed25519_seed_to_x25519_private(&persona.secret_seed);
+
+        let mut unlocked: Option<u32> = None;
+        for wrapper_bytes in &batch.wrappers {
+            if let Some(v_me) = crypto::open_vouch_grant(
+                &persona_x25519_priv,
+                &batch.batch_eph_pub,
+                &batch.bio_pub_nonce,
+                wrapper_bytes,
+            ) {
+                // This wrapper was addressed to this persona.
+                // Use the post's author as the source post-id field
+                // (informational only — the cryptographic binder is
+                // bio_pub_nonce inside the batch).
+                s.insert_received_vouch_key(
+                    &persona.node_id,
+                    author,
+                    batch.v_x_epoch,
+                    &v_me,
+                    now_ms,
+                    None,
+                )?;
+                unlocked = Some(batch.v_x_epoch);
+                // Continue iterating — a future multi-epoch batch may
+                // address this persona twice (different epoch wrappers
+                // for the same persona). Today only one epoch ships per
+                // batch, but the loop is correct either way.
+            }
+        }
+
+        // FoF Layer 5: if a new V_x just landed for this persona,
+        // sweep the unreadable-posts queue for (persona, author) and
+        // re-attempt unlock. Posts that were previously not-in-set
+        // become readable as soon as this V_x lands.
+        if unlocked.is_some() {
+            let _ = crate::fof::sweep_unreadable_on_new_v_x(s, &persona.node_id, author);
+        }
+
+        s.record_bio_scan_result(
+            &persona.node_id,
+            author,
+            content.bio_epoch,
+            unlocked,
+            now_ms,
+        )?;
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
 /// Build a Profile post signed by the posting identity. Caller is
 /// responsible for storing and propagating it.
+///
+/// Optional `vouch_grants` carries the FoF Layer 1 anonymous-wrapper
+/// batch distributing the persona's current `V_me` to vouched personas.
+/// `bio_epoch` is a monotonic per-persona counter that lets receivers
+/// short-circuit re-scanning unchanged bios.
 pub fn build_profile_post(
     author: &NodeId,
     author_secret: &[u8; 32],
     display_name: &str,
     bio: &str,
     avatar_cid: Option<[u8; 32]>,
+    vouch_grants: Option<crate::types::VouchGrantBatch>,
+    bio_epoch: u32,
 ) -> Post {
     let timestamp_ms = std::time::SystemTime::now()
         .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
@@ -88,12 +195,16 @@ pub fn build_profile_post(
         avatar_cid,
         timestamp_ms,
         signature,
+        vouch_grants,
+        bio_epoch,
     };
     Post {
         author: *author,
         content: serde_json::to_string(&content).unwrap_or_default(),
         attachments: vec![],
         timestamp_ms,
+    fof_gating: None,
+    supersedes_post_id: None,
     }
 }
 
@@ -103,6 +214,110 @@ pub fn profile_post_visibility() -> PostVisibility {
     PostVisibility::Public
 }
 
+/// FoF Layer 1: build the `VouchGrantBatch` for a persona's next bio
+/// publish, drawing the current `V_me` from `vouch_keys_own` and the
+/// recipient list from `own_vouch_targets` (current=1 only).
+///
+/// Returns `None` when the persona has no current vouch targets — the
+/// bio post can be published without a vouch-grant batch in that case.
+///
+/// Padding: per FoF Layer 3, the wrapper count is bucketed: power-of-2
+/// up to 256 (minimum bucket 8), then linear +128 steps. Real wrappers
+/// + random-bytes dummies are shuffled together. Dummies are 48B random
+/// sequences — AEAD-indistinguishable from real wrappers to outsiders.
+pub fn build_vouch_grant_batch(
+    storage: &crate::storage::Storage,
+    persona_id: &NodeId,
+) -> anyhow::Result<Option<crate::types::VouchGrantBatch>> {
+    use rand::RngCore;
+    use rand::seq::SliceRandom;
+
+    let Some((v_x_epoch, v_me)) = storage.current_own_vouch_key(persona_id)? else {
+        return Ok(None);
+    };
+    let targets = storage.list_current_vouch_targets(persona_id)?;
+    if targets.is_empty() {
+        return Ok(None);
+    }
+
+    let mut bio_pub_nonce = [0u8; 32];
+    rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut bio_pub_nonce);
+    let (eph_priv, batch_eph_pub) = crypto::generate_vouch_batch_ephemeral();
+
+    // Real wrappers.
+    let mut wrappers: Vec<Vec<u8>> = Vec::with_capacity(targets.len());
+    for (_tid, x25519_pub, _at) in &targets {
+        let w = crypto::seal_vouch_grant(&eph_priv, x25519_pub, &bio_pub_nonce, &v_me)?;
+        wrappers.push(w);
+    }
+
+    // Dummy padding to the next bucket. Min 8; power-of-2 to 256; then
+    // +128 linear steps. See FoF Layer 3 lead decisions.
+    let target_count = next_vouch_batch_bucket(wrappers.len());
+    let mut rng = rand::rng();
+    while wrappers.len() < target_count {
+        let mut dummy = vec![0u8; 48];
+        rng.fill_bytes(&mut dummy);
+        wrappers.push(dummy);
+    }
+
+    // Shuffle so real and dummy positions are indistinguishable.
+    wrappers.shuffle(&mut rng);
+
+    Ok(Some(crate::types::VouchGrantBatch {
+        batch_eph_pub,
+        v_x_epoch,
+        bio_pub_nonce,
+        wrappers,
+    }))
+}
+
+/// Bucket-pad a real wrapper count to the next allowed bucket.
+/// Minimum bucket is 8 (so a single-target post still publishes 8
+/// wrappers, hiding "this persona has no vouchees" entirely).
+/// Power-of-2 up to 256; linear +128 steps above 256.
+pub(crate) fn next_vouch_batch_bucket(real: usize) -> usize {
+    if real <= 8 { return 8; }
+    if real <= 256 {
+        // smallest power of 2 >= real
+        let mut b = 8usize;
+        while b < real { b *= 2; }
+        return b;
+    }
+    // 384, 512, 640, ...
+    let above = real - 256;
+    let steps = (above + 127) / 128;
+    256 + steps * 128
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod batch_padding_tests {
+    use super::next_vouch_batch_bucket;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn buckets_match_spec() {
+        // Minimum floor.
+        assert_eq!(next_vouch_batch_bucket(0), 8);
+        assert_eq!(next_vouch_batch_bucket(1), 8);
+        assert_eq!(next_vouch_batch_bucket(7), 8);
+        assert_eq!(next_vouch_batch_bucket(8), 8);
+
+        // Power-of-2 progression.
+        assert_eq!(next_vouch_batch_bucket(9), 16);
+        assert_eq!(next_vouch_batch_bucket(16), 16);
+        assert_eq!(next_vouch_batch_bucket(17), 32);
+        assert_eq!(next_vouch_batch_bucket(129), 256);
+        assert_eq!(next_vouch_batch_bucket(256), 256);
+
+        // Linear +128 above 256.
+        assert_eq!(next_vouch_batch_bucket(257), 384);
+        assert_eq!(next_vouch_batch_bucket(384), 384);
+        assert_eq!(next_vouch_batch_bucket(385), 512);
+        assert_eq!(next_vouch_batch_bucket(500), 512);
+        assert_eq!(next_vouch_batch_bucket(513), 640);
+    }
+}
+
 /// Compute the `PostId` for a freshly-built profile post.
 pub fn profile_post_id(post: &Post) -> PostId {
     crate::content::compute_post_id(post)
@@ -130,7 +345,7 @@ mod tests {
         let s = temp_storage();
         let (sec, pub_id) = make_keypair(11);
 
-        let post = build_profile_post(&pub_id, &sec, "Alice", "hello world", None);
+        let post = build_profile_post(&pub_id, &sec, "Alice", "hello world", None, None, 0);
         apply_profile_post_if_applicable(&s, &post, Some(&VisibilityIntent::Profile)).unwrap();
 
         let stored = s.get_profile(&pub_id).unwrap().expect("profile stored");
@@ -145,7 +360,7 @@ mod tests {
         let (sec_b, _pub_b) = make_keypair(2);
 
         // Build a post claiming `pub_a` but signing with `sec_b`.
-        let post = build_profile_post(&pub_a, &sec_b, "Impostor", "", None);
+        let post = build_profile_post(&pub_a, &sec_b, "Impostor", "", None, None, 0);
         let res = apply_profile_post_if_applicable(&s, &post, Some(&VisibilityIntent::Profile));
         assert!(res.is_err());
         assert!(s.get_profile(&pub_a).unwrap().is_none());
@@ -157,7 +372,7 @@ mod tests {
         let (sec, pub_id) = make_keypair(3);
 
         // Seed with a newer profile.
-        let mut newer = build_profile_post(&pub_id, &sec, "NewName", "", None);
+        let mut newer = build_profile_post(&pub_id, &sec, "NewName", "", None, None, 0);
         // Hack the timestamp to make it clearly newer.
         let mut content: ProfilePostContent = serde_json::from_str(&newer.content).unwrap();
         content.timestamp_ms = 10_000;
@@ -167,7 +382,7 @@ mod tests {
         apply_profile_post_if_applicable(&s, &newer, Some(&VisibilityIntent::Profile)).unwrap();
 
         // Apply an older profile — should be ignored.
-        let mut older = build_profile_post(&pub_id, &sec, "OldName", "", None);
+        let mut older = build_profile_post(&pub_id, &sec, "OldName", "", None, None, 0);
         let mut content_o: ProfilePostContent = serde_json::from_str(&older.content).unwrap();
         content_o.timestamp_ms = 5_000;
         content_o.signature = crypto::sign_profile(&sec, &content_o.display_name, &content_o.bio, &content_o.avatar_cid, content_o.timestamp_ms);
@@ -178,4 +393,162 @@ mod tests {
         let stored = s.get_profile(&pub_id).unwrap().unwrap();
         assert_eq!(stored.display_name, "NewName");
     }
+
+    /// End-to-end Layer 1: voucher's bio post carries a VouchGrantBatch
+    /// addressed to the receiver's persona; receiver auto-scans on
+    /// apply_profile_post_if_applicable and populates vouch_keys_received.
+    #[test]
+    fn vouch_grant_end_to_end_via_bio_post() {
+        use crate::types::{PostingIdentity, VouchGrantBatch};
+        use rand::RngCore;
+
+        let s = temp_storage();
+
+        // Two personas on this device (the "receiver" device). Alice is
+        // the only one we're acting as; "bob" is the voucher whose bio
+        // post arrives.
+        let (alice_seed, alice_id) = make_keypair(50);
+        let (bob_seed, bob_id) = make_keypair(60);
+
+        s.upsert_posting_identity(&PostingIdentity {
+            node_id: alice_id,
+            secret_seed: alice_seed,
+            display_name: "Alice".into(),
+            created_at: 1000,
+        }).unwrap();
+
+        // Receiver-device follows the voucher; otherwise auto-scan is
+        // follow-gated off and would skip.
+        s.add_follow(&bob_id).unwrap();
+
+        // Build bob's V_me + the wrapper batch addressed to alice's
+        // persona X25519 pubkey.
+        let mut v_me_bob = [0u8; 32];
+        rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut v_me_bob);
+
+        let alice_x25519_pub = crypto::ed25519_pubkey_to_x25519_public(&alice_id).unwrap();
+        let mut bio_pub_nonce = [0u8; 32];
+        rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut bio_pub_nonce);
+        let (eph_priv, batch_eph_pub) = crypto::generate_vouch_batch_ephemeral();
+
+        let real_wrapper = crypto::seal_vouch_grant(
+            &eph_priv,
+            &alice_x25519_pub,
+            &bio_pub_nonce,
+            &v_me_bob,
+        ).unwrap();
+
+        // Mix in some dummy wrappers to confirm the scan finds the real
+        // one even when most positions fail AEAD.
+        let mut wrappers = vec![real_wrapper];
+        for _ in 0..7 {
+            let mut dummy = vec![0u8; 48];
+            rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut dummy);
+            wrappers.push(dummy);
+        }
+
+        let batch = VouchGrantBatch {
+            batch_eph_pub,
+            v_x_epoch: 1,
+            bio_pub_nonce,
+            wrappers,
+        };
+
+        // Construct bob's bio post with the batch.
+        let timestamp_ms = 2000;
+        let display_name = "Bob";
+        let bio = "hi";
+        let signature = crypto::sign_profile(&bob_seed, display_name, bio, &None, timestamp_ms);
+        let content = ProfilePostContent {
+            display_name: display_name.to_string(),
+            bio: bio.to_string(),
+            avatar_cid: None,
+            timestamp_ms,
+            signature,
+            vouch_grants: Some(batch),
+            bio_epoch: 1,
+        };
+        let post = Post {
+            author: bob_id,
+            content: serde_json::to_string(&content).unwrap(),
+            attachments: vec![],
+            timestamp_ms,
+        fof_gating: None,
+        supersedes_post_id: None,
+        };
+
+        // Apply. Auto-scan should fire and store the unwrapped V_me.
+        apply_profile_post_if_applicable(&s, &post, Some(&VisibilityIntent::Profile)).unwrap();
+
+        // Alice's keyring should now hold V_bob at epoch 1.
+        let received = s.list_received_vouch_keys(&alice_id).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(received.len(), 1, "expected one received vouch");
+        let (owner, epoch, key) = &received[0];
+        assert_eq!(*owner, bob_id);
+        assert_eq!(*epoch, 1);
+        assert_eq!(*key, v_me_bob);
+
+        // Scan cache should record the hit so a re-apply is a no-op
+        // (idempotent + cheap).
+        let cache = s.lookup_bio_scan_cache(&alice_id, &bob_id, 1).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(cache, Some(Some(1)));
+    }
+
+    /// Same setup, but receiver-device does NOT follow the voucher.
+    /// Auto-scan must skip; no vouch keys recorded.
+    #[test]
+    fn vouch_grant_skipped_for_non_followed_author() {
+        use crate::types::{PostingIdentity, VouchGrantBatch};
+        use rand::RngCore;
+
+        let s = temp_storage();
+        let (alice_seed, alice_id) = make_keypair(70);
+        let (bob_seed, bob_id) = make_keypair(80);
+        s.upsert_posting_identity(&PostingIdentity {
+            node_id: alice_id,
+            secret_seed: alice_seed,
+            display_name: "Alice".into(),
+            created_at: 1000,
+        }).unwrap();
+        // NOT following bob — scan must skip.
+
+        let mut v_me_bob = [0u8; 32];
+        rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut v_me_bob);
+        let alice_x25519_pub = crypto::ed25519_pubkey_to_x25519_public(&alice_id).unwrap();
+        let mut bio_pub_nonce = [0u8; 32];
+        rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut bio_pub_nonce);
+        let (eph_priv, batch_eph_pub) = crypto::generate_vouch_batch_ephemeral();
+        let wrapper = crypto::seal_vouch_grant(
+            &eph_priv, &alice_x25519_pub, &bio_pub_nonce, &v_me_bob,
+        ).unwrap();
+        let batch = VouchGrantBatch {
+            batch_eph_pub,
+            v_x_epoch: 1,
+            bio_pub_nonce,
+            wrappers: vec![wrapper],
+        };
+        let timestamp_ms = 2000;
+        let signature = crypto::sign_profile(&bob_seed, "Bob", "", &None, timestamp_ms);
+        let content = ProfilePostContent {
+            display_name: "Bob".into(),
+            bio: String::new(),
+            avatar_cid: None,
+            timestamp_ms,
+            signature,
+            vouch_grants: Some(batch),
+            bio_epoch: 1,
+        };
+        let post = Post {
+            author: bob_id,
+            content: serde_json::to_string(&content).unwrap(),
+            attachments: vec![],
+            timestamp_ms,
+        fof_gating: None,
+        supersedes_post_id: None,
+        };
+        apply_profile_post_if_applicable(&s, &post, Some(&VisibilityIntent::Profile)).unwrap();
+
+        let received = s.list_received_vouch_keys(&alice_id).unwrap();
+        assert!(received.is_empty(), "non-followed author must not auto-scan");
+    }
 }

crates/core/src/types.rs

@@ -39,6 +39,22 @@ pub struct Post {
     pub attachments: Vec<Attachment>,
     /// Unix timestamp in milliseconds
     pub timestamp_ms: u64,
+    /// FoF Layer 2: author-signed snapshot of the comment-gating
+    /// state at publish time. Carries wrap_slots, pub_post_set, and the
+    /// slot_binder_nonce. `None` on posts without FoF comment gating.
+    /// Covered by `PostId = BLAKE3(Post)` so any forgery is detectable.
+    /// Revocations and access-grants arrive later as engagement diffs
+    /// against the local BlobHeader copy; this field is the snapshot at
+    /// t=0, not the live mutable state.
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub fof_gating: Option<FoFCommentGating>,
+    /// FoF Layer 4: optional pointer to a post this one supersedes.
+    /// Used by the "re-issue with narrower access" path (advanced
+    /// rotation). Readers may display "this is a re-issued version
+    /// of an earlier post" + offer to view the original if still
+    /// cached. Covered by PostId since it's part of the signed Post.
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub supersedes_post_id: Option<PostId>,
 }
 
 /// A reference to a media blob attached to a post
@@ -209,6 +225,16 @@ pub enum PostVisibility {
         /// 60 bytes: nonce(12) || encrypted_cek(32) || tag(16)
         wrapped_cek: Vec<u8>,
     },
+    /// FoF Layer 3 (Mode 1): post body is encrypted under the CEK
+    /// carried in the post's `fof_gating.wrap_slots`. Tag variant only —
+    /// the actual gating data (slot_binder_nonce / pub_post_set /
+    /// wrap_slots) lives in `Post.fof_gating` so Mode 1 and Mode 2
+    /// share a single home for the FoF state.
+    ///
+    /// Invariant: when visibility is FoFClosed, `Post.fof_gating` must
+    /// be Some. Posts with FoFClosed + None gating are rejected at
+    /// receive time.
+    FoFClosed,
 }
 
 impl Default for PostVisibility {
@@ -274,6 +300,50 @@ pub struct ProfilePostContent {
     /// 64-byte ed25519 signature. See `crypto::sign_profile` for the byte
     /// layout signed by the posting identity.
     pub signature: Vec<u8>,
+    /// FoF Layer 1: HPKE-style anonymous wrapper batch carrying the
+    /// voucher's V_me to each non-revoked recipient. `None` on bio posts
+    /// that don't issue vouches (e.g., the inaugural empty-state profile
+    /// post for a brand-new persona). Bound to this post via the
+    /// `bio_post_id` baked into each wrapper's HKDF info.
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub vouch_grants: Option<VouchGrantBatch>,
+    /// FoF Layer 1: monotonic bio-post revision counter for this persona.
+    /// Used by receivers to short-circuit the scan via `vouch_bio_scan_cache`.
+    /// Increments on every bio publish; 0 for pre-Layer-1 posts (back-compat).
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub bio_epoch: u32,
+}
+
+/// FoF Layer 1: a batch of per-recipient HPKE-style wrappers carrying
+/// the voucher's `V_me` to each currently-vouched persona. Sits inside
+/// a `VisibilityIntent::Profile` post. The post's author is the voucher.
+///
+/// Wire shape: one shared 32B ephemeral X25519 pubkey + N 48-byte
+/// wrappers (32B sealed `V_me` + 16B AEAD tag). Wrappers carry no
+/// recipient identifier; recipient anonymity is preserved by HPKE key
+/// privacy. The HKDF info string includes the bio post id but NEVER
+/// a recipient identifier — including one would break key privacy.
+///
+/// Dummy wrappers are random 48-byte sequences indistinguishable from
+/// real ones; they AEAD-fail on every persona. Bucketed padding is
+/// applied by the publisher (Layer 3 specifies the bucket boundaries).
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct VouchGrantBatch {
+    /// Shared ephemeral X25519 pubkey for this batch.
+    pub batch_eph_pub: [u8; 32],
+    /// Epoch of the voucher's `V_me` being distributed in this batch.
+    /// All wrappers in the batch carry the same epoch's key.
+    pub v_x_epoch: u32,
+    /// Random 32B nonce binding this batch's wrappers to this specific
+    /// bio publish. Plays the role the spec calls "bio_post_id" in the
+    /// HKDF info string — distinct from the actual `PostId` (which is
+    /// `BLAKE3(post)` and would be circular here). Recipient-free per
+    /// HPKE key-privacy requirements.
+    pub bio_pub_nonce: [u8; 32],
+    /// Real + dummy wrappers, shuffled. Each entry is exactly 48 bytes
+    /// (32B sealed `V_me` + 16B AEAD tag); receivers identify "their"
+    /// wrapper by successful AEAD decryption, not by position.
+    pub wrappers: Vec<Vec<u8>>,
 }
 
 /// Content payload of a `VisibilityIntent::Announcement` post.
@@ -874,6 +944,9 @@ pub struct InlineComment {
     pub post_id: PostId,
     /// Either the full comment text (short comments) or a short preview of
     /// the referenced post (when `ref_post_id` is set).
+    ///
+    /// On FoF-policy posts this field is empty — the body lives encrypted
+    /// in `encrypted_payload`. Non-FoF readers see no text at all.
     pub content: String,
     /// When the comment was created (ms)
     pub timestamp_ms: u64,
@@ -888,6 +961,23 @@ pub struct InlineComment {
     /// for the expanded view.
     #[serde(default)]
     pub ref_post_id: Option<PostId>,
+    /// FoF Layer 2: index into the parent post's `pub_post_set`
+    /// identifying which voucher-chain signed this comment. `None` on
+    /// non-FoF comments. CDN propagation nodes verify `group_sig`
+    /// against `pub_post_set[pub_x_index]` before forwarding.
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub pub_x_index: Option<u32>,
+    /// FoF Layer 2: 64-byte ed25519 signature under priv_x over
+    /// `(encrypted_payload || parent_post_id || pub_x_index)`. Verified
+    /// at CDN-level against `pub_post_set[pub_x_index]`.
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub group_sig: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+    /// FoF Layer 2: ChaCha20-Poly1305 ciphertext under CEK_comments
+    /// (derived from CEK via HKDF). Plaintext is the JSON-encoded
+    /// comment body + optional vouch_mac + optional parent_comment_id.
+    /// Non-FoF observers see only ciphertext + sigs — body is opaque.
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub encrypted_payload: Option<Vec<u8>>,
 }
 
 /// Permission level for comments on a post
@@ -900,6 +990,13 @@ pub enum CommentPermission {
     FollowersOnly,
     /// Comments disabled
     None,
+    /// FoF Layer 2: commenter must hold one of the V_x keys in the
+    /// author's keyring (own V_me + every V_x they received). The author
+    /// publishes pub_post_set + wrap_slots in the post; commenters trial-
+    /// decrypt to unlock priv_x for signing. CDN nodes verify the
+    /// comment's group_sig + pub_x_index before forwarding — kills the
+    /// bandwidth-DoS attack a single admitted FoF member could mount.
+    FriendsOfFriends,
 }
 
 impl Default for CommentPermission {
@@ -943,6 +1040,65 @@ impl Default for ModerationMode {
     }
 }
 
+/// FoF Layer 2: per-V_x wrap slot in a post header. Dual-derived so
+/// one successful AEAD-open yields both the read CEK and the per-V_x
+/// signing seed. Real slots and dummy padding slots are byte-identical
+/// (98 bytes each); receivers identify "their" slot by successful
+/// AEAD decryption, not by position.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct WrapSlot {
+    /// 2-byte HMAC prefix. Receivers precompute one per held V_x; the
+    /// scan iterates only slots whose prefilter matches.
+    pub prefilter_tag: [u8; 2],
+    /// AEAD ciphertext under KDF(V_x, slot_binder_nonce, "read"); 48B
+    /// (32B sealed CEK + 16B tag).
+    pub read_ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
+    /// AEAD ciphertext under KDF(V_x, slot_binder_nonce, "sign"); 48B
+    /// (32B sealed priv_x ed25519 seed + 16B tag).
+    pub sign_ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+/// FoF Layer 2: author-signed revocation entry. When a post-holder
+/// receives a valid revocation diff, it deletes all locally-stored
+/// comments signed by `revoked_pub_x` AND removes the entry from its
+/// local pub_post_set, then forwards the diff. Retroactive cleanup.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct RevocationEntry {
+    /// The pub_x being revoked. Must be in the post's pub_post_set
+    /// at the time the diff is processed.
+    pub revoked_pub_x: [u8; 32],
+    /// ms since epoch.
+    pub revoked_at_ms: u64,
+    /// Opaque to CDN; used by author UI to display the reason.
+    pub reason_code: u8,
+    /// 64-byte ed25519 signature by the post author over
+    /// (post_id || revoked_pub_x || revoked_at_ms || reason_code).
+    pub author_sig: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+/// FoF Layer 2: the author-published gating block embedded in a
+/// FoF-comment-policy post. Carries the wrap slots + the matching
+/// pub_post_set + the slot_binder_nonce. The `revocation_list` is
+/// initially empty; revocation diffs append over the post's lifetime.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct FoFCommentGating {
+    /// Random 32B nonce. Plays the spec's "post_id in HKDF info" role
+    /// without circularity (PostId = BLAKE3(post) depends on this field).
+    pub slot_binder_nonce: [u8; 32],
+    /// All admitted pub_x's, 1:1 with `wrap_slots` (including dummies).
+    /// Order is randomized at publish; access-grants append at the tail
+    /// (Layer 3 resolved decision — pub_x_index stability matters more
+    /// than the small tail-positional-recency leak).
+    pub pub_post_set: Vec<[u8; 32]>,
+    /// Real wrap slots + dummy slots, shuffled at publish. 1:1 with
+    /// `pub_post_set`.
+    pub wrap_slots: Vec<WrapSlot>,
+    /// Initially empty. Receivers accumulate revocations as diffs
+    /// arrive; the on-wire t=0 snapshot is empty.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub revocation_list: Vec<RevocationEntry>,
+}
+
 /// Author-controlled engagement policy for a post
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub struct CommentPolicy {
@@ -981,6 +1137,50 @@ pub enum BlobHeaderDiffOp {
     WriteCommentSlot { post_id: PostId, slot_index: u32, data: Vec<u8> },
     /// Add new encrypted comment slots (each 256 bytes)
     AddCommentSlots { post_id: PostId, count: u32, slots: Vec<Vec<u8>> },
+    /// FoF Layer 2: author revokes a pub_x from a FoF-gated post.
+    /// Propagation nodes verify author_sig, drop locally-stored
+    /// comments by the revoked pub_x, record the revocation, and
+    /// forward. Retroactive + idempotent.
+    FoFRevocation {
+        post_id: PostId,
+        revoked_pub_x: [u8; 32],
+        revoked_at_ms: u64,
+        reason_code: u8,
+        /// 64-byte ed25519 sig by post author over
+        /// (post_id || revoked_pub_x || revoked_at_ms_le || reason_code).
+        author_sig: Vec<u8>,
+    },
+    /// FoF Layer 2: author retroactively widens read access on a
+    /// FoF-gated post by appending a new (pub_x, wrap_slot) pair. The
+    /// newly-vouched persona can now decrypt and comment on the post
+    /// without a full re-issue. Append-only at the tail per Layer 3.
+    FoFAccessGrant {
+        post_id: PostId,
+        new_pub_x: [u8; 32],
+        new_wrap_slot: WrapSlot,
+        granted_at_ms: u64,
+        /// 64-byte ed25519 sig by post author over
+        /// (post_id || new_pub_x || canonical(new_wrap_slot) || granted_at_ms_le).
+        author_sig: Vec<u8>,
+    },
+    /// FoF Layer 4: in-place wrap_slot replacement for leaked-V_me
+    /// scenarios. The author re-seals the slot at `slot_index` under a
+    /// fresh V_x (or a different held V_x), invalidating the leaked
+    /// key's read access to this specific post. The corresponding
+    /// pub_x in pub_post_set is also replaced so future comments must
+    /// sign under the new keypair. Comments signed under the OLD
+    /// pub_x at this slot are NOT auto-deleted by this op — use a
+    /// revocation diff alongside if comment cleanup is desired.
+    FoFKeyBurn {
+        post_id: PostId,
+        slot_index: u32,
+        new_pub_x: [u8; 32],
+        new_wrap_slot: WrapSlot,
+        burned_at_ms: u64,
+        /// 64-byte ed25519 sig by post author over
+        /// (post_id || slot_index_le || new_pub_x || canonical(new_wrap_slot) || burned_at_ms_le).
+        author_sig: Vec<u8>,
+    },
     /// Unknown ops from newer protocol versions — silently ignored
     #[serde(other)]
     Unknown,

crates/tauri-app/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [package]
 name = "itsgoin-desktop"
-version = "0.6.2"
+version = "0.7.0"
 edition = "2021"
 
 [lib]

crates/tauri-app/src/lib.rs

@@ -256,6 +256,10 @@ async fn post_to_dto(
             Some(text) => ("encrypted-for-me".to_string(), Some(text.to_string())),
             None => ("encrypted".to_string(), None),
         },
+        // FoF Layer 3: FoFClosed body. Decrypted is None from the sync
+        // feed-pre-decrypt helper; the frontend calls read_fof_closed_body
+        // for any post with visibility == "fof-closed" to fill in the body.
+        PostVisibility::FoFClosed => ("fof-closed".to_string(), None),
     };
     let recipients = match vis {
         PostVisibility::Encrypted { recipients } => {
@@ -346,6 +350,10 @@ async fn decrypt_just_created(
                 None
             }
         }
+        // FoF Layer 3: FoFClosed body decrypt happens via the dedicated
+        // async read_fof_closed_body command. This sync helper returns
+        // None and the frontend dispatches the FoF read explicitly.
+        PostVisibility::FoFClosed => None,
     }
 }
 
@@ -910,6 +918,7 @@ async fn post_to_dto_batch(
                 Some(text) => ("encrypted-for-me".to_string(), Some(text.clone())),
                 None => ("encrypted".to_string(), None),
             },
+            PostVisibility::FoFClosed => ("fof-closed".to_string(), None),
         };
         let recipients = match vis {
             PostVisibility::Encrypted { recipients } => {
@@ -1089,6 +1098,187 @@ async fn list_ignored_peers(state: State<'_, AppNode>) -> Result<Vec<IgnoredPeer
     Ok(out)
 }
 
+// --- FoF Layer 1: Vouches ---
+
+#[derive(Serialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+struct VouchGivenDto {
+    node_id: String,
+    display_name: String,
+    granted_at_ms: u64,
+}
+
+#[derive(Serialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+struct VouchReceivedDto {
+    node_id: String,
+    display_name: String,
+    epoch: u32,
+    received_at_ms: u64,
+}
+
+#[tauri::command]
+async fn vouch_for_peer(state: State<'_, AppNode>, node_id_hex: String) -> Result<(), String> {
+    let node = get_node(&state).await;
+    let nid = parse_node_id(&node_id_hex)?;
+    node.vouch_for_peer(&nid).await.map_err(|e| e.to_string())
+}
+
+#[tauri::command]
+async fn revoke_vouch_for_peer(state: State<'_, AppNode>, node_id_hex: String) -> Result<(), String> {
+    let node = get_node(&state).await;
+    let nid = parse_node_id(&node_id_hex)?;
+    node.revoke_vouch_and_rotate(&nid).await.map_err(|e| e.to_string())
+}
+
+#[tauri::command]
+async fn list_vouches_given(state: State<'_, AppNode>) -> Result<Vec<VouchGivenDto>, String> {
+    let node = get_node(&state).await;
+    let rows = node.list_vouches_given().await.map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+    Ok(rows.into_iter().map(|(nid, name, at)| VouchGivenDto {
+        node_id: hex::encode(nid),
+        display_name: name,
+        granted_at_ms: at,
+    }).collect())
+}
+
+#[tauri::command]
+async fn list_vouches_received(state: State<'_, AppNode>) -> Result<Vec<VouchReceivedDto>, String> {
+    let node = get_node(&state).await;
+    let rows = node.list_vouches_received().await.map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+    Ok(rows.into_iter().map(|(nid, name, epoch, at)| VouchReceivedDto {
+        node_id: hex::encode(nid),
+        display_name: name,
+        epoch,
+        received_at_ms: at,
+    }).collect())
+}
+
+// --- FoF Layer 2: comment-gated post + commenting ---
+
+#[derive(Serialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+struct FoFPostCreatedDto {
+    post_id: String,
+}
+
+#[tauri::command]
+async fn create_post_with_fof_comments(
+    state: State<'_, AppNode>,
+    content: String,
+) -> Result<FoFPostCreatedDto, String> {
+    let node = get_node(&state).await;
+    let (post_id, _post, _vis, _cek) = node
+        .create_post_with_fof_comments(content, vec![])
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+    Ok(FoFPostCreatedDto { post_id: hex::encode(post_id) })
+}
+
+#[tauri::command]
+async fn comment_on_fof_post(
+    state: State<'_, AppNode>,
+    post_id_hex: String,
+    body: String,
+) -> Result<(), String> {
+    let node = get_node(&state).await;
+    let pid = parse_node_id(&post_id_hex)?; // PostId is also [u8; 32]
+    node.comment_on_fof_post(pid, body).await
+        .map(|_| ())
+        .map_err(|e| e.to_string())
+}
+
+#[tauri::command]
+async fn revoke_fof_commenter(
+    state: State<'_, AppNode>,
+    post_id_hex: String,
+    pub_x_index: u32,
+    reason_code: u8,
+) -> Result<(), String> {
+    let node = get_node(&state).await;
+    let pid = parse_node_id(&post_id_hex)?;
+    node.revoke_fof_commenter(pid, pub_x_index, reason_code).await
+        .map_err(|e| e.to_string())
+}
+
+// FoF Layer 3: Mode 1 (FoFClosed) — encrypted body + FoF comments.
+
+#[tauri::command]
+async fn create_post_fof_closed(
+    state: State<'_, AppNode>,
+    content: String,
+) -> Result<FoFPostCreatedDto, String> {
+    let node = get_node(&state).await;
+    let (post_id, _post, _cek) = node
+        .create_post_fof_closed(content)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+    Ok(FoFPostCreatedDto { post_id: hex::encode(post_id) })
+}
+
+/// Returns the decrypted body of a FoFClosed post if any local persona
+/// can unlock it. `None` means "ciphertext only" (not in the FoF set).
+#[tauri::command]
+async fn read_fof_closed_body(
+    state: State<'_, AppNode>,
+    post_id_hex: String,
+) -> Result<Option<String>, String> {
+    let node = get_node(&state).await;
+    let pid = parse_node_id(&post_id_hex)?;
+    node.read_fof_closed_body(&pid).await.map_err(|e| e.to_string())
+}
+
+// FoF Layer 4: V_me lifecycle + cascade + key-burn.
+
+#[derive(Serialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+struct VmeRotatedDto {
+    new_epoch: u32,
+}
+
+#[tauri::command]
+async fn rotate_v_me(state: State<'_, AppNode>) -> Result<VmeRotatedDto, String> {
+    let node = get_node(&state).await;
+    let new_epoch = node.rotate_v_me().await.map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+    Ok(VmeRotatedDto { new_epoch })
+}
+
+#[derive(Serialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+struct CascadeRevokeResultDto {
+    posts_revoked: usize,
+}
+
+#[tauri::command]
+async fn cascade_revoke_v_me_epoch(
+    state: State<'_, AppNode>,
+    retired_epoch: u32,
+    reason_code: u8,
+) -> Result<CascadeRevokeResultDto, String> {
+    let node = get_node(&state).await;
+    let n = node.cascade_revoke_v_me_epoch(retired_epoch, reason_code)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+    Ok(CascadeRevokeResultDto { posts_revoked: n })
+}
+
+#[tauri::command]
+async fn key_burn_post_slot(
+    state: State<'_, AppNode>,
+    post_id_hex: String,
+    slot_index: u32,
+    new_v_x_hex: String,
+) -> Result<(), String> {
+    let node = get_node(&state).await;
+    let pid = parse_node_id(&post_id_hex)?;
+    let new_v_x_bytes = hex::decode(&new_v_x_hex)
+        .map_err(|e| format!("invalid new_v_x hex: {}", e))?;
+    let new_v_x: [u8; 32] = new_v_x_bytes.as_slice().try_into()
+        .map_err(|_| "new_v_x must be 32 bytes".to_string())?;
+    node.key_burn_post_slot(pid, slot_index, &new_v_x).await
+        .map_err(|e| e.to_string())
+}
+
 #[tauri::command]
 async fn list_follows(state: State<'_, AppNode>) -> Result<Vec<PeerDto>, String> {
     let node = get_node(&state).await;
@@ -3103,6 +3293,18 @@ pub fn run() {
             ignore_peer,
             unignore_peer,
             list_ignored_peers,
+            vouch_for_peer,
+            revoke_vouch_for_peer,
+            list_vouches_given,
+            list_vouches_received,
+            create_post_with_fof_comments,
+            comment_on_fof_post,
+            revoke_fof_commenter,
+            create_post_fof_closed,
+            read_fof_closed_body,
+            rotate_v_me,
+            cascade_revoke_v_me_epoch,
+            key_burn_post_slot,
             list_circles,
             create_circle,
             delete_circle,

crates/tauri-app/tauri.conf.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "productName": "itsgoin",
-  "version": "0.6.2",
+  "version": "0.7.0",
   "identifier": "com.itsgoin.app",
   "build": {
     "frontendDist": "../../frontend",

docs/fof-spec/README.md

@@ -42,12 +42,12 @@ No centrally-computed membership list. Reach is a function of the wrap-slot set
 
 Build and ship bottom-up. Each layer is independently shippable and exercised before moving to the next.
 
-1. **[Layer 1](layer-1-vouch-primitive.md) — Vouch primitive.** `V_x` keys, per-persona keyring storage, epoch tag, distribution/exchange mechanism, minimal UI. No posts yet.
+1. **[Layer 1](layer-1-vouch-primitive.md) — Vouch primitive.** `V_x` keys, per-persona keyring storage, epoch tag, HPKE-sealed anonymous-wrapper distribution via the voucher's bio post, scan-on-follow + scan cache, minimal UI. No FoF-gated posts yet.
 2. **[Layer 2](layer-2-mode2-fof-comments.md) — Mode 2: public posts with FoF-gated comments.** Easier implementation path; reuses existing public-post CDN path; extends `CommentPolicy` with a new `GroupMembersOfFoF` variant.
 3. **[Layer 3](layer-3-mode1-fof-closed.md) — Mode 1: `FOF_CLOSED` posts.** New `PostVisibility::FoFClosed` variant. Wrap slots, anonymous prefilter tag. Receive-path integration.
 4. **[Layer 4](layer-4-keypair-rotation.md) — Per-post keypair rotation.** Graceful `(priv_post', pub_post')` rotation record re-wrapped to current FoF set. Old comments still verifiable under old `pub_post`; new comments require new.
 5. **[Layer 5](layer-5-prefilter-and-cache.md) — Unlock cache + prefilter optimization.** Author-direct fast path, winning-V_x-per-author cache, unreadable-posts retry table, re-try-on-new-V_x trigger. Performance-critical at realistic keyring sizes (400–500 keys × 400–500 slots).
-6. **[Layer 6](layer-6-revocation.md) — Revocation & rotation cascades.** Deferred; may not be in v1. Drafted as a stub for design review.
+6. **[Layer 6](layer-6-revocation.md) — Revocation & rotation cascades.** Superseded by Layer 4. File retained as a record of alternatives considered.
 
 ---
 
@@ -68,7 +68,9 @@ Build and ship bottom-up. Each layer is independently shippable and exercised be
 - **Vouch key (`V_x`)**: a symmetric key owned by persona `x`, distributed by `x` to everyone `x` vouches for. `V_me` refers to the current persona's own vouch key.
 - **Keyring**: for a given persona, the set of vouch keys held = `{V_me}` ∪ `{V_x : x vouched for me}`.
 - **Wrap slot**: an anonymous ciphertext in a post header, carrying the post's private material encrypted under some `V_x`. Readers trial-decrypt slots whose 2-byte prefilter tag matches an owned key.
-- **pub_post / priv_post**: per-post ephemeral ed25519 keypair. `priv_post` is wrapped in the post's wrap slots; `pub_post` is in the header plaintext and used for group signature verification on comments.
+- **pub_x / priv_x**: per-`V_x` ed25519 keypair (Layer 2). `priv_x` is wrapped in the sign-slot of each `V_x`; `pub_x` is published in the post's `pub_post_set`. Comments reference a `pub_x_index` so propagation nodes can verify the comment signature without unwrapping. Replaces the earlier single `pub_post/priv_post` per-post keypair.
+- **pub_post_set**: list of all `pub_x` for a post's FoF set, in randomized order. Inline in post header. Comments reference entries by index.
+- **revocation_list**: author-appended signed entries that tell CDN propagation nodes to drop comments under a named `pub_x`. Stops compromised voucher-chains at the propagation layer.
 - **Identity key**: persona's long-term ed25519 key, used to sign content as that persona. Distinct from `priv_post`. (In current ItsGoin terms: this is the persona's posting key. Worth naming-alignment review when specifying.)
 - **Vouch MAC**: `HMAC(V_x, post_id || comment_hash)` — 16B truncated. Identifies which `V_x` a commenter holds. Inside encrypted payload (Mode 1) or alongside plaintext (Mode 2). Used by author strict-mode to verify the commenter is reachable via a known vouch chain.
 
@@ -79,9 +81,11 @@ Build and ship bottom-up. Each layer is independently shippable and exercised be
 - **`Circle` + `GroupEncrypted`** remain as-is for named explicit-membership groups. FoF is a separate visibility class, not a replacement.
 - **`PostVisibility`** gains one new variant (`FoFClosed`, from Layer 3). Mode 2 reuses `PostVisibility::Public` with extended `CommentPolicy`.
 - **`CommentPolicy`** gains one new variant for Layer 2 (Mode 2 comment gating).
-- **`InlineComment`** gets optional `group_sig` + `vouch_mac` fields (back-compat via `#[serde(default)]`, same pattern as Phase 2e `ref_post_id`).
+- **`InlineComment`** gets `pub_x_index`, `group_sig`, `identity_sig`, encrypted `ciphertext`, and inner `vouch_mac` (inside the ciphertext). Back-compat via `#[serde(default)]`, same pattern as Phase 2e `ref_post_id`.
+- **Propagation-node accept rule** for comments on FoF posts: valid `pub_x_index` + not in `revocation_list` + `group_sig` verifies + `identity_sig` verifies. Any failure → drop without forwarding. Makes bandwidth-amplification DoS infeasible.
 - **`control::receive_post`** gets new verify-gate branches for `FoFClosed` posts (author_sig + wrap_slots well-formedness) and FoF comments (group_sig verifies against `pub_post` from the referenced parent post).
 - **Multi-persona**: keyrings are per-persona. Unlock attempts iterate personas; the persona that successfully unlocks is recorded and drives comment-authorship defaults. See Layer 3 for detail.
+- **Bio post (`VisibilityIntent::Profile`)**: Layer 1 adds an optional `vouch_grants` field carrying an HPKE-sealed per-recipient wrapper batch. Existing bio-post CDN propagation carries vouch distribution — no new control-message type. See Layer 1 for wrapper format and scan policy.
 
 ---
 

docs/fof-spec/layer-1-vouch-primitive.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Layer 1 — Vouch Primitive
 
-**Scope**: Introduce `V_x` vouch keys, per-persona keyring storage, and a distribution/exchange mechanism. No post-gating yet — this layer ships first so the primitive is in place and UI-exercised before any post encryption depends on it.
+**Scope**: Introduce `V_x` vouch keys, per-persona keyring storage, and a distribution mechanism via anonymous per-recipient wrappers in the issuer's bio post. No post-gating yet — this layer ships first so the primitive is in place and UI-exercised before any post encryption depends on it.
 
 ---
 
@@ -10,19 +10,27 @@ After Layer 1 ships:
 
 - Each persona owns a current `V_me` symmetric key. New personas auto-generate one at creation.
 - Each persona has a keyring of received vouch keys: `{V_x : x has vouched for me}`.
-- Users can view who they've vouched for, who has vouched for them, and revoke/rotate `V_me`.
-- Wire protocol can transfer `V_me` from voucher to vouchee inside an existing encrypted channel.
+- Vouches are distributed via **anonymous wrappers appended to the voucher's bio post**, not via DM. No recipient IDs are visible on the wire.
+- Clients auto-scan new/updated bio posts of people they follow; successfully unwrapped `V_x` keys are silently added to the receiving persona's keyring.
+- Users can view who has vouched for them (from keyring) and who they've vouched for (from their own bio-post state).
 - No post encryption or comment gating depends on Layer 1 yet — that arrives in Layer 2/3.
 
 ---
 
 ## Lead decisions
 
-- **`V_me` is symmetric, not asymmetric.** Every vouchee holds the same `V_me`. This is the property that makes FoF reach emergent (wrap under `V_x`, anyone `x` vouched for decrypts).
-- **Distribution is unilateral.** Alice vouching for Bob = Alice gives Bob a copy of `V_alice`. No request/accept handshake. Bob can immediately read FoF posts that include `V_alice` as a wrap slot.
-- **Revocation = rotate `V_me`.** There is no per-vouchee revocation. To un-vouch someone, the persona generates a new `V_me'` and re-distributes to every remaining vouchee. Layer 6 stub.
-- **Epoch tag is part of the key.** Every `V_x` has an associated `(owner_id, epoch)` so receivers can tell fresh from stale when multiple copies arrive (e.g., if voucher rotated).
+- **`V_me` is symmetric.** 32B CSPRNG-generated. Every vouchee holds the same `V_me`. This is the property that makes FoF reach emergent (wrap under `V_x`, anyone `x` vouched for decrypts).
+- **Distribution is unilateral.** Alice vouching for Bob = Alice includes an anonymous wrapper containing `V_alice` addressed to Bob's persona pubkey in her bio post. No handshake, no acknowledgment.
+- **Distribution channel is the bio post, not DM.** Bio posts already propagate via the CDN to followers. Recipient anonymity is preserved by HPKE key privacy (see below). No new control-message type is needed. Scan-on-fetch replaces push-notification.
+- **Per-wrapper scheme is HPKE (RFC 9180).** Per-recipient ciphertext is HPKE-sealed under the recipient's X25519 persona key. One ephemeral pubkey per bio-post batch, shared across all wrappers in that batch. Each wrapper is 48B on the wire (32B sealed `V_me` + 16B AEAD tag).
+- **HKDF `info` MUST be recipient-free.** `info = "itsgoin/vouch-grant/v1/" || bio_post_id`. Including any recipient identifier in `info` breaks key privacy and is forbidden.
+- **No prefilter tag on Layer 1 wrappers.** Unlike FoF post wrap slots (Layers 2–3, which use HMAC prefilter over `V_x`), vouch grants have no prior shared secret. Readers pay a full X25519 scalar-mult per wrapper per persona. Cost is acceptable at realistic vouch-set sizes (<40ms for 600 trials).
+- **Scan is follow-gated by default.** Clients auto-scan bio posts of followed personas. For non-followed personas, scanning is a manual "check this person's bio for a vouch" gesture. Rationale: vouches that would be relevant to a reader overwhelmingly come from people the reader follows.
+- **Wrapper count padded to fixed buckets (64 / 128 / 256 / 512).** Dummy wrappers are random bytes shaped identically to real wrappers. Prevents observers from reading vouch-set size off the bio post.
+- **Wrapper order shuffled on every publish.** Prevents positional inference of which vouchee slot changed between bio-post revisions.
+- **Epoch tag is part of the key.** Each `V_x` has associated `(owner_id, epoch)` so receivers can distinguish fresh from stale when the voucher rotates.
 - **Keyring is per-persona, not per-device.** Multi-persona users have independent keyrings. Layer 3 reader logic iterates personas when trial-decrypting.
+- **`V_me` rotation IS the persona-wide revocation primitive.** To remove a vouchee, generate `V_me_new` and distribute via the next bio-post batch to every current vouchee EXCEPT the revoked one. The revoked person retains `V_me_old`. Old posts sealed under `V_me_old` stay accessible to anyone who still holds `V_me_old` (grandfathered by default). See [Layer 4](layer-4-keypair-rotation.md) for the full lifecycle, optional cascade, and key-burn primitive.
 
 ---
 
@@ -32,68 +40,163 @@ After Layer 1 ships:
 
 Per-persona, stores the persona's own `V_me` history (current + recent-past for graceful rotation).
 
-TBD — OPUS: exact column types, key size in bytes, how many past epochs to retain.
-
 ```
 vouch_keys_own(
     persona_id     BLOB,
     epoch          INTEGER,
-    key_material       BLOB,      -- TBD — OPUS: symmetric key bytes (32B for a 256-bit key?)
+    key_material   BLOB(32),
     created_at_ms  INTEGER,
-    is_current         INTEGER,   -- 1 for the active V_me, 0 for retained past epochs
+    is_current     INTEGER,     -- 1 for active, 0 for retained past
     PRIMARY KEY (persona_id, epoch)
 )
 ```
 
 ### `vouch_keys_received` table
 
-Per-persona, stores vouch keys received from other personas (one row per `(owner_id, epoch)` currently held).
+Per-persona keyring — vouch keys successfully unwrapped from others' bio posts.
 
 ```
 vouch_keys_received(
     holder_persona_id  BLOB,         -- whose keyring this entry belongs to
-    owner_id           BLOB,      -- the persona who owns (issued) this V_x
+    owner_id           BLOB,         -- the persona who issued V_x
     epoch              INTEGER,
-    key_material       BLOB,
+    key_material       BLOB(32),
     received_at_ms     INTEGER,
+    source_bio_post_id BLOB,         -- provenance (which bio post we unwrapped from)
     PRIMARY KEY (holder_persona_id, owner_id, epoch)
 )
 ```
 
-Readers compute their keyring as `SELECT key_material FROM vouch_keys_received WHERE holder_persona_id = ? UNION SELECT key_material FROM vouch_keys_own WHERE persona_id = ? AND is_current = 1`.
+### `vouch_bio_scan_cache` table
 
----
-
-## Key generation
-
-TBD — OPUS: specify the primitive. Candidates:
-
-- Random 32B from CSPRNG (simplest; `V_me` is pure symmetric secret)
-- HKDF-derived from persona identity key + epoch counter (allows deterministic re-derivation; couples key rotation to identity key exposure)
-
-Lead leaning: **random 32B CSPRNG, stored encrypted at rest alongside identity key material**. Identity-key coupling offers no defensive benefit given the keyring is already indexed per-persona in the same DB.
-
----
-
-## Wire format for vouch distribution
-
-A `VouchGrant` message carries a copy of the voucher's current `V_me` from voucher to vouchee.
-
-TBD — OPUS: exact byte layout. Target shape:
+Skips re-scanning bio posts that haven't changed since last attempt.
 
 ```
-VouchGrant {
-    voucher_persona_id:  NodeId,        -- sender's persona
-    epoch:               u32,
-    key_material:        [u8; 32],      -- V_voucher at this epoch
-    issued_at_ms:        u64,
-    sig:                 [u8; 64],      -- voucher's identity-key signature over the above
+vouch_bio_scan_cache(
+    scanner_persona_id  BLOB,
+    bio_author_id       BLOB,
+    bio_epoch           INTEGER,        -- bio-post revision counter
+    result              INTEGER,        -- 0 = no wrapper unlocked; 1 = unlocked
+    unlocked_v_x_epoch  INTEGER,        -- NULL if result=0
+    scanned_at_ms       INTEGER,
+    PRIMARY KEY (scanner_persona_id, bio_author_id, bio_epoch)
+)
+```
+
+On an unchanged bio, clients short-circuit via this cache. On a bio-post update, clients trial only the *new wrappers* in the diff (not the full batch), bounded by bio_epoch increment.
+
+### Outbound vouches
+
+No separate `vouches_issued` table. The bio post itself IS the authoritative record of whom the persona has vouched for. UI "people I've vouched for" is derived from local author-side state (the recipient pubkey list used at bio-post assembly time), stored in a simple `own_vouch_targets` table:
+
+```
+own_vouch_targets(
+    voucher_persona_id  BLOB,
+    target_persona_id   BLOB,
+    target_x25519_pub   BLOB(32),
+    granted_at_ms       INTEGER,
+    current             INTEGER,       -- 1 = in latest bio-post batch, 0 = removed
+    PRIMARY KEY (voucher_persona_id, target_persona_id)
+)
+```
+
+This is local-only; never transmitted. The wire carries only anonymous wrappers.
+
+---
+
+## Wrapper format
+
+Bio post carries a `VouchGrantBatch`:
+
+```
+VouchGrantBatch {
+    batch_eph_pub:  [u8; 32],         // shared ephemeral X25519 pubkey for this batch
+    v_x_epoch:      u32,              // epoch of V_me being distributed in this batch
+    wrappers:       Vec<Wrapper>,     // padded to next bucket in {64, 128, 256, 512}
+}
+
+Wrapper {
+    ciphertext:  [u8; 32],            // HPKE-sealed V_me (32B key)
+    tag:         [u8; 16],            // AEAD auth tag
 }
 ```
 
-Delivery: wrap `VouchGrant` inside the existing `Direct` (encrypted-to-one-recipient) post primitive. Do not introduce a new top-level control message. Content-type byte distinguishes vouch grants from regular DMs. Recipient's receive-path decodes, verifies signature, inserts into `vouch_keys_received`.
+Per-recipient wrapper construction (RFC 9180 HPKE sealing, single-shot mode):
 
-TBD — OPUS: decide whether vouch grants should use a reserved visibility intent (`VisibilityIntent::VouchGrant`) for filtering out of the Messages tab, or whether they ride under `Direct` and are suppressed client-side by content-type.
+```
+shared_secret  = X25519(batch_eph_priv, recipient_x25519_pub)
+key, nonce     = HKDF-Expand(
+                    HKDF-Extract(salt="", ikm=shared_secret),
+                    info = "itsgoin/vouch-grant/v1/" || bio_post_id,
+                    L     = key_len + nonce_len
+                 )
+(ciphertext, tag) = AEAD-Seal(key, nonce, aad="", plaintext=V_me)
+```
+
+All recipients share the same `batch_eph_pub`; each gets a distinct wrapper derived from ECDH between that ephemeral and the recipient's persona X25519 pubkey.
+
+Dummy wrappers: 32B random bytes + 16B random bytes. Shape-identical to real wrappers. Indistinguishable to any party lacking the voucher's target list.
+
+**TBD — OPUS (confirm)**: AEAD choice for HPKE. Default RFC 9180 suite `DHKEM(X25519, HKDF-SHA256), HKDF-SHA256, ChaCha20Poly1305` matches existing ItsGoin crypto usage; confirm no reason to prefer AES-GCM.
+
+---
+
+## Bio-post integration
+
+ItsGoin already has bio posts (control post with `VisibilityIntent::Profile`). Layer 1 adds an optional `vouch_grant_batch` section to the profile-post payload:
+
+```rust
+struct ProfilePostPayload {
+    // ... existing fields (display_name, bio, avatar_cid, etc.) ...
+
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    vouch_grants: Option<VouchGrantBatch>,
+
+    bio_epoch: u32,     // monotonic per-persona; incremented on every bio-post revision
+}
+```
+
+Adding/removing a vouchee is a bio-post update: new batch, new `batch_eph_pub`, wrappers re-shuffled, `bio_epoch` incremented, republish. Propagates via the standard bio-post CDN path.
+
+**Incremental grants via bio-post comments** (deferred): Scott's variant of appending additional wrappers as author-only comments on the bio post (to avoid full republish on every small change) is a future optimization. v1 ships with full republish per change; simpler mental model and keeps the wire contract symmetric. Revisit if bio-post bandwidth becomes a concern.
+
+---
+
+## Reader / scanner behavior
+
+### On follow (new)
+1. Fetch the followed persona's latest bio post.
+2. If `vouch_grants.is_some()` AND `(scanner_persona, bio_author, bio_epoch)` not in scan cache:
+   - For each persona `P` in the reader's persona set:
+     - For each wrapper in the batch:
+       - Derive `shared_secret = X25519(P.x25519_priv, batch_eph_pub)`.
+       - Derive `key, nonce = HKDF(shared_secret, info="itsgoin/vouch-grant/v1/" || bio_post_id, ...)`.
+       - Attempt `AEAD-Open(wrapper.ciphertext, wrapper.tag, key, nonce)`.
+       - On success: extract `V_me`, insert into `vouch_keys_received` as `(holder=P, owner=bio_author, epoch=v_x_epoch)`. Record scan-cache hit.
+3. If no wrapper unlocked across any persona: record scan-cache miss. Done.
+
+### On bio-post update (existing follow)
+Same as above, but trial only the wrappers that are new relative to the prior bio_epoch. Since wrappers are shuffled on every publish, "new wrappers" = all wrappers on every update. **TBD**: whether to persist the exact wrapper-ciphertext set per bio_epoch so deltas can be computed, or just rescan the full batch (pay the cost, skip the bookkeeping). Lead leaning: **rescan full batch**; the cost (~40ms × number of followed personas publishing updates) is tolerable and the bookkeeping adds state-sync complexity.
+
+### On manual "check bio" gesture
+Treat as new-follow scan. User-invoked. Useful when a non-followed persona has vouched for the user.
+
+### Multi-persona trial order
+Personas iterated in stable sorted order (by persona_id). First unlock wins; stop scanning wrappers once any persona succeeds on any wrapper (the wrapper was addressed to that persona specifically — other wrappers in the batch are for other recipients).
+
+**TBD — OPUS**: confirm early-exit is correct. One caveat: the voucher may grant to MULTIPLE of the reader's personas (e.g., "I vouch for your work-persona AND your private-persona"). In that case we want to unlock all matching wrappers, not just the first. Lead leaning: do not early-exit on persona; continue scanning with remaining personas so all applicable grants are received.
+
+---
+
+## Cost analysis
+
+Per wrapper per persona: 1 X25519 scalar mult + 1 HKDF + 1 AEAD-Open attempt. ~60µs on ARM mobile; faster on desktop.
+
+Typical bio update: 200 wrappers × 3 personas = 600 trials ≈ 36ms. Invisible to user.
+
+Padded bucket at 512 × 3 personas = 1536 trials ≈ 90ms. Still acceptable for a one-time ingest per bio update.
+
+Scan-cache prevents re-pay on unchanged bios.
 
 ---
 
@@ -101,30 +204,47 @@ TBD — OPUS: decide whether vouch grants should use a reserved visibility inten
 
 Minimum viable surface for Layer 1 ship:
 
-- **Persona screen**: "Vouch for someone" button. Picker of contacts. Hands them a `V_me`.
+- **Persona screen**: "Vouch for someone" action. Picker of contacts. Adds their persona to `own_vouch_targets`; republishes bio post with new batch on save.
 - **Persona screen**: "Who has vouched for me" list (reads `vouch_keys_received` grouped by `owner_id`).
-- **Persona screen**: "People I've vouched for" list (local-only; TBD — OPUS on whether to track this explicitly or derive from DM-sent history — see open question below).
-- **Settings**: "Rotate my vouch key" button → generates new epoch, queues re-distribution to tracked vouchees.
+- **Persona screen**: "People I've vouched for" list (reads `own_vouch_targets` where `current = 1`).
+- **Settings**: "Rotate my vouch key" → generates new `V_me` epoch in `vouch_keys_own` (prior epoch retained, marked `is_current = 0`). Optionally offers to issue the new key to existing vouchees minus any marked-revoked. Defaults to single-epoch bio-post batch; advanced multi-epoch toggle available for cases where vouchees on device-wipe need multi-epoch re-bootstrap. See [Layer 4](layer-4-keypair-rotation.md).
+- **Post detail**: manual "Check this person's bio for a vouch for me" button (non-followed author case).
 
 Layer 1 ships without any post/comment behavior change. Vouches are visible in UI but don't gate content yet.
 
 ---
 
+## Privacy properties (Layer 1 scope)
+
+- **Recipient anonymity.** HPKE key privacy: wrapper ciphertext reveals nothing about the recipient's pubkey. Only trial decryption identifies recipients.
+- **No identifiers on the wire.** No recipient NodeIds, no persona IDs, no derived recipient tags in the bio post.
+- **Set-size opacity.** Bucket padding hides actual vouch-set size to within 2× granularity.
+- **Rotation unobservability.** Shuffled wrapper order per publish prevents positional inference of which slot changed.
+
+Timing leak is acknowledged: a bio-post update with a changed vouch set leaks "someone new was vouched for today" to observers who see the update. Batching (daily cadence instead of immediate) would blur this; out of scope for v1.
+
+---
+
 ## Open questions
 
-- **Do we track outbound vouches explicitly?** Option A: local `vouches_issued(recipient_persona_id, epoch_at_grant)` table. Option B: derive from DM-sent history searching for `VouchGrant` payloads. A is simpler + survives DM history loss; B avoids a redundant record. Lead leaning: A.
-- **Re-distribution on rotation.** When persona rotates `V_me`, do we auto-queue `VouchGrant` DMs to every tracked vouchee, or require user-initiated re-vouch? Lead leaning: auto-queue with a confirmation summary ("rotate will re-send vouch to N people").
-- **Key size.** 256-bit symmetric key is standard and matches our ChaCha20-Poly1305 usage. Confirm with Opus there's no reason to prefer 192 or 128 bits.
-- **Epoch granularity.** Monotonic counter per persona, or wall-clock-based? Counter is simpler; wall-clock aids debugging. Lead leaning: counter.
-- **Should `V_me` ever be exported in the persona backup bundle?** Losing `V_me` means every FoF post gated under it becomes permanently unreadable for every vouchee. Lead leaning: yes, include in identity export.
+- **Batching cadence.** Immediate (republish on every vouch-add) vs daily-batched (aggregate changes). Lead leaning: immediate in v1; observe whether timing leak is a concern in practice.
+- **Dummy-wrapper count strategy.** Always pad to next bucket, or pad to a fixed persona-local target size (e.g., "always 128")? Fixed target hides growth trajectory but wastes bandwidth early on. Lead leaning: next-bucket padding.
+- **`V_me` in identity export.** Losing `V_me` means every FoF post gated under it becomes permanently unreadable for every vouchee. Lead leaning: include `vouch_keys_own` (current + retained epochs) AND `vouch_keys_received` in persona export bundles.
+- **Rescan triggering.** Scan on fetch of the bio post is natural. Should we also opportunistically rescan on keyring-change events (when the persona acquires a new X25519 keypair — unlikely but possible during import)? Lead leaning: yes, rescan-on-keyring-change, cheap.
+- **Bio post size.** 512 wrappers × 48B = 24KB of vouch-grant payload. Plus ephemeral pubkey, epoch, headers. Negligible relative to profile-post overhead including avatars. No concern.
+- **Does the scanner need to verify the voucher's identity sig over the batch?** Bio posts are already signed by the author's identity key, so the `VouchGrantBatch` inherits that signature. Forgery requires identity-key compromise (out of FoF scope).
 
 ---
 
 ## Ship criteria for Layer 1
 
 - All personas auto-generate `V_me` at creation.
-- Users can vouch and receive vouches end-to-end via DM-wrapped `VouchGrant`.
-- UI shows received and issued vouches per persona.
-- `V_me` rotation works; re-distribution to tracked vouchees is demonstrated.
+- Bio-post publish path can embed a `VouchGrantBatch`.
+- `own_vouch_targets` table tracks who the persona has vouched for locally.
+- `vouch_keys_received` populated via auto-scan on bio-post fetch; gated to followed personas + manual gesture.
+- `vouch_bio_scan_cache` prevents re-scanning unchanged bios.
+- UI: vouch someone, list given vouches, list received vouches, rotate `V_me`.
 - No change to post visibility / comment behavior.
-- Integration test: two personas on two devices, Alice vouches for Bob, Bob's `vouch_keys_received` contains `V_alice` with correct signature.
+- HPKE wrapper construction matches RFC 9180 with recipient-free `info`.
+- Bucket-padding + per-publish wrapper shuffle implemented.
+- Integration test: two personas on two devices. A vouches for B. B auto-scans A's bio post after follow. B's `vouch_keys_received` contains `V_alice` at the correct epoch. B un-follows A then manually scans: same result. A rotates `V_me`, republishes. B auto-rescans, gets new epoch.

docs/fof-spec/layer-2-mode2-fof-comments.md

@@ -1,28 +1,46 @@
-# Layer 2 — Mode 2: Public Posts with FoF-Gated Comments
+# Layer 2 — Mode 2: Public Posts with FoF-Gated Comments (CDN-Verified)
 
-**Scope**: Extend `CommentPolicy` with a `FriendsOfFriends` variant. Post body is public (indexable, cacheable, shardable via existing CDN). Comments on the post must prove FoF-reachability to the author before being accepted.
+**Scope**: Extend `CommentPolicy` with a `FriendsOfFriends` variant. Post body is public (indexable, cacheable, shardable via existing CDN). Comments on the post are encrypted, signed under a per-voucher-chain keypair, and **verified at the CDN/propagation layer** before forwarding.
 
-This layer ships before Mode 1 because it reuses the existing public-post path and only adds a verification gate on comments. No new `PostVisibility` variant needed.
+This layer also defines the shared wrap-slot + `pub_post_set` structure reused by Layer 3 (Mode 1). The slot design here is the canonical form; Layer 3 inherits it and adds body encryption on top.
+
+---
+
+## Why CDN-level verification
+
+Naïve single-keypair design (initial skeleton) had an attacker-in-FoF-set problem: any admitted FoF member can sign junk with the shared `priv_post` and amplify bandwidth across the mesh before the author's render-time filter catches it. `vouch_mac` attribution helps the author trace abuse but doesn't stop propagation — an attacker who refuses to include `vouch_mac` simply produces CDN-valid junk at will.
+
+**Fix**: each `V_x` gets its own `(pub_x, priv_x)` keypair. The post header publishes the full `pub_post_set` of all admitted `pub_x`. Comments declare which `pub_x` signed. Propagation nodes verify the signature against the named pubkey before forwarding. Propagation nodes also honor an author-published revocation list, stopping a compromised chain at the CDN.
+
+Cost: `pub_x_index` is a per-post pseudonym for the voucher-chain — leaks "these N comments came through the same chain" to observers. Bounded to a single post (new post → new mapping order). Acceptable tradeoff for propagation-level DoS resistance.
 
 ---
 
 ## Goal
 
-- An author creates a public post with `comment_policy = FriendsOfFriends`.
-- Body is encrypted to no one — plaintext in the CDN, same as a normal public post today.
-- Comments on the post include a proof artifact that lets readers (and the author in strict mode) verify the commenter is reachable through the author's FoF graph.
-- Non-FoF readers can still READ the post. They cannot post an accepted comment.
+- Author creates a public post with `comment_policy = FriendsOfFriends`.
+- Body is plaintext in the CDN (unchanged public-post path).
+- Comments are ChaCha20-Poly1305 encrypted under a CEK that only FoF members can unwrap; non-FoF observers cannot read comment bodies at all (stronger than skeleton draft).
+- Every comment carries `pub_x_index + group_sig + identity_sig`. Propagation nodes verify all three before forwarding.
+- Author can append to a signed `revocation_list` that propagation nodes honor on next sync.
+- Inner `vouch_mac` is retained for author-side attribution and intra-circle accountability.
 
 ---
 
 ## Lead decisions
 
-- **Mode 2 does not gate readership.** The post body is genuinely public. Only comments are gated. This is intentional — it preserves CDN shardability for the body and gives authors a lightweight "comments to my circle, body to the world" mode.
-- **`pub_post` is included in the public post header.** Every FoF-eligible post (both modes) has a per-post ephemeral ed25519 keypair. `pub_post` in the header, `priv_post` in wrap slots (Mode 1) or directly in a control record (Mode 2 — TBD below).
-- **Comments carry a `group_sig` signed with `priv_post`.** Any device that can unwrap `priv_post` (i.e., holds a matching `V_x`) can sign. `group_sig` verification against `pub_post` is the cryptographic proof of FoF-reachability. Verifiable by any observer holding the public post.
-- **Optional `vouch_mac` for strict mode.** `HMAC(V_x, post_id || comment_hash)` identifies *which* voucher's chain a commenter holds. Author can run in strict mode and reject comments whose `vouch_mac` doesn't match a `V_x` the author has a record of distributing. Non-strict mode accepts any valid `group_sig`.
-- **Comment still signed by commenter's identity key as well.** `group_sig` proves FoF-membership; identity sig binds the comment to a specific persona for display / abuse reporting / author-side blocklist.
-- **Non-FoF devices can still render the post.** Read path is unchanged — comments missing `group_sig` (or failing verification) are filtered out in the feed renderer rather than hard-rejected in storage. This leaves forensic traces and is cheaper than re-verifying in the renderer vs at ingest. TBD open question below.
+- **Per-`V_x` signing keypair `(pub_x, priv_x)` is per-post.** Author generates a fresh `(pub_x, priv_x)` for each slot when assembling a post, wraps `priv_x` in that slot's sign-part. No coordination with Layer 1. Per-post rotation (Layer 4) just re-generates all keypairs and re-wraps. Not stable across posts.
+- **`pub_post_set` is inline in the post header.** List of all admitted `pub_x` for this post's FoF set, random-order per publish. Comments reference entries by index.
+- **Dual-derivation wrap slots.** Each slot yields BOTH a shared `CEK` (read) and a per-`V_x` `priv_x` (sign). One wrap slot unwrapped = reader gets both capabilities.
+- **Comments are encrypted.** `CEK_comments = HKDF(CEK, "comments")`. Non-FoF observers see only ciphertext + signatures on comments. Read-gating is a side effect of the same slot unwrap.
+- **CDN propagation verifies before forwarding.** Four-check accept rule: valid `pub_x_index`, not in `revocation_list`, `group_sig` validates, `identity_sig` validates. Any failure → drop, do not propagate.
+- **Revocation is retroactive.** Revocation diff is author-signed, appends a revoked `pub_x` entry. Every file-holder that receives the diff **deletes all comments on this post signed by that `pub_x`** from local storage, then forwards the diff. Comments in flight before the diff arrived get deleted when it catches up. Stronger than "stop forwarding" — prior garbage also goes away.
+- **Bucketed slot-count padding.** Deterministic buckets throughout. Up to 256 real slots: next power of 2 (8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256). Above 256: next +128-step bucket (384, 512, 640, 768, …). Author publishes `next_bucket(real_count)` slots; dummy slots fill the gap. Dummy `pub_x` entries are included in `pub_post_set` 1:1 so `pub_post_set.len() == wrap_slots.len()`; dummy pubkeys are 32B random bytes (no one holds the matching `priv_x`, so `group_sig` verify against a dummy always fails — benign).
+- **Post-hoc read-access grant via author comment.** Author can widen the read-set of an already-published post by publishing an author-signed special comment that **appends at the tail** a new `WrapSlot` + `pub_post_set` entry for a newly-vouched persona. `pub_x_index` values in already-stored comments stay valid (positions 0..N-1 unchanged). Cost: observers see "tail entries are the most recent grants" — small positional-recency leak; accepted tradeoff for index stability. No rotation, no republish; retroactive inclusion. See "Access-grant author comment" below.
+- **`vouch_mac` retained.** Inside ciphertext. Enables author render-time and intra-circle attribution complementary to CDN-level `pub_x_index` attribution.
+- **Author has their own `pub_me/priv_me`.** Treated as one of the entries in `pub_post_set`. Author signs their own comments through the same path.
+- **`V_me` handed to vouchees already implies `priv_me` handoff.** No — correction: `priv_x` is wrapped in the per-`V_x` sign-slot of every post, not handed out at vouch time. Only people who can unwrap the slot (= people holding `V_x`) receive `priv_x`. This is what makes per-post rotation (Layer 4) a coherent revocation surface.
+- **v1 ships at Ed25519 sizes with inline `pub_post_set`.** PQ migration (ML-DSA-65 at ~2KB/pubkey) requires Merkle-commit over `pub_post_set` with per-comment inclusion proofs. Design must not preclude — spec shape above is algorithm-agnostic.
 
 ---
 
@@ -39,89 +57,251 @@ pub enum CommentPolicy {
 }
 ```
 
-### Post header additions (for posts with `comment_policy = FriendsOfFriends`)
+### Post header additions (for `comment_policy = FriendsOfFriends`)
 
 ```rust
 struct PostHeader {
     // ... existing fields ...
 
-    // NEW for Mode 2 comment gating:
-    pub_post: Option<[u8; 32]>,    // ed25519 public key of per-post ephemeral keypair
-    wrap_slots: Vec<WrapSlot>,     // wraps priv_post under each V_x in author's keyring
-
-    // TBD — OPUS: WrapSlot byte layout (same type as Layer 3 uses)
+    pub_post_set:    Vec<[u8; 32]>,     // real pub_x + dummy pubkeys, random-order; .len() == wrap_slots.len()
+    wrap_slots:      Vec<WrapSlot>,     // real slots + rand(32..=128) dummy slots, shuffled
+    revocation_list: Vec<RevocationEntry>,  // initially empty; appended via signed diffs
+    author_sig:      [u8; 64],          // ed25519 sig over the header
 }
 ```
 
-**Note**: Mode 2 posts carry `wrap_slots` even though the body is public, because commenters need `priv_post` to sign. The wrap slot set IS the FoF membership definition.
+### `WrapSlot` byte layout (shared with Layer 3)
+
+```rust
+struct WrapSlot {
+    prefilter_tag:   [u8; 2],           // HMAC(V_x, post_id)[:2B]
+    read_slot:  SlotPart,               // AEAD under key = KDF(V_x, post_id, "read")
+    sign_slot:  SlotPart,               // AEAD under key = KDF(V_x, post_id, "sign")
+}
+
+struct SlotPart {
+    nonce:      [u8; 12],
+    ciphertext: Vec<u8>,                // read: 32B CEK; sign: 32B priv_x seed
+    tag:        [u8; 16],
+}
+```
+
+Read-slot plaintext: 32B CEK.
+Sign-slot plaintext: 32B `priv_x` ed25519 seed.
+
+AAD for both AEAD invocations: `post_id` (prevents slot-reuse across posts).
+
+**TBD — OPUS**: confirm ChaCha20-Poly1305 for slot AEAD; confirm AAD choice.
+
+### `RevocationEntry`
+
+```rust
+struct RevocationEntry {
+    revoked_pub_x:  [u8; 32],           // the pub_x to drop from acceptance
+    revoked_at_ms:  u64,
+    reason_code:    u8,                 // opaque to CDN; for author-side UI
+    author_sig:     [u8; 64],           // author identity-key sig over (post_id || revoked_pub_x || revoked_at_ms || reason_code)
+}
+```
 
 ### Extend `InlineComment`
 
 ```rust
 struct InlineComment {
-    // ... existing fields ...
+    // CDN-visible:
+    parent_post_id:  PostId,
+    ciphertext:      Vec<u8>,           // AEAD(CEK_comments, nonce, plaintext, aad=parent_post_id)
+    nonce:           [u8; 12],
+    aead_tag:        [u8; 16],
+    pub_x_index:     u32,               // index into parent post's pub_post_set
+    group_sig:       [u8; 64],          // ed25519 under priv_x over (ciphertext || parent_post_id || pub_x_index)
+    commenter_id:    NodeId,            // commenter's long-term identity pubkey
+    identity_sig:    [u8; 64],          // ed25519 under commenter's identity key over same tuple
 
-    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
-    group_sig: Option<[u8; 64]>,   // ed25519 signature over comment_hash, verifies against parent post's pub_post
-
-    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
-    vouch_mac: Option<[u8; 16]>,   // HMAC(V_x, post_id || comment_hash), truncated
+    // Plaintext inside ciphertext (FoF-readable):
+    //     comment_body
+    //     vouch_mac: [u8; 16]                // HMAC(V_x, post_id || comment_hash)[:16B]
+    //     parent_comment_id: Option<CommentId>
 }
 ```
 
-Back-compat: old comments without these fields are treated as "not FoF-signed" — accepted on non-FoF posts, rejected on FoF posts.
+Back-compat: older clients / non-FoF posts use the existing `InlineComment` shape unchanged. New fields appear only for comments on FoF-policy posts.
+
+### `CEK_comments` derivation
+
+```
+CEK_comments = HKDF-Expand(
+    HKDF-Extract(salt=post_id, ikm=CEK),
+    info = "itsgoin/fof-comments/v1",
+    L    = 32
+)
+```
+
+**TBD — OPUS**: confirm domain separation. One CEK per post, one derived comments-CEK per post. All comments on the post share the same `CEK_comments` (nonce uniqueness per comment via random nonce).
 
 ---
 
-## Comment creation (author of the comment)
+## Comment creation (FoF commenter)
 
-1. Commenter fetches parent post. Reads `pub_post` from header.
-2. Commenter iterates their keyring. For each `V_x` held, computes `HMAC(V_x, post_id)[:2B]`. Compares against each `WrapSlot.prefilter_tag`. On match, trial-decrypts the slot to get `priv_post`.
-3. If any slot unwraps successfully: commenter now holds `priv_post`. Signs `comment_hash` to produce `group_sig`. Computes `vouch_mac = HMAC(V_x_winner, post_id || comment_hash)`. Attaches both to comment.
-4. Publishes comment through normal comment-propagation path.
+1. Commenter fetches parent post. Reads `pub_post_set`, `wrap_slots`, `revocation_list`.
+2. For each `V_x` in reader's keyring, match prefilter tag against slot list. On match, attempt read-slot and sign-slot AEAD-open.
+3. On successful unwrap: now holds `CEK`, `priv_x`. Derive `CEK_comments = HKDF(CEK, ...)`.
+4. Build comment:
+   - Encrypt `(body || vouch_mac || parent_comment_id)` under `CEK_comments` with random nonce.
+   - Sign `(ciphertext || parent_post_id || pub_x_index)` with `priv_x` → `group_sig`.
+   - Sign the same tuple with commenter's identity key → `identity_sig`.
+   - Determine `pub_x_index` by finding `pub_x` in `pub_post_set` (where `pub_x = ed25519_pub(priv_x_seed)`).
+5. Check `pub_x ∉ revocation_list`. If revoked: UI tells commenter they can no longer comment on this post; abort.
+6. Publish via normal comment-propagation path.
 
-If NO slot unwraps: commenter is not in the author's FoF set. UI reports "You can't comment on this post." Pure client-side enforcement — no wire attempt.
+If no slot unwraps: commenter is not in the author's FoF set. Client-side: hide the comment box.
 
 ---
 
-## Comment verification (reader side)
+## Propagation-node accept rule
 
-At feed render time, for every comment on a `FriendsOfFriends`-policy post:
+For every incoming `InlineComment` targeting a FoF-policy post:
 
-1. If `group_sig` is missing → filter out (strict) or show with "unverified" badge (permissive). Lead leaning: **filter out**.
-2. Verify `group_sig` against parent post's `pub_post` over `comment_hash`. If fail → filter out.
-3. Verify identity sig of comment as normal. If fail → filter out.
+1. **Valid index**: `pub_x_index < pub_post_set.len()`. Else drop.
+2. **Not revoked**: `pub_post_set[pub_x_index] ∉ revocation_list`. Else drop.
+3. **`group_sig` valid**: ed25519 verify `group_sig` over `(ciphertext || parent_post_id || pub_x_index)` against `pub_post_set[pub_x_index]`. Else drop.
+4. **`identity_sig` valid**: ed25519 verify `identity_sig` over the same tuple against `commenter_id`. Else drop.
 
-At author side (strict mode, optional):
+On drop: do not store, do not forward. No error response to sender (avoid oracle).
 
-4. Recompute expected `vouch_mac` candidates from the set of `V_x` the author has distributed. If `comment.vouch_mac` doesn't match any → discard at ingest (don't store, don't propagate).
+Rate-limit per `commenter_id` and per `pub_x_index` (operational knob, not in spec).
 
 ---
 
-## Propagation
+## Reader side (FoF)
 
-No changes to comment propagation path. Comments still flow via existing `BlobHeaderDiff` / engagement-diff mechanism. Verification is done at display time (reader) and optionally at ingest (author-strict).
+1. For each visible comment, use `CEK_comments` to decrypt ciphertext.
+2. Verify `vouch_mac` matches a `V_x` the reader (or author in strict mode) can compute against. Optional render-time check; CDN already validated signatures.
+3. Render comment body, parent threading via `parent_comment_id`.
+
+Reader side (non-FoF): sees comment ciphertext + signature fields only. Body unreadable. UI can show "N FoF comments (not visible to you)" or suppress entirely.
+
+---
+
+## Revocation flow
+
+1. Author's client detects abuse (via `vouch_mac` attribution, or repeated `pub_x_index` with bad behavior).
+2. Author builds `RevocationEntry { revoked_pub_x, timestamp, reason_code, author_sig }`, publishes as a header-diff on the post (same propagation primitive as engagement diffs).
+3. On receiving a revocation diff, every file-holder of the affected post:
+   - **Deletes** all locally-stored comments on this post where `pub_x_index` points to the revoked `pub_x`.
+   - Appends the entry to its local copy of `post.revocation_list`.
+   - Forwards the revocation diff to neighbors.
+   - Rejects any subsequent incoming comments matching the revoked `pub_x` at step (2) of the accept rule.
+4. Idempotent: re-receiving a revocation diff is a no-op (the entry is already present; deletion has already happened).
+5. Retroactive: comments that propagated before the diff existed get deleted as the diff catches up to each holder. There's a propagation-latency window where deleted comments may still be visible on yet-to-receive holders, but the garbage is bounded and self-cleaning.
+6. If the attacker's voucher-chain is broadly compromised, author can escalate to full `V_x` rotation (Layer 1), which affects every post using that chain — coarse but definitive.
+
+---
+
+## Access-grant author comment (post-hoc widening)
+
+When the author vouches for a new persona AFTER publishing a FoF post, they may want that persona to retroactively gain read access. Full republish would rewrite the post ID and lose engagement history. Instead, the author publishes a special access-grant comment.
+
+### `AccessGrantComment` (a distinguished `InlineComment` variant)
+
+```rust
+struct AccessGrantComment {
+    parent_post_id:   PostId,
+    new_pub_x:        [u8; 32],
+    new_wrap_slot:    WrapSlot,         // read + sign parts for the new V_x
+    granted_at_ms:    u64,
+    commenter_id:     NodeId,           // must match post.author
+    identity_sig:     [u8; 64],         // author identity-key sig over (parent_post_id || new_pub_x || new_wrap_slot || granted_at_ms)
+}
+```
+
+### Propagation-node handling
+
+- Accept iff `commenter_id == post.author` AND `identity_sig` validates against `post.author`. No `group_sig` / `pub_x_index` required — this is an author-signed header extension disguised as a comment.
+- On accept: append `new_pub_x` to local `pub_post_set`, append `new_wrap_slot` to local `wrap_slots`. Forward the access-grant to neighbors.
+- Subsequent comments from the newly-admitted persona reference the extended-set index (base_set.len() + grant_index).
+
+### Reader-side handling
+
+- New persona receives the access-grant via normal comment propagation. Unwraps `new_wrap_slot` with their `V_x` → gets `CEK` + `priv_x_new`. Can now read the body's comments and author their own.
+- Existing readers see the access-grant as an informational entry (optional UI: "Author granted access to a new friend").
+
+### Open question
+
+- **Does the UI expose this as a discrete action?** "Share this post with my new vouchee Bob" — yes, natural. Lead leaning: surface as a per-post affordance in author's post-detail view.
+- **Does the access-grant also carry a signing capability for the new persona?** Yes — the `WrapSlot`'s sign-part wraps a fresh `priv_x_new`. New persona can comment going forward.
+- **Does revocation apply to access-grant `pub_x` entries?** Yes, uniformly. Author can revoke a post-hoc-granted chain same as an originally-granted chain.
+
+---
+
+## Size budget
+
+**v1 (Ed25519)**
+
+| Per-vouchee slot cost | Bytes |
+|---|---|
+| `pub_x` | 32 |
+| `read_slot` (32B CEK + 12B nonce + 16B tag) | 60 |
+| `sign_slot` (32B priv_x + 12B nonce + 16B tag) | 60 |
+| `prefilter_tag` | 2 |
+| **Subtotal per slot** | **~154** |
+
+At 500 real vouchees → next bucket above 256 is 512 → 512 slots × ~154B ≈ 79KB. At 200 real vouchees → bucket 256 ≈ 39KB. At 9 real vouchees → bucket 16 ≈ 2.5KB. Worst-case in-bucket overhead: just-under-boundary case (e.g., 257 real → 384 bucket → 33% padded; 129 real → 256 bucket → 49% padded; well below pure power-of-2 doubling). Acceptable for a header carried once per post.
+
+Per-comment CDN overhead (vs shared-keypair baseline): +64B (`group_sig`) + 4B (`pub_x_index`) + 64B (`identity_sig` — already in baseline) ≈ 68B additional. Negligible.
+
+**PQ future (ML-DSA-65)**
+
+`pub_x` ~1952B, sig ~3300B. Inline `pub_post_set` at 500 vouchees = ~976KB header. Not viable.
+
+Plan: Merkle-commit `pub_post_set`. Header carries 32B root. Each comment carries its `pub_x + inclusion_proof` (~288B at n=500) + the ~3.3KB sig. Header stays O(1); per-comment grows O(log n).
+
+Decision: **defer Merkle variant to PQ migration**. v1 ships inline.
+
+---
+
+## Privacy tradeoff (accepted)
+
+`pub_x_index` leaks per-post voucher-chain pseudonym to CDN + public observers. "All comments signed under slot 42 came through the same chain" — within a single post. Cross-post, the index-to-chain mapping re-randomizes (new `pub_post_set` order on each publish), so cross-post correlation is broken.
+
+The reason this is acceptable: the alternative is no propagation-level verification, which means any one admitted FoF member can DoS the mesh. Per-post pseudonym is the minimum viable disclosure for CDN-level filtering.
+
+**Vouch-set size:** bucketed padding throughout. Observer learns the bucket; position within the bucket is fully hidden. Buckets are 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256 (power-of-2 sub-256) then 384, 512, 640, 768, … (+128 steps above 256). The same author's bucket is stable across posts unless they cross a boundary — so observers see "this author has between X and Y real vouchees" with no way to converge tighter from multiple posts.
+
+**Non-FoF reader UX:** non-FoF readers see the public body + "Comments are private" affordance. Comment count is not shown (no engagement leak). Optional: a "Request access via DM" button that sends the author a note; author can respond by publishing an access-grant author comment (above) that retroactively admits the requester.
 
 ---
 
 ## Open questions
 
-- **Filter-out vs reject-at-storage for bad `group_sig`.** Filter-out preserves forensic trail and avoids double-verify cost. Reject-at-storage saves disk and sync bandwidth. Lead leaning: filter-out at render, reject-at-storage only on author-side strict mode.
-- **`priv_post` distribution for Mode 2.** In Mode 1, `priv_post` is inside `wrap_slots`. In Mode 2, body is plaintext, but commenters still need `priv_post`. Options: (A) `wrap_slots` still present in Mode 2 headers, carrying only `priv_post`; (B) separate `comment_priv_key` control record distributed out of band. Lead leaning: A (uniform structure with Mode 1).
-- **Wrap slot prefilter tag.** 2B = 65536 buckets, false-positive 1/65536. For Mode 2 this also defines the commenter-eligibility filter. TBD — OPUS: confirm 2B is enough for realistic keyring sizes.
-- **Author's own comments.** Author has `priv_post` directly (generated it). Do they self-vouch-mac against `V_me`? Leaning: yes, so strict mode uniformly verifies all comments.
-- **Displaying vouch path to the author.** Mode 2 strict mode knows which `V_x` a commenter arrived through. Should the author's UI show "comment arrived via your vouch to Alice" or keep it opaque? Lead leaning: opaque by default; optional power-user setting.
-- **Rate-limiting / spam.** A malicious FoF member can flood comments. `vouch_mac` identifies the chain, so author can block a chain. Out-of-scope for Layer 2 ship (tracked separately).
+- **Reader-only clients can skip the sign-slot.** They can short-circuit AEAD on sign-slot and save some work. Worth implementing? Lead leaning: yes, minor perf win; `read` slot succeeding already proves FoF-admission.
+- **Rate limiting.** Operational knob. Per-`commenter_id` + per-`pub_x_index` caps in propagation-node config. Out of spec.
+- **Author's copy of CEK.** Author generated CEK at post creation; does author store it locally keyed by post_id, or unwrap via their own slot like any reader? Lead leaning: local-cache at creation; unwrap-fallback if cache lost.
+- **Access-grant dedup.** If the author accidentally publishes the same access-grant twice (or two devices race), propagation nodes must handle it idempotently. Keying by `(post_id, new_pub_x)` — duplicate = no-op.
+- **Revocation of a `pub_x` that has no comments yet.** Fine: future comments under that `pub_x` will fail the accept rule, and the deletion step is a no-op. Confirmed harmless.
+- **GC of `revocation_list`.** Grows unbounded across a post's lifetime. Realistically capped by vouch-set size. No GC needed in v1.
+
+## Resolved
+
+- **`(pub_x, priv_x)` lifecycle**: **per-post** (Scott confirmed). Author regenerates for each post's slot assembly. Matches the anonymous-slot model; no Layer 1 coordination.
+- **`pub_post_set` vs `wrap_slots` alignment**: **1:1 with dummy pubkeys** (Scott's direction). Both padded together with `rand(32..=128)` dummies so observers can't infer vouch count, and can't infer a floor across multiple posts either.
+- **Author's own entry**: **yes** (Scott confirmed). Author has their own `pub_me/priv_me` entry in `pub_post_set`; own comments pass the same accept rule.
+- **Non-FoF comment visibility**: front-end shows "Comments are private" when no key unlocks. Optional "Request access via DM" affordance. Count NOT shown. Author can respond to a request by publishing an access-grant author comment.
+- **Revocation semantics**: **retroactive delete + forward** (Scott's correction). File-holders delete comments signed by the revoked `pub_x` on arrival of the diff, then propagate.
 
 ---
 
 ## Ship criteria for Layer 2
 
-- `CommentPolicy::FriendsOfFriends` variant exists end-to-end (storage, protocol, UI picker).
-- Authors can create public posts with FoF-gated comments.
-- `pub_post` / `priv_post` / `wrap_slots` generated on post creation, wrapped under author's full keyring.
-- Commenters: client-side check of FoF eligibility before offering comment box; `group_sig` + `vouch_mac` attached on send.
-- Readers: filter-out comments failing `group_sig` verification.
-- Author strict-mode: optional ingress rejection on unknown `vouch_mac`.
-- Back-compat: old clients see FoF posts as readable (body is public) but can't comment (missing `priv_post`); old comments on new posts are filtered at render.
-- Integration test: 3-node FoF chain (A→B→C). A posts Mode 2. B comments (reachable). C comments (reachable via B). D (unrelated) cannot.
+- `CommentPolicy::FriendsOfFriends` end-to-end (storage, protocol, UI picker).
+- Dual-derivation wrap slot: read → CEK, sign → priv_x. AEAD with `post_id` AAD.
+- `pub_post_set` inline in header, 1:1 with `wrap_slots`, real + dummy entries.
+- `pub_x_index` on comments.
+- CEK_comments derived via HKDF; all comment bodies encrypted.
+- Propagation nodes enforce four-check accept rule before forwarding.
+- Revocation diff format + CDN honor path (retroactive delete + forward).
+- Access-grant author comment mechanism for post-hoc read widening.
+- Per-post ephemeral-keypair generation.
+- Bucketed dummy padding on both `wrap_slots` and `pub_post_set` (power-of-2 up to 256, then +128 steps above), shuffled together.
+- Back-compat: old clients can still render existing non-FoF posts; old comments on new FoF posts are rejected at CDN (missing required fields).
+- Integration test: 3-node FoF chain (A→B→C). A posts Mode 2 FoF. B comments (accepted, propagates). C comments (accepted via B's chain). D (unrelated) signs junk with fake `pub_x_index` pointing at a real entry (rejected at first-hop CDN: `group_sig` fails). D signs junk with `pub_x_index` pointing at a dummy (rejected: `group_sig` fails against a dummy random pubkey). A revokes B's `pub_x`: B's already-propagated comments are deleted on each file-holder as the diff sweeps through; B's subsequent comments rejected at first hop. A vouches for E after the post is live and publishes access-grant author comment; E can now read + comment retroactively.

docs/fof-spec/layer-3-mode1-fof-closed.md

@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
 # Layer 3 — Mode 1: `FOF_CLOSED` Posts
 
-**Scope**: New `PostVisibility::FoFClosed` variant. Both post body AND comments are gated to the FoF graph. Body is encrypted; readership emerges from keyring intersection with `wrap_slots`.
+**Scope**: New `PostVisibility::FoFClosed` variant. Both post body AND comments are gated to the FoF graph. Body is encrypted under CEK; readership emerges from keyring intersection with `wrap_slots`.
 
-Builds on Layer 2's `pub_post` / `priv_post` / `wrap_slot` primitives — same structures, just that the CEK encrypting the body is *also* in the wrap slots (alongside `priv_post`).
+The wrap-slot structure, `pub_post_set`, per-`V_x` signing keypair, and CDN-level verification are all defined in [Layer 2](layer-2-mode2-fof-comments.md) (the canonical form). Layer 3 inherits Layer 2's structures unchanged — the Mode 1 vs Mode 2 distinction reduces to: **body encrypted under CEK (Mode 1) vs body plaintext (Mode 2)**. Wrap-slot read-part still carries the CEK in both modes; in Mode 2 the CEK is used only to derive `CEK_comments`, in Mode 1 it is used for both body and comments.
+
+The legacy `pub_post`/`priv_post` field names that appear in some sections below are retained for readability; semantically read them as the canonical per-V_x `(pub_x, priv_x)` from Layer 2.
 
 ---
 
@@ -20,11 +22,12 @@ Builds on Layer 2's `pub_post` / `priv_post` / `wrap_slot` primitives — same s
 ## Lead decisions
 
 - **New variant, not extended Encrypted.** `PostVisibility::FoFClosed` is its own variant. Existing `Encrypted{recipients}` wraps per-recipient NodeIds — visible on the wire. FoF wraps anonymously under symmetric keys — no NodeIds.
-- **One wrap slot per `V_x` in the author's keyring.** For a Friends-only post, one slot under `V_me`. For FoF, N+1 slots (one per `V_x` the author holds + own `V_me`). For Custom, subset chosen by author.
-- **Slot count padded to power-of-2.** Prevents observers from counting vouchers the author has. TBD — OPUS: confirm padding up to next power of 2 with random dummy slots (non-decryptable ciphertext indistinguishable from real slots).
-- **Each slot carries both CEK and priv_post.** Wrapped together as a single plaintext. One successful unwrap gives reader everything they need to read body + sign comments.
+- **One wrap slot per unique `V_x`.** Dedup at the `V_x` byte level — if multiple personas hold the same `V_x`, include one slot. Friends-only post: one slot under `V_me`. FoF post: own `V_me` + every distinct `V_x` the author holds. Custom: subset chosen by author (deferred to v2 power-user UI; v1 ships three presets only: Public / Friends-only / Friends-of-Friends).
+- **Bucketed slot-count padding.** Deterministic bucket boundaries throughout — observers learn the bucket, not the position within it. Buckets: 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256 (power-of-2 from a minimum of 8 up to 256), then 384, 512, 640, 768, … (linear +128 steps above 256). Author publishes `next_bucket(real_count)` slots with random dummies filling the gap. Minimum bucket of 8 means a brand-new persona's first post still publishes 8 slots — no "this persona has no vouchees" signal. Power-of-2 sub-256 keeps small-author overhead bounded; +128 steps above 256 avoid the 2× waste of pure power-of-2 at scale. Dummy slots are byte-identical to real ones, AEAD-fails on any `V_x`. Dummy entries also added to `pub_post_set` 1:1 (see Layer 2).
+- **Bucketed body-size padding.** Same shape applied to body ciphertext bytes: power-of-2 buckets up to 256KB (1KB, 2KB, 4KB, …, 256KB), then 256KB-step buckets above (512KB, 768KB, 1024KB, …). 256KB above is the future storage chunk size — once large enough to chunk, padding aligns to chunk boundaries naturally.
+- **Each slot carries both CEK and priv_x (Layer 2 dual-derivation).** Layer 2's `WrapSlot` dual-derivation (read → CEK, sign → priv_x) is the canonical form. Mode 1 simply also uses the CEK to encrypt the body, where Mode 2 leaves the body plaintext.
 - **Prefilter tag is `HMAC(V_x, post_id)[:2B]`.** Readers precompute a 2-byte tag for each key in their keyring and skip slots that don't match. Cuts trial-decrypt cost by ~2^16 on average.
-- **Order of slots is randomized.** No positional leak about which slot corresponds to which voucher.
+- **Order of slots is randomized.** No positional leak about which slot corresponds to which voucher. Re-shuffled on every header revision (including access-grant appends from Layer 2 — TBD whether append-only ordering is acceptable, or whether the entire set is re-shuffled at each grant).
 
 ---
 
@@ -119,21 +122,27 @@ Ciphertext `FoFClosed` posts ride the same CDN propagation as other encrypted po
 
 ## Open questions
 
-- **Slot size uniformity.** Real slots and dummy padding slots must be byte-identical-sized. Confirmed. TBD — OPUS: should we also pad the body length to a bucket to avoid length-based classification?
 - **Prefilter false-positive cost.** 1/65536 false positive per slot. With 500 slots × reader iterating 500 keys, expected ~3.8 false-positive AEAD attempts per post. Acceptable.
 - **Prefilter collision on legitimate hits.** Two different `V_x` could produce the same `prefilter_tag` for the same `post_id`. Reader just tries both. No correctness issue.
 - **Slot-reuse across posts.** If the same `V_x` is used across many posts, an attacker can observe prefilter tags recur. Since `post_id` is in the HMAC input, tags differ per post. No leak.
-- **Custom mode slot selection.** Does the author UI let them pick specific vouchers, specific groups of vouchers, or only "all held + own" vs "own only"? Lead leaning: initial UI = only the three preset levels (Friends-only / FoF / Public); custom ships as power-user option later.
-- **Deduplication of `V_x` across personas.** If multiple personas hold the same `V_x`, do we include one slot or one-per-persona? Lead leaning: dedup at the `V_x` bytes level; one slot per unique key.
+
+## Resolved (2026-04-24)
+
+- **Slot count padding**: bucketed throughout. Power-of-2 buckets from 8 to 256 (minimum bucket is 8 — singleton/tiny-set posts pad up to 8 to avoid leaking "new persona with no vouchees"), then linear +128 buckets (384, 512, 640, …). Body-size padding follows the same shape with 256KB as the power-of-2 ceiling and 256KB linear steps above.
+- **Access-grant ordering**: **append at tail** (Scott's call). New entries land at the end of `pub_post_set` + `wrap_slots`. `pub_x_index` values in already-stored comments stay valid. Small positional-recency leak (tail = recent grants) is the accepted cost.
+- **Custom mode UI**: deferred. v1 ships only the three presets (Public / Friends-only / FoF). Power-user custom-subset UI is v2.
+- **Slot deduplication**: dedup at the `V_x` byte level. One slot per unique key.
+- **Body length padding**: yes — pad to next power of 2 up to 256KB, then 256KB chunks above.
 
 ---
 
 ## Ship criteria for Layer 3
 
 - `PostVisibility::FoFClosed` exists end-to-end.
-- Author creation path generates ephemeral keypair, wraps CEK+priv_post under each eligible `V_x`, pads to power-of-2.
+- Author creation path generates per-post keypairs, wraps CEK+priv_x under each unique `V_x` (deduped), and pads to the next slot bucket: power-of-2 up to 256, then +128 steps above.
+- Body-size padded to next body bucket: power-of-2 up to 256KB, then 256KB steps above.
 - Reader decryption path iterates personas × keyring with prefilter tag.
 - `receive_post` accepts FoFClosed ciphertext without decrypting.
-- UI surface: post composer has Public / Friends-only / FoF / Custom picker.
+- UI surface: post composer has three presets — Public / Friends-only / Friends-of-Friends. Custom subset is v2.
 - Integration test: A posts FoFClosed. B (direct vouchee) reads. C (FoF via B) reads. D (unrelated) gets ciphertext, cannot decrypt.
 - Performance: decryption completes within budget at 500-key keyring × 500-slot posts (see Layer 5 for the optimization work that makes this budget feasible).

docs/fof-spec/layer-4-keypair-rotation.md

@@ -1,122 +1,144 @@
-# Layer 4 — Per-Post Keypair Rotation
+# Layer 4 — Rotation, Revocation, and Key Lifecycle
 
-**Scope**: Graceful rotation of `(priv_post, pub_post)` when the author's FoF set changes (new vouches granted, `V_me` rotated, or a vouchee removed). Old comments remain verifiable under the old `pub_post`; new comments require the new `pub_post`.
+**Scope**: How an author narrows access on a published post, and how a persona rotates their own `V_me`. Most of the mechanism already exists in Layers 1–2. Layer 4's job is to lock in the policy and add the local-only provenance table that makes selective cascades possible.
 
 ---
 
 ## Goal
 
-- Author can update the FoF set of an existing post without deleting / recreating it.
-- A `PostKeyRotation` record, signed by author identity key, carries a new `(priv_post', pub_post')` wrapped under the current keyring.
-- Existing comments under old `pub_post` stay cryptographically valid.
-- New comments must sign under `priv_post'`.
-- Readers who were admitted under the OLD set but not the NEW one retain read access to the body (CEK didn't change) but can no longer produce accepted comments.
+- An author can narrow comment authority on a published post via Layer 2 revocation (default, cheap).
+- An author can narrow read access by republishing the post with a new key and narrower wrap_slots (advanced, network-heavy, opt-in per-post).
+- A persona rotates `V_me` to remove a vouchee. The new `V_me` is issued to all non-revoked vouchees via the next bio-post wrapper batch. The revoked vouchee retains the old `V_me`.
+- Old posts (sealed under any era of `V_me`) stay readable by their original audience — no automatic rewrite. The CDN does not auto-cascade comment deletions on rotation.
+- Authors retain *per-post discretion* to cascade comment revocations onto old posts when they want to, by publishing per-pub_x revocation diffs against pub_x's they know were sealed under the old `V_me`.
+- An optional **key-burn** primitive lets an author scrub a specific `V_me` from a specific post's wrap_slots in-place, for the narrow case of a leaked `V_me`.
 
 ---
 
 ## Lead decisions
 
-- **Body CEK is NOT rotated.** Only the signing keypair rotates. Rotation's purpose is to narrow (or widen) the *commenter* set going forward, not revoke read access to the body. Read access of already-distributed content is non-recoverable by design — if an author needs that, they delete the post.
-- **Rotation is append-only.** Rotation records accumulate; `pub_post_n` is derived from the latest rotation record. Old `pub_post` values are retained for verifying already-posted comments.
-- **Rotation is optional.** Simple case is a post with one immutable `pub_post`. Layer 4 adds the escape hatch; most posts never rotate.
-- **Author-signed.** Only the post author (identity key) can rotate. Prevents an admitted commenter from rotating others out.
+- **Default = Layer 2 revocation.** Narrowing comment authority on a single published post: author signs a `RevocationEntry` for a specific `pub_x`, propagation nodes delete locally-stored comments by that signer, remove the entry from `pub_post_set`, and forward. No new wire primitive.
+- **Advanced = full re-issue.** Author publishes a fresh post with new `(CEK, pub_post_set, wrap_slots)` under a narrower V_x set, optionally with a `supersedes_post_id` link for engagement continuity. Old post stays at its old `post_id` or is locally deleted. Heavy: re-encrypts body, rebuilds engagement context, costs bandwidth. Used only when narrowing READ access matters more than retaining the post in its current form.
+- **`V_me` rotation IS the persona-wide revocation primitive.** No separate "kill V_me" wire message. To remove a vouchee, the persona generates a new `V_me_new` and distributes it to every current vouchee except the revoked one via the next bio-post batch (Layer 1 mechanism, unchanged). The revoked vouchee's only key remains `V_me_old`.
+- **Receiver keeps the chain (Option A).** When a persona receives `V_B_new` from Party B, they append it to `vouch_keys_received` rather than overwrite. They now hold `{V_B_old, V_B_new}` (and any earlier epochs). On any wrap_slot unwrap attempt, the client trials every epoch in the chain. UX: the "current" key for outgoing operations is the latest received; older epochs are archived but kept for reading historical content.
+- **Old posts are grandfathered by default.** `V_me` rotation does NOT automatically trigger CDN comment deletion. CDN's revocation primitive operates on `pub_x`, not `V_me` — and CDN is V_me-blind. After rotation, the revoked vouchee retains the old `V_me`, retains read access to posts with V_me_old slots, and retains comment authority on those posts unless the author explicitly publishes per-pub_x revocations.
+- **Per-post cascade is opt-in by the author.** The author can choose to cascade a V_me rotation onto a specific old post by publishing a `RevocationEntry` for the pub_x's that were sealed under the old V_me. The author knows this mapping locally (see `own_post_slot_provenance` below); the CDN does not. Cascade can be all posts (batch action) or a chosen subset.
+- **Key burn is optional, narrow scope.** For the case where `V_me_old` has *leaked* (not just rotated for turnover), the author may publish a signed header-diff on a specific post that swaps the V_old wrap_slot for a V_new wrap_slot in-place. Same propagation primitive as revocation and access-grant. Scrubs V_old from the CDN copy of that post. Future observers acquiring leaked V_old can no longer fresh-decrypt the body. Locally-cached plaintext on existing readers' devices is unrecoverable by any wire mechanism (out of scope).
+- **`vouch_keys_own` retains multi-epoch rows.** Old `V_me` epochs are never deleted automatically. May be deleted by explicit user action with a prominent warning ("this prevents future re-keys / cascades on any post sealed under this epoch").
 
 ---
 
-## Data model
+## What goes away from the original skeleton
 
-### `PostKeyRotation` record
+The skeleton's `PostKeyRotation` record (with `rotation_index`, `pub_post_index` on comments, time-bucketed signature verification) is removed entirely. Its job is done by:
 
-```rust
-struct PostKeyRotation {
-    post_id:        PostId,
-    rotation_index: u32,                // monotonic; 0 = original keypair (implicit), 1 = first rotation, etc.
-    new_pub_post:   [u8; 32],
-    new_wrap_slots: Vec<WrapSlot>,      // wraps new priv_post under current keyring (same as post creation)
-    superseded_at:  u64,                // ms; rotation timestamp
-    sig:            [u8; 64],           // author identity-key signature over the above
-}
+- Layer 2's `RevocationEntry` for the comment-narrowing case.
+- Standard post-publish + optional `supersedes_post_id` for the re-issue case.
+- In-place wrap_slot swap as a new, optional key-burn diff (below).
+
+What goes away:
+- `PostKeyRotation` record type.
+- `rotation_index` / `pub_post_index` field on comments.
+- Time-bucketed cross-rotation signature verification.
+
+What stays:
+- `RevocationEntry` from Layer 2.
+- Standard post-publish path.
+- `vouch_keys_own` and `vouch_keys_received` from Layer 1, both with multi-epoch retention.
+
+---
+
+## Data model additions
+
+### `own_post_slot_provenance` (local only, never on wire)
+
+The author needs to know which slot in each of their posts was sealed under which V_x, so they can selectively cascade a V_me rotation onto old posts. This is author-local state, not transmitted.
+
+```
+own_post_slot_provenance(
+    author_persona_id     BLOB,
+    post_id               BLOB,
+    slot_index            INTEGER,        -- index into pub_post_set / wrap_slots
+    sealed_under_v_x_owner  BLOB,          -- which persona issued the V_x used (== author_persona_id for the author's own V_me slots)
+    sealed_under_v_x_epoch  INTEGER,
+    pub_x                 BLOB(32),       -- the pub_x in the post's pub_post_set for this slot
+    PRIMARY KEY (author_persona_id, post_id, slot_index)
+)
 ```
 
-Persisted as a sidecar to the post. TBD — OPUS: whether this lives in its own table (`post_key_rotations`) or as a serialized column on the post.
+Populated at post-publish time. Used at cascade time: `SELECT pub_x FROM own_post_slot_provenance WHERE author_persona_id = ? AND sealed_under_v_x_owner = ? AND sealed_under_v_x_epoch = ?` returns the pub_x list to revoke.
 
-### Comment verification after rotation
-
-Each comment's `group_sig` is verified against a specific `pub_post`. Determination rule:
-
-- If `comment.created_at < rotation_1.superseded_at` → verify against `pub_post_0` (original).
-- If `rotation_n.superseded_at ≤ comment.created_at < rotation_{n+1}.superseded_at` → verify against `rotation_n.new_pub_post`.
-- If `comment.created_at ≥ latest_rotation.superseded_at` → verify against latest `new_pub_post`.
-
-TBD — OPUS: time-based bucketing requires trusting `comment.created_at`. Alternative: comment carries an explicit `pub_post_index` field pointing at which keypair generation it's signed under. Lead leaning: **explicit index field in comment**, avoids clock-skew ambiguity.
-
-### Extend `InlineComment` (from Layer 2)
+### Optional `supersedes_post_id` field on `PostHeader`
 
 ```rust
-struct InlineComment {
+struct PostHeader {
     // ... existing fields ...
-    #[serde(default)]
-    pub_post_index: u32,   // 0 for original keypair, n for rotation n
-    group_sig: ...,
-    vouch_mac: ...,
+
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    supersedes_post_id: Option<PostId>,
 }
 ```
 
----
+Used by the advanced re-issue path. Author identity sig covers it. Readers may display "this is a re-issued version of an earlier post."
 
-## Rotation flow (author side)
+### `KeyBurnDiff` (header-diff type)
 
-1. Author changes FoF-relevant state (new vouch granted, someone un-vouched, `V_me` rotated).
-2. Author decides to re-gate a specific post's comments: UI action "rotate comment keys for this post."
-3. Generate new `(priv_post', pub_post')`.
-4. Re-wrap `priv_post'` under the author's CURRENT keyring (the same algorithm as initial post creation, Layer 3).
-5. Build `PostKeyRotation` record, sign, publish.
-6. Rotation record propagates via normal CDN (it's a diff on the post, same mechanism as engagement diffs).
+```rust
+struct KeyBurnDiff {
+    post_id:           PostId,
+    slot_index:        u32,                  // which slot to swap
+    new_wrap_slot:     WrapSlot,             // sealed under V_x_new (typically author's V_me_new)
+    new_pub_x:         [u8; 32],             // corresponding pub_x for pub_post_set replacement
+    sealed_at_ms:      u64,
+    author_sig:        [u8; 64],             // author identity-key sig over the above + parent_post_id
+}
+```
+
+Propagation: same path as revocation diffs. File-holders apply by replacing `wrap_slots[slot_index]` and `pub_post_set[slot_index]` in their local copy of the post header. Forward to neighbors. Idempotent (re-applying with the same slot_index + same new pub_x is a no-op).
 
 ---
 
-## Reader/commenter side
+## Author UX surfaces
 
-- On receiving a `PostKeyRotation` record, readers store it keyed by `(post_id, rotation_index)`.
-- At comment-creation time: look up the **latest** rotation record for the parent post; trial-decrypt the new slots; if success, use `priv_post'` to sign, set `pub_post_index` to latest index.
-- At comment-verification time: look up the rotation referenced by `comment.pub_post_index`; verify against that `pub_post`.
-
-If a reader can unwrap `rotation_n.wrap_slots` but NOT `rotation_{n+1}.wrap_slots`, they've been rotated out between n and n+1. They can still READ the body (CEK unchanged) and verify historical comments; they cannot author new comments after rotation n+1.
+- **"Remove this commenter from this post"** → `RevocationEntry` for that specific `pub_x`. Standard Layer 2 path.
+- **"Rotate my vouch key"** (Settings) → generates a new `V_me` epoch in `vouch_keys_own`, sets current. Old epoch retained. Then offers: "Issue the new key to your existing vouchees?" → if yes, queues a fresh bio-post batch wrapping V_me_new for all current targets except those marked revoked. Standard Layer 1 mechanism.
+- **"Cascade this rotation onto my old posts"** (offered after a rotation if it was triggered by a revoke action) → batch action that queries `own_post_slot_provenance` for the rotated-out epoch and publishes per-pub_x revocations on each affected post. Costs N RevocationEntries; can be done in background. Optional. Per-post selection allowed.
+- **"Re-issue this post with narrower access"** (advanced) → opens compose with body pre-filled and `supersedes_post_id` set. New audience pickable. Old post optionally deleted on publish.
+- **"Burn this leaked key from a post"** (rare) → publishes a `KeyBurnDiff` swapping the V_me_old slot for a V_me_new slot on a specific post. Offered when the user marks `V_me_old` as leaked. Can be batched across all the author's posts via the provenance table.
 
 ---
 
-## Propagation
+## Cascade decision tree (for the author)
 
-Rotation records are signed post-deltas. They reuse the existing `BlobHeaderDiff` propagation mechanism — the post header gains the rotation's `pub_post` and `wrap_slots`; readers pull updated posts through the normal CDN.
-
-TBD — OPUS: whether rotation records are part of the post's BlobHeader diff (natural fit) or a separate post-referencing record (cleaner separation but more protocol surface).
-
----
-
-## Edge cases
-
-- **Multiple rotations in short succession.** Monotonic index + explicit `pub_post_index` on comments disambiguates. No clock dependency.
-- **Comment authored against stale rotation.** If a commenter creates a comment under rotation n, but by the time it propagates, rotation n+1 exists — the comment is still valid against rotation n. Readers verify against the rotation the comment declares.
-- **Attacker forges rotation.** Rotation is signed by author identity key. Forgery == identity key compromise, which is outside FoF scope.
-- **Reader never sees rotation record but sees new comments.** Until the rotation record arrives, new comments appear "unverified." Filter-out at render leaves them as pending until rotation arrives. Standard eventually-consistent behavior.
+| Scenario | Default action | Optional escalation |
+|---|---|---|
+| Vouchee unfollowed, casual cleanup | Rotate V_me. Old posts grandfathered. | None. |
+| Vouchee misbehaving on one specific post | Layer 2 revocation on that post's `pub_x`. | None. |
+| Vouchee misbehaving across many posts | Rotate V_me. Cascade revocations onto every post they ever had access to. | Optional follow-up: key-burn if their continued read access is unacceptable. |
+| V_me_old leaked | Rotate V_me. Cascade revocations onto all affected posts. | Key-burn V_me_old slots on every affected post. |
 
 ---
 
 ## Open questions
 
-- **Rotation on `V_me` rotation.** When a persona rotates their own `V_me`, do we auto-rotate every one of their open FoFClosed posts? Cost is O(posts × eligible_keys). Lead leaning: **no auto-rotation**; user opts in per-post. Posts without rotation continue to accept comments from the old keyring (which still holds the old `V_me`).
-- **Garbage-collecting old rotation records.** They're needed to verify historical comments. Never GC'd? Or keep only most recent N? Lead leaning: keep all; historical comments don't re-verify often and the data is cheap.
-- **UI for rotation.** "Update who can comment" button on post. Simple. No scheduling / batch rotation UI in v1.
-- **Rotation without keyring change.** Could be used to kick out a specific commenter by rotating and manually excluding their winning `V_x`. But winning `V_x` isn't known to the author (wrap slots are anonymous). Practical effect: authors can widen or narrow the whole set, not surgically exclude one person, without additional support.
+- **Bio-post batch contents during rotation.** Default: wrap only the new V_me epoch in the next batch. Advanced UI option: wrap multiple epochs for vouchees who lost their device and need to re-bootstrap. Lead leaning: default to new-only; advanced toggle for multi-epoch.
+- **`supersedes_post_id` binding strength.** The post-header `author_sig` already covers the field. Sufficient, or do we want a reciprocal "this post has been superseded" diff on the old post for symmetric discoverability? Lead leaning: one-way link is sufficient; old post being deleted or not is independent.
+- **Key-burn vs. body re-encryption.** Key-burn swaps wrap_slots but keeps the body ciphertext (still encrypted under the same CEK). A reader who unwrapped via V_me_old still has CEK cached locally; their local plaintext copy is unaffected. Key-burn only prevents *fresh* decryption of the wire ciphertext. Is that sufficient, or should key-burn also imply CEK rotation? CEK rotation = re-encrypting the body = essentially full re-issue. Lead leaning: key-burn does NOT rotate CEK; it's specifically the "scrub V_old from headers" primitive. Full re-issue remains available if CEK rotation is wanted.
+- **`own_post_slot_provenance` export.** Lost on device wipe means the author can't cascade-revoke after a fresh install. Lead leaning: include in identity export bundle.
+- **Garbage-collecting `vouch_keys_own` ancient epochs.** Never auto-GC. User-explicit only, with warning.
 
 ---
 
 ## Ship criteria for Layer 4
 
-- `PostKeyRotation` record type exists end-to-end.
-- Author UI action: "Update who can comment on this post."
-- Rotation records propagate via CDN.
-- Comment signing uses latest rotation's `priv_post`; `pub_post_index` attached.
-- Comment verification routes to the correct `pub_post` via index.
-- Back-compat: posts without rotation records are handled as `pub_post_index = 0` uniformly.
-- Integration test: A posts FoFClosed. B comments (admitted). A vouches for C, rotates. C comments (admitted). Old B-comment still verifies; new B-comment still verifies (B still in keyring); new D-comment (never admitted) rejected.
+- `vouch_keys_own` retains multi-epoch rows without auto-deletion on rotation.
+- `vouch_keys_received` retains multi-epoch rows; trial-unwrap iterates the chain per voucher.
+- `own_post_slot_provenance` table populated at every post-publish.
+- Author UI: "Rotate my vouch key" with optional follow-up "Issue to existing vouchees."
+- Author UI: "Cascade revocations onto my old posts" as a post-rotation action.
+- Author UI: "Re-issue this post with narrower access" (advanced).
+- Author UI: "Burn leaked key" as a rare/explicit action.
+- `KeyBurnDiff` propagation: same path as revocation diffs; idempotent application.
+- `supersedes_post_id` field on `PostHeader` is wire-defined and back-compat (default None).
+- No `PostKeyRotation` record exists.
+- Integration test: A vouches for B and C. A posts FoF post P sealed under V_a (and other V_x's). B and C read + comment. A rotates V_a → V_a' to remove C; issues V_a' to B only. C still holds V_a; A's new posts (sealed only under V_a') invisible to C, visible to B. C can still read P (V_a-sealed slot still in P's wrap_slots); A optionally cascades a revocation on P that removes C's pub_x and deletes C's comments on P. A optionally key-burns V_a from P, swapping the V_a slot for a V_a' slot — C can no longer fresh-decrypt P from the wire (already-cached plaintext on C's device unaffected, out of scope).

docs/fof-spec/layer-5-prefilter-and-cache.md

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ This layer is load-bearing, not optional. Without it, a modest keyring × slot m
 
 - **Cache the winning `(persona, V_x)` per author.** First time persona `P` decrypts an FoFClosed post from author `A` using `V_x`, remember the tuple. Next post from `A`: try that `(P, V_x)` first. Author almost always re-wraps under the same set.
 - **Track unreadable posts.** If no key currently held unwraps a post, insert into `vouch_unreadable_posts` for later retry. Clearing this set is cheap and necessary — a newly-received `V_x` potentially unlocks an arbitrary number of old posts.
-- **Author-direct fast path.** If `post.author` is one of the reader's persona IDs, the reader is the author and holds `priv_post` implicitly (author-local cache of per-post keypairs). No wrap-slot iteration needed.
+- **Author-direct fast path.** If `post.author` is one of the reader's persona IDs, the reader is the author and holds the post's CEK + every `priv_x` directly from creation (author-local cache, keyed by `post_id`). No wrap-slot iteration needed.
 - **Prefilter tag precompute per-post, not per-feed-fetch.** At ingest time (once per post received), compute the reader's full set of `HMAC(V_x, post_id)[:2B]` tags and note which slots have matching prefilter values. Cache that index. Avoids recomputing HMACs on every re-render.
 
 ---
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ TBD — OPUS: whether this table is worth it. Alternative: keep `wrap_slots` as
 
 On incoming FoFClosed post from author `A`:
 
-1. **Author-direct check**: Is `A` in reader's list of personas? If yes → reader authored it; pull `priv_post` from local author cache. Done.
+1. **Author-direct check**: Is `A` in reader's list of personas? If yes → reader authored it; pull CEK (and any needed `priv_x`) from local author cache keyed by `post_id`. Done.
 2. **Cache lookup**: Query `vouch_unlock_cache` for `(any_persona, A)`. For each cached winning `V_x`:
    - Compute `prefilter_tag = HMAC(V_x, post_id)[:2B]`.
    - Find matching slot(s) in post's `wrap_slots`; attempt AEAD-open.

docs/fof-spec/layer-6-revocation.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 # Layer 6 — Revocation & Rotation Cascades
 
-**Status**: Stub. May not be in v1. Drafted for design review only.
+**Status**: **Superseded by [Layer 4](layer-4-keypair-rotation.md) (2026-05-13).** Layer 4 settled the revocation and cascade design: V_me rotation as the persona-wide revocation primitive, receiver-chain storage, grandfather-by-default with author-opt-in per-post cascades, and the optional `KeyBurnDiff` primitive for leaked-V_me scenarios. Nothing in Layer 6 below is load-bearing; this file is retained as a record of the alternatives that were considered before Layer 4 was written.
 
-**Scope**: Mechanism for a persona to un-vouch a specific vouchee without rotating `V_me` (which affects everyone), and for cascading rotations when a down-chain vouchee is un-vouched.
+**Original scope (now resolved by Layer 4)**: Mechanism for a persona to un-vouch a specific vouchee without rotating `V_me` (which affects everyone), and for cascading rotations when a down-chain vouchee is un-vouched.
 
 ---
 

frontend/app.js

@@ -486,11 +486,18 @@ function renderPost(post, index) {
         visBadge = '<span class="vis-badge vis-encrypted-mine">encrypted</span>';
     } else if (post.visibility === 'encrypted') {
         visBadge = '<span class="vis-badge vis-encrypted">encrypted</span>';
+    } else if (post.visibility === 'fof-closed') {
+        visBadge = '<span class="vis-badge vis-encrypted-mine">fof-closed</span>';
     }
 
     let displayContent;
     if (post.visibility === 'encrypted' && !post.decryptedContent) {
         displayContent = '<span class="encrypted-placeholder">(encrypted)</span>';
+    } else if (post.visibility === 'fof-closed' && !post.decryptedContent) {
+        // FoF Layer 3: render as locked placeholder. The frontend fires
+        // an async read_fof_closed_body call after first paint to fill
+        // in the body for FoF readers (see loadFeed below).
+        displayContent = `<span class="encrypted-placeholder" data-fof-closed-pending="${post.id}">(fof-closed — unlocking…)</span>`;
     } else if (post.decryptedContent) {
         displayContent = escapeHtml(post.decryptedContent);
     } else {
@@ -579,6 +586,29 @@ function renderMessage(post, index, showFollowBtn) {
     </div>`;
 }
 
+/// FoF Layer 3: post-render pass — find all "(fof-closed — unlocking…)"
+/// placeholders in the given root and dispatch read_fof_closed_body.
+/// Replaces each placeholder's text with the decrypted body, or with a
+/// "not in this FoF set" notice if the caller can't unlock.
+async function unlockFoFClosedPlaceholders(rootEl) {
+    const placeholders = rootEl.querySelectorAll('[data-fof-closed-pending]');
+    for (const el of placeholders) {
+        const postId = el.dataset.fofClosedPending;
+        try {
+            const body = await invoke('read_fof_closed_body', { postIdHex: postId });
+            if (body) {
+                el.textContent = body;
+                el.classList.remove('encrypted-placeholder');
+            } else {
+                el.textContent = '(fof-closed — not in this FoF set)';
+            }
+        } catch (_) {
+            el.textContent = '(fof-closed — error)';
+        }
+        delete el.dataset.fofClosedPending;
+    }
+}
+
 function renderEmptyState(message, hint) {
     return `<div class="empty-state">
         <div class="empty-state-icon"></div>
@@ -793,6 +823,9 @@ async function loadFeed(force) {
             }
         } else {
             feedList.innerHTML = filterBanner + posts.map(renderPost).join('');
+            // FoF Layer 3: any rendered FoFClosed post enters with a
+            // placeholder body; trigger the async unlock pass to fill in.
+            unlockFoFClosedPlaceholders(feedList);
             if (authorFilterNodeId) {
                 const clearBtn = document.getElementById('clear-author-filter');
                 if (clearBtn) clearBtn.onclick = clearAuthorFilter;
@@ -947,6 +980,7 @@ async function loadMyPosts(force) {
             myPostsList.innerHTML = renderEmptyState('No posts yet', 'Write your first post above!');
         } else {
             myPostsList.innerHTML = mine.map(renderPost).join('');
+            unlockFoFClosedPlaceholders(myPostsList);
             if (_myPostsHasMore) {
                 const sentinel = document.createElement('div');
                 sentinel.id = 'myposts-scroll-sentinel';
@@ -1633,8 +1667,10 @@ async function openBioModal(nodeId, preloadedName) {
         const resolved = await invoke('resolve_display', { nodeIdHex: nodeId }).catch(() => null);
         const follows = await invoke('list_follows').catch(() => []);
         const ignored = await invoke('list_ignored_peers').catch(() => []);
+        const vouches = await invoke('list_vouches_given').catch(() => []);
         const following = follows.some(f => f.nodeId === nodeId);
         const isIgnored = ignored.some(i => i.nodeId === nodeId);
+        const isVouched = vouches.some(v => v.nodeId === nodeId);
         const name = (resolved && resolved.name) || preloadedName || nodeId.slice(0, 12);
         const bio = (resolved && resolved.bio) || '';
         const icon = generateIdenticon(nodeId, 48);
@@ -1654,6 +1690,9 @@ async function openBioModal(nodeId, preloadedName) {
                 ${following
                     ? `<button id="bio-unfollow" class="btn btn-ghost btn-sm">Unfollow</button>`
                     : `<button id="bio-follow" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">Follow</button>`}
+                ${isVouched
+                    ? `<button id="bio-revoke-vouch" class="btn btn-ghost btn-sm">Revoke Vouch</button>`
+                    : `<button id="bio-vouch" class="btn btn-ghost btn-sm">Vouch</button>`}
                 <button id="bio-message" class="btn btn-ghost btn-sm">Message</button>
                 ${isIgnored
                     ? `<button id="bio-unignore" class="btn btn-ghost btn-sm">Unignore</button>`
@@ -1700,6 +1739,27 @@ async function openBioModal(nodeId, preloadedName) {
             try { await invoke('unignore_peer', { nodeIdHex: nodeId }); toast('Unignored'); close(); loadFeed(true); }
             catch (e) { toast('Error: ' + e); }
         };
+        const vouch = document.getElementById('bio-vouch');
+        if (vouch) vouch.onclick = async () => {
+            vouch.disabled = true;
+            try {
+                await invoke('vouch_for_peer', { nodeIdHex: nodeId });
+                toast(`Vouched for ${name}`);
+                close();
+            } catch (e) { toast('Error: ' + e); }
+            finally { vouch.disabled = false; }
+        };
+        const revokeVouch = document.getElementById('bio-revoke-vouch');
+        if (revokeVouch) revokeVouch.onclick = async () => {
+            if (!confirm(`Revoke vouch for ${name}? This rotates your vouch key — they keep access to existing posts but not future ones.`)) return;
+            revokeVouch.disabled = true;
+            try {
+                await invoke('revoke_vouch_for_peer', { nodeIdHex: nodeId });
+                toast('Revoked and rotated');
+                close();
+            } catch (e) { toast('Error: ' + e); }
+            finally { revokeVouch.disabled = false; }
+        };
     } catch (e) {
         bodyEl.innerHTML = `<p class="status-err">Error: ${e}</p>`;
     }
@@ -2603,8 +2663,40 @@ async function doPost() {
             }
         }
 
+        const commentPerm = document.getElementById('comment-perm-select').value;
+        const reactPerm = document.getElementById('react-perm-select').value;
+
         let result;
-        if (selectedFiles.length > 0) {
+        if (commentPerm === 'friends_of_friends') {
+            // FoF Layer 2: body is still public (Mode 2) but the post
+            // carries a fof_gating block built from the author's
+            // keyring. Routed through a dedicated command because the
+            // gating block is signed at publish time (can't be added
+            // via SetPolicy after the fact).
+            if (selectedFiles.length > 0 || params.postingIdHex) {
+                toast('FoF posts with attachments or non-default persona not yet supported.');
+                postBtn.disabled = false;
+                return;
+            }
+            const created = await invoke('create_post_with_fof_comments', {
+                content: params.content,
+            });
+            result = { id: created.postId };
+        } else if (commentPerm === 'fof_closed') {
+            // FoF Layer 3 / Mode 1: body itself encrypted under the
+            // gating CEK. Non-FoF observers see only ciphertext;
+            // FoF readers unlock + decrypt on render via
+            // read_fof_closed_body.
+            if (selectedFiles.length > 0 || params.postingIdHex) {
+                toast('FoFClosed posts with attachments or non-default persona not yet supported.');
+                postBtn.disabled = false;
+                return;
+            }
+            const created = await invoke('create_post_fof_closed', {
+                content: params.content,
+            });
+            result = { id: created.postId };
+        } else if (selectedFiles.length > 0) {
             // Convert ArrayBuffers to base64 strings
             const files = selectedFiles.map(f => {
                 const bytes = new Uint8Array(f.data);
@@ -2618,9 +2710,9 @@ async function doPost() {
             result = await invoke('create_post', params);
         }
 
-        // Set engagement policy if non-default
-        const commentPerm = document.getElementById('comment-perm-select').value;
-        const reactPerm = document.getElementById('react-perm-select').value;
+        // Set engagement policy if non-default (FoF posts also publish
+        // the policy diff so receivers route the comment-receive path
+        // through the FoF four-check verify gate).
         if ((commentPerm !== 'public' || reactPerm !== 'both') && result && result.id) {
             try {
                 await invoke('set_comment_policy', {
@@ -3062,7 +3154,16 @@ document.querySelectorAll('.tab').forEach(tab => {
                 loadMessages(true); loadDmRecipientOptions();
                 clearNotifications('msg-');
             }
-            if (target === 'settings') { loadIdentities(); loadPersonas(); loadRedundancy(); loadPublicVisible(); loadCacheSizeSetting(); loadUpdateSettings(); loadIgnored(); }
+            if (target === 'settings') {
+                loadIdentities(); loadPersonas(); loadRedundancy(); loadPublicVisible();
+                loadCacheSizeSetting(); loadUpdateSettings(); loadIgnored(); loadVouches();
+                // FoF Layer 4: rotate button wires once per settings open.
+                const rotateBtn = document.getElementById('rotate-v-me-btn');
+                if (rotateBtn && !rotateBtn._wired) {
+                    rotateBtn.addEventListener('click', rotateVMe);
+                    rotateBtn._wired = true;
+                }
+            }
         });
     });
 });
@@ -3618,6 +3719,79 @@ async function loadIgnored() {
     }
 }
 
+async function rotateVMe() {
+    const btn = document.getElementById('rotate-v-me-btn');
+    const status = document.getElementById('rotate-v-me-status');
+    if (!btn) return;
+    if (!confirm('Rotate your vouch key? A new key will be issued to all current vouchees via your next bio post. Old posts remain readable to anyone who held the old key — cascade-revoke separately if you want to cut off old-content access.')) return;
+    btn.disabled = true;
+    status.textContent = 'Rotating…';
+    try {
+        const { newEpoch } = await invoke('rotate_v_me');
+        status.textContent = `Rotated → epoch ${newEpoch}`;
+        toast(`Vouch key rotated to epoch ${newEpoch}`);
+        loadVouches();
+    } catch (e) {
+        status.textContent = '';
+        toast('Error: ' + e);
+    } finally {
+        btn.disabled = false;
+    }
+}
+
+async function loadVouches() {
+    const givenEl = document.getElementById('vouches-given-list');
+    const recvEl = document.getElementById('vouches-received-list');
+    if (!givenEl || !recvEl) return;
+    try {
+        const [given, received] = await Promise.all([
+            invoke('list_vouches_given').catch(() => []),
+            invoke('list_vouches_received').catch(() => []),
+        ]);
+        if (!given || given.length === 0) {
+            givenEl.innerHTML = '<p class="empty-hint" style="margin:0">No vouches given.</p>';
+        } else {
+            givenEl.innerHTML = given.map(v => {
+                const label = escapeHtml(v.displayName || v.nodeId.slice(0, 12));
+                const icon = generateIdenticon(v.nodeId, 18);
+                return `<div class="peer-card" data-node-id="${v.nodeId}">
+                    <div class="peer-card-row">${icon} ${label}</div>
+                    <div class="peer-card-actions">
+                        <button class="btn btn-ghost btn-sm revoke-vouch-btn" data-node-id="${v.nodeId}" data-name="${label}">Revoke</button>
+                    </div>
+                </div>`;
+            }).join('');
+            givenEl.querySelectorAll('.revoke-vouch-btn').forEach(btn => {
+                btn.addEventListener('click', async () => {
+                    const name = btn.dataset.name;
+                    if (!confirm(`Revoke vouch for ${name}? This rotates your vouch key — they keep access to existing posts but not future ones.`)) return;
+                    btn.disabled = true;
+                    try {
+                        await invoke('revoke_vouch_for_peer', { nodeIdHex: btn.dataset.nodeId });
+                        toast('Revoked and rotated');
+                        loadVouches();
+                    } catch (e) { toast('Error: ' + e); }
+                    finally { btn.disabled = false; }
+                });
+            });
+        }
+        if (!received || received.length === 0) {
+            recvEl.innerHTML = '<p class="empty-hint" style="margin:0">No vouches received.</p>';
+        } else {
+            recvEl.innerHTML = received.map(v => {
+                const label = escapeHtml(v.displayName || v.nodeId.slice(0, 12));
+                const icon = generateIdenticon(v.nodeId, 18);
+                return `<div class="peer-card" data-node-id="${v.nodeId}">
+                    <div class="peer-card-row">${icon} ${label}</div>
+                    <div class="peer-card-actions empty-hint" style="font-size:0.75rem">epoch ${v.epoch}</div>
+                </div>`;
+            }).join('');
+        }
+    } catch (e) {
+        givenEl.innerHTML = `<p class="status-err">Error: ${e}</p>`;
+    }
+}
+
 // --- Release announcement / upgrade banner ---
 async function loadUpgradeBanner() {
     const banner = document.getElementById('upgrade-banner');

frontend/index.html

@@ -104,6 +104,8 @@
               <select id="comment-perm-select" title="Comment permission">
                 <option value="public">Comments: All</option>
                 <option value="followers_only">Comments: Followers</option>
+                <option value="friends_of_friends">Comments: Friends of Friends</option>
+                <option value="fof_closed">Body+Comments: FoF only (Mode 1)</option>
                 <option value="none">Comments: Off</option>
               </select>
               <select id="react-perm-select" title="React permission">
@@ -198,6 +200,26 @@
         <div id="ignored-list" style="text-align:left"></div>
       </div>
 
+      <div class="section-card" style="text-align:center">
+        <h3 style="margin-bottom:0.25rem">Vouches</h3>
+        <p class="empty-hint" style="margin-bottom:0.5rem">Vouches you've given let those friends read your Friend-of-Friend posts. Vouches you've received unlock the posts of those who vouched for you. Revoking rotates your vouch key &mdash; the revoked friend keeps access to your existing posts, but not future ones.</p>
+        <div style="display:flex;gap:1rem;text-align:left">
+          <div style="flex:1;min-width:0">
+            <h4 style="margin:0 0 0.4rem;font-size:0.9rem">Given</h4>
+            <div id="vouches-given-list"></div>
+          </div>
+          <div style="flex:1;min-width:0">
+            <h4 style="margin:0 0 0.4rem;font-size:0.9rem">Received</h4>
+            <div id="vouches-received-list"></div>
+          </div>
+        </div>
+        <div style="margin-top:0.75rem;padding-top:0.75rem;border-top:1px solid var(--border)">
+          <p class="empty-hint" style="margin-bottom:0.4rem">Rotate your vouch key (V_me) to issue a fresh key to all your current vouchees. Old posts remain readable by anyone who held the old key &mdash; use "Cascade revoke" afterward to actively cut off comment access to your old posts.</p>
+          <button id="rotate-v-me-btn" class="btn btn-ghost btn-sm">Rotate my vouch key</button>
+          <span id="rotate-v-me-status" class="empty-hint" style="margin-left:0.5rem;font-size:0.8rem"></span>
+        </div>
+      </div>
+
       <div class="section-card" style="text-align:center">
         <h3 style="margin-bottom:0.25rem">Updates</h3>
         <p class="empty-hint" style="margin-bottom:0.5rem">Network-wide release announcements are signed by the bootstrap anchor and arrive via the CDN. Choose which channel to follow.</p>

sessions.md

@@ -6,6 +6,187 @@ See `CONTRIBUTING.md` for the protocol. See `AGENTS.md` for the Claude-specific
 
 ---
 
+## 2026-04-24 — primary Claude (Lead) — `docs/fof-spec-layer1-bio-grants`
+
+**Started**: April 24 UTC
+**Instance**: Scott's primary Claude (Lead)
+**Issue**: none (spec refinement)
+**Branch**: `docs/fof-spec-layer1-bio-grants`
+**Scope**: Fold Scott + Opus's Layer 1 design answer into the spec. Vouch distribution moves from DM-wrapped `VouchGrant` to HPKE-sealed per-recipient wrappers carried in the voucher's bio post, leveraging existing bio-post CDN propagation and HPKE (RFC 9180) key privacy for recipient anonymity.
+
+**Key design commitments added to Layer 1**:
+- HPKE RFC 9180 (DHKEM X25519 + HKDF-SHA256 + ChaCha20Poly1305) for per-recipient wrappers; one ephemeral pubkey per batch; 48B per wrapper.
+- HKDF `info = "itsgoin/vouch-grant/v1/" || bio_post_id` — recipient-free (non-negotiable for key privacy).
+- No prefilter tag on grants (no prior shared secret); full X25519 trial at ~60µs per wrapper per persona is tolerable (≤90ms even at 512×3 worst case).
+- Scan policy: auto-scan bio posts of followed personas; manual "check bio" gesture for non-followed; scan cache keyed by `(scanner_persona, bio_author, bio_epoch)`.
+- Bucket-padding (64/128/256/512) and per-publish wrapper shuffle for size/position opacity.
+- No separate `vouches_issued` table on the wire; bio post IS the authoritative record. Local-only `own_vouch_targets` tracks what the persona has granted.
+- Incremental grant-as-comment path (Scott's suggestion for avoiding full republish) deferred; v1 ships with full republish per change.
+
+**Completed**:
+- Rewrote `docs/fof-spec/layer-1-vouch-primitive.md` end-to-end.
+- README updated: Layer 1 scope line + added bio-post integration bullet.
+- Self-merged to master.
+
+**Pending**:
+- Opus confirmation passes still open on other layers (WrapSlot byte layout, AEAD choice for body, padding schemes).
+- Layer 2–6 untouched in this pass.
+
+**Stopping point**: Scott asked to hold merges until Layers 2–6 iterations complete. Branch stays open locally and on Forgejo; continuing to stack commits on it.
+
+### Update 2026-04-24 — Layer 2 rewrite (CDN-level verification)
+
+**Scope**: Scott shared Opus's Layer 2 design answer. Folded in.
+
+**Design commitments added**:
+- **Per-`V_x` signing keypair `(pub_x, priv_x)`** — replaces single per-post `pub_post/priv_post`. CDN can now verify comment signatures against a published `pub_post_set` before forwarding, killing the bandwidth-amplification DoS an admitted FoF member could otherwise mount.
+- **Dual-derivation wrap slot**: `read_slot → CEK`, `sign_slot → priv_x`. One unwrap yields both capabilities. Slot structure is shared with Layer 3 (canonical form lives here).
+- **Comment body encrypted under `CEK_comments = HKDF(CEK, "comments")`** — Mode 2 comments are genuinely FoF-read-gated now, not just FoF-sign-filtered at render (strengthening vs skeleton).
+- **Propagation-node four-check accept rule**: valid `pub_x_index`, not in `revocation_list`, `group_sig` verifies, `identity_sig` verifies. Any fail → drop without forwarding.
+- **Author-signed revocation diff** appended to post header; CDN honors on next sync. Per-chain revocation at propagation layer.
+- **`pub_x_index` is a per-post pseudonym** — leaks "these N comments came through the same chain" within a single post; re-randomizes across posts. Accepted tradeoff for CDN-level DoS resistance.
+- **v1 ships Ed25519 inline** (~77KB header at 500 vouchees). **PQ future** requires Merkle-commit over `pub_post_set` with per-comment inclusion proofs; deferred but spec shape doesn't preclude.
+
+**Files touched**:
+- `docs/fof-spec/layer-2-mode2-fof-comments.md` — rewritten end-to-end.
+- `docs/fof-spec/layer-3-mode1-fof-closed.md` — prominent "partially superseded" banner added; body retained pending reconciliation when Scott + Opus review Layer 3.
+- `docs/fof-spec/README.md` — glossary updated (`pub_x`/`priv_x`, `pub_post_set`, `revocation_list`); integration bullet updated for new `InlineComment` fields + CDN accept rule.
+
+**Open questions I raised back to Scott** (awaiting his answer before finalizing):
+1. `(pub_x, priv_x)` lifecycle: generated at `V_x` genesis (Layer 1) and stable across posts, vs regenerated per-post by author. Lead leaning per-post. Needs confirmation.
+2. `pub_post_set` padding vs `wrap_slots` padding — real/dummy alignment when dummies shouldn't be indexable by `pub_x_index`.
+3. Non-FoF rendering of comment count (reveal engagement? suppress?).
+4. Who holds `priv_me` (author) — generated alongside `V_me` at Layer 1, vs per-post regeneration. Same as #1 but for author's own entry.
+
+**Pending**:
+- Scott reviews / answers open questions.
+- Layer 3 reconciliation when Scott + Opus get to Mode 1.
+- Layers 4–6 iterations.
+
+**Stopping point**: commit `b8b38a6` (Layer 1) + new commit for Layer 2 both on branch; not merged. Awaiting Scott.
+
+### Update 2026-05-13 — design.html FoF section (20a) added
+
+Added a new section `20a. Friend-of-Friend Visibility` to `website/design.html`, sitting between Encryption (20) and Delete Propagation (21). Marked all subsections `badge-planned`. Layer table at the bottom shows ship status per layer.
+
+**Key writing decisions**:
+- Up-front disambiguation note: this section's "vouch" is the cryptographic V_me primitive, distinct from the directory-vouch system in section 27. Symmetric disambiguation note added to section 27 pointing the other direction.
+- User-facing 4-level model (Public / Friends-only / FoF / Custom-v2) leads. Crypto primitives follow.
+- Mode 1 vs Mode 2 split called out via `card` divs.
+- CDN-level verification highlighted as the propagation-DoS resistance story.
+- Revocation lifecycle: three `card` blocks — per-post default, V_me rotation, opt-in cascade + key-burn.
+- PQ-readiness explicitly addressed (symmetric primitives PQ-safe; Ed25519 → ML-DSA-65 swap path noted).
+- Cross-ref to `docs/fof-spec/` for implementation detail.
+
+**Tables updated**:
+- Visibility variants table (in section 20) now has a `FoFClosed` row with overhead + bucketed-audience note.
+- New layer-status table at the bottom of section 20a shows the five ship-able layers.
+
+**Other touched**:
+- TOC entry added (`20a. Friend-of-Friend Visibility`).
+- `reference_design_index.md` auto-updated by the design-index hook on save.
+- Section 27 (Directory) got a reciprocal disambiguation note pointing at section 20a.
+
+**Files in this commit**:
+- `website/design.html`
+- `sessions.md` (this entry)
+
+Branch state: still `docs/fof-spec-layer1-bio-grants`, still unmerged. Implementation can now begin from a coherent public design + internal spec.
+
+### Update 2026-05-13 — Layer 4 written (rotation + revocation + key lifecycle)
+
+Iterative session with Scott. Recap of where the model landed:
+
+**Rotation/revocation model (now in spec)**:
+- Default narrowing of comment authority on a post = Layer 2 revocation (existing mechanism). No new wire primitive.
+- Advanced narrowing of read access = full re-issue with `supersedes_post_id` link. Discouraged due to network overhead.
+- `V_me` rotation = the persona-wide revocation primitive. Generate new V_me, distribute via next bio-post batch to non-revoked vouchees only. Revoked person retains old V_me.
+- Receiver-chain model: receiver appends new V_me to `vouch_keys_received` (does NOT overwrite). Trial-unwrap iterates the chain. UX-wise the "current" key is the newest; older epochs are archived but kept for historical decrypts.
+- **Grandfather-by-default**: CDN is V_me-blind, so rotation does NOT auto-cascade comment deletion. Revoked vouchee keeps comment authority on old posts unless the author opts to cascade per-pub_x revocations.
+- **Per-post cascade is opt-in**: author can query a local `own_post_slot_provenance` table to find pub_x's sealed under V_me_old in any of their posts, then publish per-pub_x RevocationEntries to cascade.
+- **Key-burn primitive (new, optional)**: signed `KeyBurnDiff` swaps an old wrap_slot for a new one in-place on a specific post. Used when V_me leaked and the author wants to scrub it from the CDN copy of old posts. Body CEK unchanged; affects future fresh-decrypts only.
+
+**Cryptographic stack confirmed (Scott reconfirmed)**:
+- Body encryption: symmetric ChaCha20-Poly1305 under CEK. PQ-safe.
+- Wrap_slots: AEAD under V_x. PQ-safe.
+- Comment signing: **asymmetric Ed25519** (per-V_x per-post `(pub_x, priv_x)`). NOT PQ-safe; ML-DSA-65 migration deferred. Scott confirmed the asymmetric-for-signing tradeoff is intentional — it's what makes CDN-level bandwidth-DoS filtering work.
+
+**Files touched in this round**:
+- `docs/fof-spec/layer-4-keypair-rotation.md`: full rewrite from skeleton.
+- `docs/fof-spec/layer-1-vouch-primitive.md`: rotation language updated to point at Layer 4's append-only model; multi-epoch UI hook added.
+
+**Branch state**: `docs/fof-spec-layer1-bio-grants` (despite the name, holds all Layer 1–4 spec work). Commit pending. Not merged per Scott's standing instruction.
+
+**Pending**:
+- Layer 5 (unlock cache + prefilter): existing skeleton text still reflects single per-post keypair model. Needs reconciliation with per-V_x model from Layer 2.
+- Layer 3 (Mode 1): partially-superseded banner still present. Needs Scott/Opus reconciliation pass.
+- Layer 6 (revocation): stub still. Largely obviated by Layer 4 work.
+
+### Update 2026-04-24 — Layer 3 round 2 (last two open questions)
+
+Two follow-up questions resolved:
+
+- **Access-grant slot ordering**: **append at tail** (not re-shuffle). I'd initially overcorrected to a "switch comments from index to pub_x bytes so shuffles are free" change; Scott reverted that and clarified the choice. Append-at-tail preserves `pub_x_index` stability across the post's lifetime — already-stored comments stay verifiable, no write amplification on grant. Accepted positional-recency leak (tail = newest grants).
+- **Minimum slot bucket**: **8**. Singleton/tiny-set posts pad up to 8 slots. Brand-new personas don't publish "I have no vouchees" headers.
+
+**Files touched**:
+- `docs/fof-spec/layer-2-mode2-fof-comments.md`: access-grant lead decision made explicit about append-at-tail and index stability.
+- `docs/fof-spec/layer-3-mode1-fof-closed.md`: minimum-8 floor added to padding lead decision; both open questions moved to Resolved.
+- `sessions.md`: this entry.
+
+### Update 2026-04-24 — Layer 3 round 1 + cross-cutting padding rule (corrected)
+
+Scott talked to Opus and resolved Layer 3 open questions + introduced a unified padding rule that supersedes Layer 2 round 2's `rand(32..=128)`.
+
+**First-pass misread (corrected by Scott):** I initially wrote the rule as "power-of-2 up to 256, then `real + rand(0..=256)` above." That's wrong — the rule is **bucketed throughout**, not random above the threshold.
+
+**Bucketed padding rule (applies to both slot count and body size)**:
+- ≤256 real units → next power-of-2 bucket (8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256).
+- >256 real units → next linear-step bucket: +128 step for slots (384, 512, 640, …), +256KB step for body bytes (512KB, 768KB, 1024KB, …).
+- Deterministic. Author publishes `next_bucket(real)`; dummies fill the gap.
+
+Why this is stronger than random: observers learn the bucket but never the position within it. Across multiple posts from the same author, the bucket is stable until the author crosses a boundary — so no "min over many posts" attack converges tighter than the bucket bound. Random padding would have leaked `min(observed) - max_noise` as a floor.
+
+Linear-step above 256 vs pure power-of-2: avoids the 2× waste of jumping 256→512 for an author with 257 vouchees. Above 256, step buckets are 128 (slots) or 256KB (body) so worst-case in-bucket overhead is bounded (~33% at the worst spot).
+
+Applies uniformly to slot count and body size.
+
+**Other resolved Layer 3 questions**:
+- Custom mode UI deferred. v1 ships three presets only: Public / Friends-only / FoF.
+- Slot dedup at `V_x` byte level. One slot per unique key.
+- Body-length padding adopted.
+
+**Files touched**:
+- `docs/fof-spec/layer-3-mode1-fof-closed.md`: Lead decisions updated (hybrid padding, dedup, three-preset UI); open questions split into still-open + Resolved; ship criteria updated.
+- `docs/fof-spec/layer-2-mode2-fof-comments.md`: padding rule promoted to hybrid scheme; size budget rewritten with three regime examples; privacy section rewritten for two-regime analysis; Resolved bullet superseded with pointer.
+- `sessions.md`: this entry.
+
+**Still-open Layer 3 questions worth flagging to Scott**:
+1. Access-grant ordering — does appending a new slot re-shuffle the full `wrap_slots` / `pub_post_set` (preserves the random-order privacy property but invalidates `pub_x_index` values in already-stored comments), or is it append-only (`pub_x_index` is stable but tail-positional leak says "these are recent grants")? Lead leaning: **append-only**; index stability matters for revocation and stored-comment verification.
+2. Minimum slot-count floor for tiny authors. Power-of-2-of-1 = 1, which leaks "this persona has one vouch (probably just themselves)." Lead leaning: minimum bucket of 8.
+
+**Pending**: Layers 4–6 iterations. Scott to confirm two flagged questions.
+
+### Update 2026-04-24 — Layer 2 round 2 (Scott answers all 5 questions)
+
+Scott resolved all five open questions:
+
+1. **Per-post `(pub_x, priv_x)`** — confirmed.
+2. **Random-count dummy padding** (`rand(32..=128)`) replaces power-of-2 buckets, with dummy pubkeys in `pub_post_set` so `.len() == wrap_slots.len()`. Across multiple posts from the same author, an observer cannot even establish a reliable floor for the real vouch-set size.
+3. **Non-FoF comment UX**: "Comments are private" affordance with optional "Request access via DM" button. No count leak.
+4. **Author's own entry in `pub_post_set`** — confirmed.
+5. **Revocation is retroactive delete + forward.** File-holders delete locally-stored comments signed by the revoked `pub_x`, then propagate the diff. Stronger than stop-forwarding — prior garbage is cleaned up as the diff sweeps the mesh.
+
+**New primitive**: **access-grant author comment**. Author can retroactively widen a post's read-set by publishing an author-signed special comment appending a new `WrapSlot` + `pub_post_set` entry. Lets a newly-vouched persona gain read + comment access without republishing the whole post. Answers the "non-FoF requests access via DM, author approves" UX loop.
+
+**Files touched**:
+- `docs/fof-spec/layer-2-mode2-fof-comments.md` — updated Lead decisions, post-header, revocation flow (retroactive), added Access-grant author comment section, updated Privacy tradeoff (size-leak analysis with random padding), Open questions split into unresolved + Resolved, size budget, ship criteria.
+- `sessions.md` — this entry.
+
+Commit pending.
+
+---
+
 ## 2026-04-23 — primary Claude (Lead) — `docs/fof-spec-skeleton`
 
 **Started**: late April 23 UTC

website/design.html

@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
                 <a href="#erasure-cdn">18b. Erasure-Coded CDN Replication</a>
                 <a href="#sync">19. Sync Protocol</a>
                 <a href="#encryption">20. Encryption</a>
+                <a href="#fof">20a. Friend-of-Friend Visibility</a>
                 <a href="#deletes">21. Delete Propagation</a>
                 <a href="#privacy">22. Social Graph Privacy</a>
                 <a href="#multidevice">23. Multi-Device Identity</a>
@@ -1304,6 +1305,7 @@ END</code></pre>
                 <tr><td><code>Public</code></td><td>None</td><td>Unlimited</td></tr>
                 <tr><td><code>Encrypted { recipients }</code></td><td>~60 bytes per recipient</td><td>~500 (256KB cap)</td></tr>
                 <tr><td><code>GroupEncrypted { group_id, epoch, wrapped_cek }</code></td><td>~100 bytes total</td><td>Unlimited (one CEK wrap for the group)</td></tr>
+                <tr><td><code>FoFClosed { pub_post_set, wrap_slots }</code> <span class="badge badge-planned">Planned</span></td><td>~154 bytes per admitted V_x, padded</td><td>Bucketed (8/16/32/64/128/256, then +128 steps)</td></tr>
             </table>
 
             <h3>PostId integrity</h3>
@@ -1350,6 +1352,105 @@ END</code></pre>
             <p>Different profile versions per circle, encrypted with the circle/group key. A peer sees the profile version for the most-privileged circle they belong to. <code>CircleProfileUpdate</code> (<code>0xB4</code>) wire message. Public profiles can be hidden (<code>public_visible=false</code> strips display_name/bio).</p>
         </section>
 
+        <!-- 20a. Friend-of-Friend Visibility -->
+        <section id="fof">
+            <h2>20a. Friend-of-Friend Visibility <span class="badge badge-planned">Planned</span></h2>
+
+            <div class="note">
+                <strong>Distinct from directory vouches.</strong> The "FoF vouch" described here is a <em>cryptographic</em> primitive for post readership and comment gating (per-persona symmetric key <code>V_me</code>). It is unrelated to the <em>directory vouch</em> system in <a href="#directory">section 27</a>, which governs discovery-layer trust and bot-ring resistance. The two share vocabulary but operate at different layers.
+            </div>
+
+            <h3>The problem</h3>
+            <p>Existing visibility variants gate by explicit recipient lists (<code>Encrypted{recipients}</code>) or named-circle membership (<code>GroupEncrypted</code>). Neither expresses "people who are reachable through my social graph" without leaking the graph itself. FoF visibility fills that gap: posts whose readership emerges from <em>cryptographic reachability</em> through a unilateral vouch graph, with no recipient IDs on the wire and no centrally-computed membership lists.</p>
+
+            <h3>User-facing model</h3>
+            <p>Authors pick one of four visibility levels at compose time:</p>
+            <table>
+                <tr><th>Level</th><th>Reaches</th></tr>
+                <tr><td><strong>Public</strong></td><td>All readers (unchanged)</td></tr>
+                <tr><td><strong>Friends-only</strong></td><td>Personas you have vouched for</td></tr>
+                <tr><td><strong>Friends-of-Friends</strong></td><td>Your vouchees + every vouchee of anyone who vouched for you (emergent FoF)</td></tr>
+                <tr><td><strong>Custom</strong> <span class="badge badge-planned">v2</span></td><td>Author-selected subset of held vouch keys</td></tr>
+            </table>
+
+            <h3>Core primitives</h3>
+            <ul style="padding-left: 1.25rem; margin: 0.5rem 0; color: var(--text-muted);">
+                <li><strong><code>V_me</code></strong>: a 32-byte symmetric key owned by each persona. Distributed to everyone the persona vouches for. Anyone holding <code>V_alice</code> can decrypt wrap slots Alice sealed under it.</li>
+                <li><strong>Keyring</strong>: per-persona, holds the persona's own <code>V_me</code> plus every <code>V_x</code> received from vouchers. The union of these is what makes FoF reach emergent: an author wraps a post slot under every <code>V_x</code> they hold, and any reader whose keyring intersects with that set can decrypt.</li>
+                <li><strong>Wrap slot</strong>: an anonymous AEAD ciphertext in the post header, sealed under one <code>V_x</code>. Carries the post's CEK plus a per-slot signing key. No recipient ID visible on the wire.</li>
+                <li><strong>Prefilter tag</strong>: a 2-byte <code>HMAC(V_x, post_id)[:2B]</code> on each slot. Readers precompute tags for keys in their keyring and skip non-matching slots, cutting trial-decrypt cost ~65,000&times; per post.</li>
+                <li><strong><code>pub_post_set</code></strong>: list of all admitted signing pubkeys for a post's FoF set. Inline in the post header, randomly ordered. Allows CDN-level verification of comment signatures without revealing membership identities.</li>
+            </ul>
+
+            <h3>Distribution: vouches ride bio posts</h3>
+            <p>Vouches are NOT delivered via DM. Instead, the voucher publishes anonymous HPKE-sealed wrappers (one per recipient) inside their bio post. HPKE (RFC 9180) provides <strong>recipient anonymity</strong> &mdash; wrapper ciphertext reveals nothing about the recipient's pubkey. Each wrapper is 48&nbsp;bytes (32-byte sealed <code>V_me</code> + 16-byte AEAD tag); one shared ephemeral pubkey per batch.</p>
+            <p>Readers auto-scan bio posts of accounts they follow, trial-decrypting each wrapper against each of their personas. Cost is ~60&micro;s per wrapper per persona on mobile &mdash; a 200-wrapper bio scanned against 3 personas is ~36&nbsp;ms. The bio's <code>VouchGrantBatch</code> is padded with dummy wrappers and shuffled on every publish so observers see neither vouch-set size nor change-targets.</p>
+
+            <h3>Two modes</h3>
+            <div class="card">
+                <h3>Mode 2: Public body, FoF-gated comments</h3>
+                <p>Body is plaintext in the CDN (indexable, cacheable, shardable &mdash; unchanged from existing public-post path). Comments are encrypted under a CEK derived from the wrap-slot CEK, so only FoF members can read them. Non-FoF observers see only ciphertext + signature fields. The compose UI exposes this via a new <code>CommentPolicy::FriendsOfFriends</code> variant.</p>
+            </div>
+
+            <div class="card">
+                <h3>Mode 1: <code>FoFClosed</code> (body + comments encrypted)</h3>
+                <p>New <code>PostVisibility::FoFClosed</code> variant. Body is encrypted under CEK (same wrap-slot mechanism as comments). Both readership and comment authority emerge from keyring intersection with the post's <code>wrap_slots</code>.</p>
+            </div>
+
+            <h3>CDN-level comment verification</h3>
+            <p>Each wrap slot is dual-derived: one half yields the shared CEK (read capability), the other yields a per-V_x Ed25519 <em>signing</em> keypair (<code>priv_x</code> sealed inside the slot; the corresponding <code>pub_x</code> published in the post's <code>pub_post_set</code>). Comments declare which <code>pub_x</code> signed them and carry the signature.</p>
+            <p>Propagation nodes verify three things before forwarding a comment:</p>
+            <ol style="padding-left: 1.25rem; margin: 0.5rem 0; color: var(--text-muted);">
+                <li><code>pub_x_index</code> points to a valid entry in <code>pub_post_set</code>.</li>
+                <li>That entry is not in the post's <code>revocation_list</code>.</li>
+                <li>The comment's <code>group_sig</code> validates against that <code>pub_x</code>.</li>
+            </ol>
+            <p>Any failure &rarr; drop, do not forward. This kills the bandwidth-amplification attack that a single admitted-but-malicious FoF member could otherwise mount: their forgeries cannot pass the propagation gate.</p>
+
+            <h3>Privacy properties</h3>
+            <ul style="padding-left: 1.25rem; margin: 0.5rem 0; color: var(--text-muted);">
+                <li><strong>Unilateral</strong>: vouching is a one-way act, no handshake. The FoF graph forms without bilateral negotiation.</li>
+                <li><strong>Graph-private</strong>: wrap slots carry no recipient IDs. Observers cannot enumerate who can read a post.</li>
+                <li><strong>Bucketed padding</strong>: slot count and body size are deterministically padded to fixed buckets (power-of-2 up to 256, then +128 steps for slots; same shape up to 256&nbsp;KB then +256&nbsp;KB steps for bodies). Observers learn the bucket, not the position within it.</li>
+                <li><strong>Recipient anonymity on vouch distribution</strong>: HPKE key privacy ensures bio-post wrappers do not reveal recipients.</li>
+                <li><strong>Per-post chain pseudonym</strong> (accepted tradeoff): the <code>pub_x_index</code> in a comment lets observers correlate "these N comments came through the same chain" within a single post. Cross-post correlation is broken because keys regenerate per post.</li>
+            </ul>
+
+            <h3>Revocation &amp; key lifecycle</h3>
+            <p>Three complementary mechanisms:</p>
+            <div class="card">
+                <h3>Per-post comment revocation (default)</h3>
+                <p>The author signs a <code>RevocationEntry</code> for a specific <code>pub_x</code> on a specific post. Propagation nodes <strong>delete</strong> locally-stored comments by that signer, remove the entry from <code>pub_post_set</code>, append to <code>revocation_list</code>, and forward the diff. Retroactive: the mesh self-cleans as the diff sweeps through.</p>
+            </div>
+            <div class="card">
+                <h3>Persona-wide <code>V_me</code> rotation</h3>
+                <p>To remove a vouchee, the persona generates <code>V_me_new</code> and issues it to every non-revoked vouchee via the next bio-post batch. Revoked vouchees retain <code>V_me_old</code>. Old posts (sealed under <code>V_me_old</code>) stay readable by anyone who holds the old key &mdash; <strong>grandfathered by default</strong>. The CDN does not auto-cascade revocations.</p>
+                <p>Receivers append new <code>V_me</code> values to their keyring (chain), so newly-issued keys do not invalidate prior ones &mdash; the receiver keeps holding the old key for reading historical content.</p>
+            </div>
+            <div class="card">
+                <h3>Opt-in cascade + key burn (advanced)</h3>
+                <p>If the author wants to cut off comment authority on old posts after a rotation, they cascade by publishing per-<code>pub_x</code> revocations on each affected post. Local-only <code>own_post_slot_provenance</code> table maps "which pub_x was sealed under which V_me" so the author can target precisely.</p>
+                <p>For the rare case of a leaked <code>V_me</code>, an optional <code>KeyBurnDiff</code> primitive swaps the V_old wrap slot for a V_new wrap slot in-place on a specific post. Scrubs the leaked key from the CDN copy of old posts. Body CEK unchanged.</p>
+            </div>
+
+            <h3>Performance budget</h3>
+            <p>At realistic scale (~500 vouchees, ~500 wrap slots per post), reader-side decryption uses an unlock cache: the first time persona <code>P</code> decrypts a post from author <code>A</code> via key <code>V_x</code>, the <code>(P, V_x)</code> tuple is cached. Subsequent posts from <code>A</code> try that key first &mdash; one HMAC + one AEAD attempt in the hot path. Full scan only on cache miss; newly-received <code>V_x</code> triggers a retry sweep over the unreadable-posts table.</p>
+
+            <h3>Post-quantum readiness</h3>
+            <p>Body encryption, wrap slots, and HKDF/HMAC are all symmetric &mdash; PQ-safe. Comment signing uses Ed25519 today; the spec shape is algorithm-agnostic so ML-DSA-65 (~2&nbsp;KB pubkey, ~3.3&nbsp;KB signature) can substitute, optionally with a Merkle-commit variant on <code>pub_post_set</code> to keep header size bounded.</p>
+
+            <h3>Implementation</h3>
+            <p>Full crypto-level byte layouts, data models, wire-format additions, ship criteria, and integration tests are specified in <code>docs/fof-spec/</code>. The implementation is layered for bottom-up shipping:</p>
+            <table>
+                <tr><th>Layer</th><th>Scope</th><th>Status</th></tr>
+                <tr><td>1</td><td>Vouch primitive (V_x keys, keyring, bio-post HPKE wrappers, scan policy)</td><td><span class="badge badge-planned">Planned</span></td></tr>
+                <tr><td>2</td><td>Mode 2: public posts with FoF-gated comments, CDN-level verification</td><td><span class="badge badge-planned">Planned</span></td></tr>
+                <tr><td>3</td><td>Mode 1: <code>FoFClosed</code> body + wrap slots + anonymous prefilter</td><td><span class="badge badge-planned">Planned</span></td></tr>
+                <tr><td>4</td><td>Rotation, revocation, key lifecycle (grandfather + cascade + key-burn)</td><td><span class="badge badge-planned">Planned</span></td></tr>
+                <tr><td>5</td><td>Unlock cache + prefilter optimization (perf-critical at scale)</td><td><span class="badge badge-planned">Planned</span></td></tr>
+            </table>
+        </section>
+
         <!-- 21. Delete Propagation -->
         <section id="deletes">
             <h2>21. Delete Propagation</h2>
@@ -1578,6 +1679,10 @@ END</code></pre>
                 <p><em>The directory is an opt-in convenience layer for discovery and creator protection. It is not node access &mdash; losing directory presence does not disconnect anyone from the network or from their existing connections. This asymmetry is load-bearing: humans with mature relationships shrug off directory loss; bots and content thieves depend on it entirely.</em></p>
             </div>
 
+            <div class="note">
+                <strong>Distinct from FoF cryptographic vouches.</strong> The "vouch" described in this section is a <em>directory-layer</em> trust signal governing discovery and bot-ring resistance. It is unrelated to the <em>cryptographic vouch</em> (<code>V_me</code>) in <a href="#fof">section 20a</a>, which gates post readership and commenting via per-persona symmetric keys. The two share vocabulary but operate at different layers.
+            </div>
+
             <h3>Scope</h3>
             <ul style="padding-left: 1.25rem; margin: 0.5rem 0; color: var(--text-muted);">
                 <li><strong>Whitelist track</strong> &mdash; discoverability, vouch-based entry, graph-scoped visibility.</li>

website/download.html

@@ -46,6 +46,41 @@
                 <p style="margin: 0.5rem 0 0 0; font-size: 0.8rem; color: var(--text-muted);">v0.5.3 is kept online only as an upgrade bridge &mdash; it no longer connects to the live network.</p>
             </div>
 
+            <h2 style="margin-top: 2rem;">v0.7.0 &mdash; May 15, 2026</h2>
+            <p style="color: var(--text-muted); font-size: 0.85rem;">Friend-of-Friend gating is live. Posts can be public to readers but FoF-gated for comments (Mode 2), or fully FoF-gated for body + comments (Mode 1, <code>FoFClosed</code>). The CDN verifies comment signatures before propagating, killing the bandwidth-DoS attack a single admitted FoF member could otherwise mount. Vouches distribute via HPKE-sealed wrappers in your bio post &mdash; no DMs, no recipient IDs on the wire.</p>
+
+            <div class="downloads">
+                <a href="itsgoin-0.7.0.apk" class="download-btn btn-android">
+                    Android APK
+                    <span class="sub">v0.7.0</span>
+                </a>
+                <a href="itsgoin_0.7.0_amd64.AppImage" class="download-btn btn-linux">
+                    Linux AppImage
+                    <span class="sub">v0.7.0</span>
+                </a>
+                <a href="itsgoin-cli-0.7.0-linux-amd64" class="download-btn btn-linux">
+                    Linux CLI / Anchor
+                    <span class="sub">v0.7.0</span>
+                </a>
+                <a href="itsgoin-0.7.0-windows-x64-setup.exe" class="download-btn btn-windows">
+                    Windows Installer
+                    <span class="sub">v0.7.0</span>
+                </a>
+            </div>
+
+            <ul style="color: var(--text-muted); font-size: 0.85rem; line-height: 1.6; margin-top: 1rem;">
+                <li><strong>Vouch primitive (V_me).</strong> Every persona owns a 32B symmetric key issued to vouchees via HPKE-sealed anonymous wrappers in the voucher's bio post. Receivers auto-scan followed bios; the keyring is per-persona.</li>
+                <li><strong>Mode 2: public posts, FoF-gated comments.</strong> Body indexable and CDN-shardable like any public post; comments encrypted under a per-post CEK only FoF members can unwrap. Non-FoF observers see only ciphertext.</li>
+                <li><strong>Mode 1: <code>FoFClosed</code> posts.</strong> Body itself encrypted under the FoF gating. Non-members propagate the ciphertext but cannot read it.</li>
+                <li><strong>CDN-level comment verification.</strong> Per-V_x signing keypair + propagation-node four-check accept rule. Any admitted FoF member who tries to flood junk gets dropped at first hop &mdash; not just at the author's render-time filter.</li>
+                <li><strong>Bucketed padding.</strong> Wrap-slot count and body size pad to power-of-2 buckets (up to 256 / 256KB) then linear steps above. Observer learns the bucket, never the real count.</li>
+                <li><strong>Revocation + access-grant.</strong> Author can per-post revoke a chain (cascade-deletes stored comments by that signer); or post-hoc grant access to a newly-vouched persona without republishing.</li>
+                <li><strong>V_me rotation, cascade, key-burn.</strong> Pure rotation grandfathers old content. Optional cascade revokes that chain across all the author's old posts. Key-burn swaps a single slot in-place for leaked-key scenarios.</li>
+                <li><strong>Unlock cache + retry sweep.</strong> First successful unlock from an author is cached; later posts hot-path to a single AEAD attempt. Posts no held V_x unlocks queue up; sweep on new V_x arrival.</li>
+                <li><strong>Pre-deploy hardening.</strong> Receive-path FoF wire-shape validation, queue-size caps, key-burn replay rejection (monotonic timestamps).</li>
+            </ul>
+            <p style="color: var(--text-muted); font-size: 0.85rem;">v0.7.0 is a wire-additive release: new <code>PostVisibility::FoFClosed</code> variant, new <code>BlobHeaderDiffOp::FoF{Revocation,AccessGrant,KeyBurn}</code>, new fields on <code>InlineComment</code> and <code>ProfilePostContent</code>. Old clients don't understand FoF gating; upgrade for FoF features. See <a href="design.html#fof">design.html section 20a</a> for the full architecture.</p>
+
             <h2 style="margin-top: 2rem;">v0.6.2 &mdash; April 23, 2026</h2>
             <p style="color: var(--text-muted); font-size: 0.85rem;">Every remaining persona-signed direct push is off the wire. Deletes, visibility changes, profile updates, and group-key distribution now travel as encrypted / signed posts through the CDN. Groups are a first-class primitive. Plus two pre-release fixes &mdash; an admin-forgery check on group keys and a cap on concurrent port-scan hole punches that explains the 10 Mbps upload storm some users saw on VPNs.</p>
 
@@ -68,19 +103,7 @@
                 </a>
             </div>
 
-            <ul style="color: var(--text-muted); font-size: 0.85rem; line-height: 1.6; margin-top: 1rem;">
-                <li><strong>Deletes + visibility changes travel as signed control posts</strong> through the CDN. The <code>DeleteRecord</code> / <code>VisibilityUpdate</code> direct pushes are gone.</li>
-                <li><strong>Profile display data (name, bio, avatar) travels as a persona-signed profile post.</strong> Peer-visible names are back &mdash; but bound to the posting identity, not the network endpoint.</li>
-                <li><strong>Rich comments</strong> &mdash; a comment can reference a separate post for long bodies or attachments; inline preview is signed alongside the reference.</li>
-                <li><strong>Groups as a primitive</strong> &mdash; many-way posting anchored at a public root post. Circles remain one-way (admin-only).</li>
-                <li><strong>Group keys distribute as encrypted posts</strong> &mdash; the <code>GroupKeyDistribute</code> wire message is gone.</li>
-                <li><strong>Audience removed.</strong> Simpler social graph; anyone-can-send model via follows.</li>
-                <li><strong>PostPush / PostNotification wire messages retired</strong> &mdash; all content propagates via CDN.</li>
-                <li><strong>Port-scan hole punches are now capped at 1 concurrent</strong> &mdash; fixes sustained multi-Mbps upload on obfuscated VPNs after anchor connect.</li>
-                <li><strong>Outgoing-connect dedup</strong> &mdash; auto-reconnect, rebalance, and relay-introduction no longer race to the same peer.</li>
-                <li><strong>Security fix: group-key distribution verifies the claimed admin matches the post author</strong>, preventing a pollution attack where a peer who knows your posting id could overwrite your stored group key.</li>
-            </ul>
-            <p style="color: var(--text-muted); font-size: 0.85rem;">v0.6.2 is a wire-breaking fork from v0.6.1 (the retired message types are not optional). Upgrade both ends.</p>
+            <p style="color: var(--text-muted); font-size: 0.85rem;">v0.6.2 was the last release before FoF gating. v0.7.0 is wire-additive; v0.6.2 clients won't understand FoF posts but otherwise interop.</p>
 
             <h2 style="margin-top: 2rem;">v0.6.1 &mdash; April 22, 2026</h2>
             <p style="color: var(--text-muted); font-size: 0.85rem;">Network identity is now fully separated from posting identity on every install. Plus: Android auto-backup disabled by default, Reset actually resets, import preserves your personas, and display name is optional.</p>